Francisco Liriano will absolutely get a few Cy Young votes, but Felix Hernandez, Trevor Cahill, and CC Sabathia are all likely to outpace him, so it looks like it will be an award-less year for the Twins.

Unless.

The last time a Twin won rookie of the year was some 15 years ago when Marty Cordova won the title for the 1995 Twins—then promptly taught fans what “plantar fasciitis” was and what it could do to even a talented player. They’ve had plenty of talented players since then, but Mauer was hurt his rookie year, Liriano was as well, and the rest had to grow into their skills. Could 2010 be the year they get their first since the 21^st century began?

Their hopes rest on Danny Valencia, a 19^th round pick out of the University of Miami, who made his debut on June 3, but didn’t see consistent action until the middle of July. It took injuries to the entire Twins infield—Morneau, Orlando Hudson, Alexi Casilla, and Nick Punto have all had at least one DL stint sometime between July 1 and the middle of August, while JJ Hardy missed substantial time due to a lingering wrist injury—to get Valencia the playing time he needed to make an impact.

Valencia became an everyday player on July 24, going 3-for-5 against the Orioles in game one of a four game stretch that saw him go 14-for-19 including a grand slam off Zack Greinke. Going into Wednesday night’s game against the Tigers, Valencia is hitting .338/.373/.496 since he forced his way into Ron Gardenhire’s day-to-day lineup and .328/.373/.446 overall since his call-up.

His defense, too, has been impressive as Valencia has made few rookie mistakes at third base and has amassed a solid UZR, albeit in too few innings to call it a full sample. Assuming he continues to play solid defense—something he did in the minors as well—he’ll finish 2010 among the best defenders in the majors at 3B (though behind Nick Punto…whatever that means).

Valencia wouldn’t crack the top five in the National League, not with Buster Posey, Jason Heyward, Steven Strasburg, Starlin Castro, and Gabby Sanchez locking down a tight race, but the AL race is much more open. And the lack of a truly obvious choice is what gives Valencia hope.

He already boasts the fourth highest VORP (value over replacement player) among rookies in the AL, despite having the second fewest plate appearances. Carlos Santana currently ranks third, but it seems unlikely that he’ll garner enough votes—stellar though he was while he played—because of his season ending injury, which leaves Valencia with two real competitors ahead of him and one serious threat behind him.

Brennan Boesch is Valencia’s nearest competitor, and if he had maintained his performance from the first half over the course of a full season, he’d be running away with this race.

His first-half line of .342/.397/.593 was a product of some combination of moderate skill, being an unknown commodity, and a whole bunch of luck. His .384 BABIP (batting average on balls in play) was ripe for regression, but who knew it would be so…stark. His BABIP in the second half fell to .191 as part of an overall drop in production that left him with a line of .153/.220/.227 and severely crippled his chances of winning the ROY. Nevertheless, his solid production isn’t going away and voters may still look favorably upon his contribution at the time when the Tigers’ injury woes were near their worst.

Rays catcher John Jaso is something of a dark horse in this race, as he wasn’t even listed among the Rays top 15 prospects heading into the season. Still, as the starting catcher for a team likely headed for a playoff berth and a possible AL East title, Jaso has earned the publicity he’s receiving. He’s hitting .280/.388/.396, which shows you his greatest strength as well as his biggest weakness.

Jaso’s plate discipline is outstanding; he’s walked some 47 times while striking out just 32 times in over 320 PAs, but he has just 21 extra-base hits over that same period. Jaso has the extra advantage of being a catcher, voters do love a catcher that hits well, but his OPS of 783 isn’t much above average (733) despite the fact that his OBP of .388 is vastly superior to the league average of .327.

While it’s possible that Jaso could win the award because of his position and increased visibility, it seems unlikely to me. He might have done enough to earn it in a down year, but voters have shown that they consider power an integral part of the equation when voting for any award and that’s not Jaso’s strong suit.

The front-runner here is another Tiger rookie, he of the .417 BABIP, Austin Jackson. While he may not have made fans forget about Curtis Granderson, he’s given them enough highlight reel material to make them hopeful for the future. Ultimately, it’s Jackson’s award to lose at this point. His defense has been better than expected and he’s been an offensive machine at the top of the Tigers’ lineup. He strikes out way too much, an AL best 138 going into play Wednesday, but that’s about the only bad thing you can say about the center fielder.

Jackson has had luck on his side—see his aforementioned BABIP—but his skill is no joke. His .304/.357/.406 line with 21 steals isn’t the product of a single hot month, or even one good half. Jackson started the year with a .364/.422/.495 in the months of March and April and while he’s cooled off just a little from there, he’s been a consistent hitter and a solid fielder for a Detroit team that has needed consistent production as their lineup has been in flux to say the least.

If the voting happened now, Jackson runs away with the award and you’d be hard pressed to say he didn’t deserve it, but Valencia has a chance to sway some voters because of the Twins battle in the AL Central.

Valencia doesn’t really have a chance to steal this award. The only way he’ll be the first Twin this millennium to win the ROY is if he continues to hit near .330, play stellar defense, and flash a little power. If he does that, he’ll deserve the award on his own merits, given that his performance will be on par with Jackson, albeit in fewer games. Like Jaso, simply being a key piece of a winning team won’t be enough to push Valencia over the edge, but with the AL Central looking like it will be a race worth watching deep into September, Valencia will get a chance to woo voters who might have missed his earlier exploits.

About the only good thing that Los Angeles could say about Matsui was that he was playing every day (health was a big concern in his signing) and Godzilla looked just as much like a menacing, slightly hung-over bulldog in an Angels uniform as he did in Yankee pinstripes. Then Matsui went on a tear, hitting .298/.388/.567 in 121 PAs since July 18, including 7 HR and 24 RBI, to drag his average into respectable territory.

If Matsui finishes 2010 hitting .262/.345/.438, it would be still his worst season ever in the first two slash categories—BA and OBP—and his third-worst in SLG, an eyelash behind his rookie year .435 and well short of 2008’s .424. It says a lot that we’re comparing his power in 2010 to either his first year in the majors or a season when his knees were so bad that he missed a month and had to undergo offseason surgery afterwards. No matter how you slice it, it’s been a disappointing season for Matsui, unless he can keep up his current torrid pace.

Why is Matsu’s production is? Since he hit started 2010 by hitting .273/.350/.477, you can’t even write 2010 off to the “Older players warm up slowly” argument. It also doesn’t seem to be luck. His .293 BABIP is a bit below his .303 career average, indicating a touch of bad luck, but he had last year’s line (see his Rotolympus card above) with a BABIP of just .273.

Furthermore, his 12.4% HR/FB is near his 13.2% average, while his 42.3% flyball rate is above his 36.8% career rate—yet it’s in line with his FB rates every year since 2006, leaving out that knee-weakened 2008. Overall, his other hitting trajectories look consistent with his approach in the recent past.

But he has definitely suffered from strikeouts in 2010. His 21.8% whiff rate is well above his career 15.3% and seems to be part of a three-year rise, from 10.1% in 2008 to 16.4% in ‘09. Digging deeper, his lack of contact seems to come from an odd reversal, as his 72.8% contact rate on pitches outside the zone is better than it’s ever been, while his 88.8% contact rate on pitches inside the zone would be his second-worst ever. Because his 22.6% swing rate on pitches outside the zone are also a career high, it looks like he’s going fishing too much; those, too, are part of a sharp uptick in that department since 2007.

That notion of going fishing is supported by the fact that only 44.9% of all pitches he sees are strikes, indicating that pitchers are offering him plenty of bait. And why shouldn’t they? His protection this year in the batting order has mostly been Juan Rivera, who’s hitting a career-worst .249/.301/.403—though Kendry Morales also protected him, and he flailed then, too. More likely, they’re recognizing his tendency to swing at balls outside the zone and exploiting it, perhaps luring him off the plate before finishing him off with a swift strike down the middle.

And if anyone’s dangling bait in front of Godzilla, it’s probably a southpaw. The real soft spot in Matsui’s game this year has been his lefty splits. Never strongly biased against them in his career (.290/.376/.486 vs. RHP, .284/.348/.458 vs. LHP), Matsui is hitting .203/.240/.398 off of fellow southpaws, but handling righties at a more typical level of .285/.383/.454.

He’s lost SLG against both flavors of pitchers, but that diminished BA and OBP against lefties come from his 28% strikeout rate against them,  far and away his most futile performance ever, well above both 2006’s 18.9% and his career 17.2% rates. His 4.8% walk rate against LHP is also the lowest ever for him, so he’s clearly not seeing them well.

Matsui’s 19.0% K% rate against RHP is lower than his usual 14.4%, but the differential is not nearly as shocking; his 13.6% walk rate off of them is actually among the best in his career. So it doesn’t seem to be fading overall skills for the 36-year-old Godzilla; his vision seems to be fuzzier only against lefties.

And they, evidently aware of this hole in Matsui’s game, are feeding him more and more pitches outside the zone, waiting for him to fan himself. If the Angels are going to recoup any part of their investment in him—or if Matsui hopes to approach his $6M payday from Los Angeles when he hits free agency this offseason—they’ll need to improve his vision against lefties or sink him into a platoon. With the AL West pretty much out of reach and September callups arriving, I’m betting on the latter.

Already having engaged in a prolonged battle with Miami-Dade County over who should pay for their new stadium that is scheduled to open in 2012, the released documents show that the team had more money to pay for the new stadium than they publicly suggested, at least according to a recent column by Jeff Passan at Yahoo! Sports.

In that article Passan wrote that Marlins team President David Samson said that he expects the season ticket holder base to expand from the roughly 5,000 it is not to anywhere from 15,000 to 20,000.  As blatantly unrealistic as that may be, it is optimism like that which is required for a person in his position in order to justify the public expense of a new stadium.

The arguments touted out over and over again by Major League Baseball for why certain teams need new stadiums are familiar to many by now: x team needs a stadium to compete; building a new stadium will create x new jobs for the community; new stadiums have been a success in other places and there’s no reason to believe it would not succeed in this new place.  Oh, and we can always find a new market for your team if you disagree.

However, the storyline for new stadiums is not quite the same anymore as it was ten years ago when new stadiums were all the rage.  To be sure, all teams that have built new stadiums have seen financial success, if not necessarily matching success on the field.  Yet the attendance numbers are not the same anymore for the more recent new stadiums than they were for the first wave of stadiums.

While all teams with new stadiums strive for the success seen in Cleveland from 1995 to 2001 when the Indians had 455 consecutive sellouts, that kind of continued attendance success in new stadiums has not been seen since.  The first table below shows the average yearly attendance at all stadiums opened from 1992 to 2004 and their average yearly attendance for its first five years of existence (stadiums opened after 2004 are excluded as they do not yet been open for five years).  On the whole it’s clear that attendance has stayed fairly consistent for the few years following the opening of new stadiums.

However those attendance numbers are almost solely due to the six stadiums that opened from 1992 to 1999:

Consequently the stadiums that have opened from 2000 to 2004 saw much less attendance success:

While these overall numbers are likely greater than the number of tickets team sold in their old stadiums, they show that more recent stadiums have not been able to keep up with the first generation of sparkly stadiums in Baltimore, Cleveland, and elsewhere.  The third year drop is especially alarming.  Furthermore, the attendance dip can not be attributed to a poor economy as these numbers are only through 2008, before Major League Baseball saw a dramatic drop in overall attendance.

For the Marlins to somehow expect to break the trend of an initial fascination with a new stadium followed by an inevitable drop off in the number of fans going to games is beyond most people, save for perhaps a few County Commissioners in Miami-Dade County.  The recent financial leaks are one reason why the stadium should not have been built; the more recent history of teams with new stadiums is another.

It’s hard to defend Howard’s emotional outbursts in a critical game that cost the Phillies their top RBI man and first baseman and thrust pitcher Roy Oswalt into left field, the clean-up spot in the lineup, and Phillies’ history but then again, it’s hard to see how anything Howard did warranted an ejection in the 2nd inning, let alone the 14th inning of a tie game where both teams’ benches were depleted.

But Scott Barry thought otherwise. Like a skilled hunter, Barry baited his prey early in the at-bat. After Howard put his hands on his hips — frustrated by an accurate Barry call on a check swing — the umpire mocked Howard by placing his hands on his hips and staring down the Phillies’ first baseman. The stare down continued as the at-bat continued. Four pitches later, Howard checked his swing again (this time not going around) and Barry rung him up. In disgust, Howard threw his bat down the line and began walking to first. From roughly 120 feet away, Barry sent the Phillies’ slugger to the showers with an uncalled-for ejection.

The facts of the events — preserved at MLB.com — will surely get blown out of proportion. Some will have Howard throwing his bat and helmet (the helmet launched after the ejection). Others will have the first baseman furiously charging Barry who fled toward the left field foul pole (again, it happened… but after the ejection). During the incident, the Houston Astros radio announcers described how Howard pushed umpire Sam Holbrook as he tried to make his way to Barry (actually, it was Holbrook who pushed Howard as the first baseman was restrained by Placido Polanco and Sam Perlozzo as Holbrook jumped in front of Ryan and decided it was his place to put his hands on a player even though such an action by a player would be a slam dunk suspension and fine).

The ejection launched Tuesday’s Astros-Phillies game into surreal status as Roy Oswalt was sent in to play left field and Barry, an umpire, was sent to the top of Philadelphia’s Twitter Trending list. The Phillies went on to lose. Coincidentally, Oswalt — in Howard’s spot in the lineup — made the final out representing the winning run.

Sadly, the story is an umpire. And not even a Major League one (Barry is a AAA call-up).

Even more unnerving is the fact that Barry has thrust himself into the spotlight before. Last week, Barry ejected Nationals’ third baseman Ryan Zimmerman for throwing his bat after striking out during the 8th inning of yet another 2-2 game with playoff implications (the Braves were the opponents and eventual winners of the game).

Barry’s Zimmerman ejection — the first of Ryan’s life — was even less defensible. Sent to the showers without a word or negative action toward the umpire, Barry decided to put the spotlight on himself rather than the game with a substantially unnecessary ejection of the team’s best player in a game that could have an impact on who plays in the postseason and who doesn’t.

In both cases, the games were likely to end the same way — with the Braves winning in the 9th over the lowly Nationals and the Astros finally scoring a run to break the extra-inning stalemate with the offensively dormant Phillies — but now there’s the “what if” that looms. In either case, the odds that anyone of the 45,000-plus that showed up in Philadelphia or 18,000-plus on hand in Atlanta paid to watch Scott Barry throw out a guy named Ryan are slim to none.

Unfortunately, for those who paid to watch a baseball game with the best Major League talent both sides had to offer, a minor league umpire stole the spotlight for a minute with his unnecessary impact on the game.

1. Shane Victorino isn’t someone usually associated with Asian-American talent, despite the “Flyin’ Hawaiian” moniker. But like many Hawaiians, he’s got Asian roots; he’s half Filipino, so we’ll take him. (This process can feel like Dave Chapelle’s “Racial Draft” skit sometimes).

I’m assuming that the starting centerfielder for the World Series winning Phillies needs no further introduction, though this year has been a downer for him. He got off to a bit of a slow start, then missed time this month with an oblique strain after an unusually impatient July (2% BB vs. 7.1% career). So his numbers are down overall, as you can see from the Rotolympus card above.

Still, he’s nearly equaled last year’s 25 swipes, and his BB% and K% are both trending in the right direction over the past three seasons. He’s hit .324/.361/.471 since coming off the DL, and a strong finish could put him at, or near, the standard he’s set for himself.

2. Victorino had better keep going strong, or Kurt Suzuki might overtake him. Kurt Klutch, as he was known at CS-Fullerton, was known more for his defense than his bat, but last year’s solid line raised fantasy eyebrows and settled him into the middle of the Oakland batting order. Suzuki, whose paternal grandparents are from Japan, came roaring out of the spring training gates in 2010, hitting .254/.343/.508 before a strained intracostal (that’s a rib for those of you who haven’t been watching your CSI reruns) landed him on the DL.

It took him the rest of the month, hitting .222/.288/.259, before he got back to speed. A July slump has carried over into August, but there’s plenty of time to recover to last year’s numbers by the end of the season. Though he’s not an elite catcher, either to fantasy players or in MLB, he was still worth $16.25M for the next four years to the A’s, who inked him to the new deal  Monday. As one of the few backstops in the league to hit cleanup, Suzuki will keep the heat on Victorino atop this list, and could vault past him.

3. My editor at The Asian Reporter asked me about Travis Ishikawa earlier this season, and I scoffed at the first baseman. “His bat never developed, so he’s mostly there for his glove,” I said. “Not a starting caliber guy—San Francisco really needs to upgrade to a guy with some pop in his bat.” I missed the mark a bit in that assessment.

Ishikawa has been a pleasant surprise for the surprising Giants in 2010, settling into a platoon role and driving the ball more than he ever has. His strikeout rate has plummeted, dropping from 28.4% in 2008 to 27.3% in 2009, to 19.7% this season. His more aggressive approach is reflected by his diminished walk rate, which is also down from 8.7% in ‘08 to 8.3% in ‘09 and 6.7% in 2010.

His 27% line drive rate shows that he’s not getting Texas Leaguers, and his .333 BABIP is consistent with last year’s .330, so this might be him finally settling into a starting role, or at least the bigger half of a platoon. He may not be quite this hot at the end of the year, and has already logged his lowest OPS of the season in August, but he may have already cemented that one good season that helps him stick around for a while.

4. Samoan-American Matt Tuiasosopo is a real rarity in the sports world, as Samoans are more often found on a gridiron than a diamond. The brother of former college quarterback Marques, Matt gave up football for a baseball mitt, but injury and some dude named Adrian Beltre has held him back.

He’s back up in the bigs this year, but is more likely to slide into a utility role than a starting spot, since he’s never flashed much power (.407 career minor-league SLG) or speed (33 SBs in 623 minor-league games) and those are key to a infield gig, especially when you’ve got a 26% strikeout rate in the minors.

5. Darwin Barney comes from my neck of the woods, and I got to interview him after Oregon State won its second straight College World Series—he’s really a great guy. The Beavers made him a co-captain, and he was a critical part of their repeat victory. Once again, I was bearish on his future, and figured he wouldn’t get to the bigs until 2011 or 12.

The emergence of Starlin Castro seemed to seal that fate, until Chicago’s NL Central pratfall led to the Great Chicago Fire Sale, and both Mike Fontenot and Ryan Theriot left town. Barney was promoted to the Cubs the day after the Fontenot trade, although he’s been used largely as a late-inning defensive replacement.

In the minors, Barney rode an 87% contact rate to a career .285 BA, though his .088 ISO means he probably won’t be their second baseman of the future. But he’s in the big leagues at 24, and has the kind of clubhouse demeanor to stick around for a long time, even if it’s not always as a regular.

I submit for your approval the case of one Tim Lincecum. The reigning 2-time NL Cy Young winner has endured an awful stretch of starts, especially by his standards. He is in the midst of the longest losing streak of his career, and all three of his true outcome rates are trending in the wrong direction. The fastball has lost its ferocious heat and bite, and Lincecum has struggled to command his arsenal.

The situation was so bad that Lincecum started to tinker with his mechanics. Timmy has been unable to generate his trademark momentum and stride, and he fell out of his intrinsic rhythm and timing signature. The result was a total loss of consistency, particularly in the August 10 start against the Cubs and the critical August 15 game versus los Padres. The timing issues were also responsible for sapping Lincecum of his velocity, as the misfiring of hips and shoulders had tarnished his separation.

The Giants’ brass had all eyes on Lincecum yesterday at Busch Stadium, to see if he could regain his form against the wild card foes from St. Louis.

–

SF vs. STL, August 21, 2010

In the 1^st inning, the incomparable Mike Krukow was discussing some of the mechanical elements that pitching coach Dave Righetti has worked on with Lincecum. In the time since his last start, Lincecum had worked on improving his balance from the beginning of the delivery, to eliminate the lean that had worked its way into his motion.

The results were immediately apparent, with better balance than Lincecum has shown in a long time. The ripple effect was improved posture at release point, which has been a weakness for Timmy in the past. It only took a couple of batters to see that the momentum was stronger than in his previous couple of outings, though not at his usual elite level.

Lincecum lined up the delivery well on a number of pitches, and was finding more of Buster Posey’s glove than in his previous starts. The velo was up, though not all the way back, hitting 93-94 on the stadium gun during his first trip through the order. Lincecum was all smiles in the dugout after the 3^rd, pleased by the results on the mound as well as the scoreboard. His line contained no hits, no runs, one walk, and one strikeout.  

Randy Winn led off the 4^th inning with a homerun off of a fastball that caught way too much plate. Lincecum rebounded to take down the formidable middle of the Cardinals’ lineup despite some rough offerings to Albert Pujols, Matt Holliday, and John Jay. At this point Lincecum began to show his frustration on the mound, and was obviously thinking about his mechanics.

The real damage came in the 5^th, as Lincecum’s timing fell apart and he failed to locate his pitches. The Cameron Frye clone was clearly distraught when his third pitch to Yadier Molina sailed high, pacing around the mound and checking the status of his launching pad next to the rubber.

He ended up walking the youngest Molina brother on five pitches, and followed that up with a first-pitch fastball that missed Posey’s outside setup and ended up belt-high on the inner half to Pedro Feliz. Feliz pulled the pitch down the 3^rd base line, and Pat Burrell misplayed the carom into a triple. The first pitch to Brendan Ryan was a sharp breaking ball low and away, but the young shortstop lunged at the outside pitch and pulled it to left for an RBI double, quickly bringing the score to 3-0.

A different pitcher showed up for the middle innings, and Lincecum looked fatigued after about 60 pitches. His balance was off along with his stride, and the timing issues flared back up. The right-hander topped 92mph just once after the 3^rd, and he was visibly annoyed with his delivery as he continued to miss Posey’s targets. The laboring Lincecum was yanked in the 6^th with one out and two on, after just 91 pitches, and with the Giants trailing by four runs.

What started as great posture got steadily worse throughout the game. This has been a career-long trend for Lincecum; the spine tilt becomes more exaggerated as he gets tired during the outing. In the past it has been apparent when Timmy became fatigued, simply by watching his balance and posture on a pitch-by-pitch basis.

–

The Wisdom of Os

With Lincecum battling through his funk, fellow 5’11” right-hander Roy Oswalt recently offered some sage advice. The newest member of the formidable Phillie rotation stressed the importance of conditioning, an aspect of pitching that often goes overlooked. The implication was that Lincecum could greatly benefit by taking a long look at his commitment to preparation.

What really caught my eye about the story was not the advice itself, but rather the source. Mechanically, Roy Oswalt is probably the closest comp in the major leagues to Lincecum’s “Freak” delivery. Both pitchers absolutely explode out of the setup position, generating crazy momentum to more than compensate for any disadvantage in height and wingspan. This requires tremendous lower body strength, which Oswalt made a point to address in terms of conditioning.

Physical maintenance forms the foundation for mechanics, timing, and stamina. Lincecum’s issues with postural stabilization and consistency of timing are directly linked to his conditioning, and the high level of athleticism it requires to reap full advantage of his mechanics.

Oswalt credits Roger Clemens for instilling the competitive drive to never get outworked by an opposing pitcher. Nolan Ryan also had a similar mantra when it came to preparation for competition at the highest level.

 Mechanical efficiency is supported by functional strength and flexibility. Athletes rely more heavily on physical conditioning as they get older and the body slides further from its peak ability to recover. Players of slight build face an even greater challenge. Lincecum would be wise to follow the words of his predecessors, and consider an adjustment to his off-season priorities.

During a recent telecast of an A’s game one of the broadcasters remarked that in trying to explain the vast different between their day and night game winning percentages Bob Geren was quoted as saying that he thinks the A’s may play better in the day because they’re a younger team.  Younger players, he thought, may be better suited to be ready to physically perform after playing a game the previous evening.

On the surface it makes at least some sense.  The daily grind of a season is hard enough on players’ bodies and, especially later in the season, asking them to play again 12 hours or so after the previous is asking a lot for even the more physically fit.  The A’s are definitely a young team this year and currently have an average batter age of 27.7 years this year, making them the second youngest batting team in the American League behind only Cleveland (27.6 years).

Of course it is not difficult to find counterexamples to this argument, and one only need look at the 2008 Oakland team to find they actually had a worse winning percentage in day games (.434 vs. .481) despite having an average batter age of only 27.2 years, good for third youngest the A.L. that year.  And this year’s Cleveland team, despite their youth has a worse winning percentage in day games as well by 48 points (.372 vs. .420).

How does Geren’s theory hold up when looking a larger number of teams?  I looked at all A.L. teams from 2005 to 2009 (excluding N.L. teams because A.L. teams play a roughly similar number of day games, unlike in the N.L. where the Chicago Cubs and the Central Division play a disproportionate number of day games compared to the rest of the league).  I compared their average batter age according to Baseball Reference (ignoring average pitcher age because starting pitchers have a few days of rest in between starts, making a day/night comparison meaningless) and compared that to the difference between their day/night winning percentages.  A positive difference meant that teams had a better winning percentage during the day.  Therefore if Geren’s theory holds one would expect an inverse relationship between the difference in winning percentage and average batter age.

Graphically speaking here are the results:

As is fairly clear by just eyeballing the graph there appears to be absolutely no relationship between the two.  Contrary to Geren’s theory there are just as many older teams from the recent past with a greater winning percentage in the day than there are younger teams.

Looking at just a few numbers as this graph does certainly does not mean that Geren’s theory has absolutely no merit.  It could very well be that Geren’s 2010 A’s team with its younger players does for whatever reason have a true ability to play better during the day.  More generally speaking this simple graph does not completely disprove his theory as there could be many ways to make such a study more rigorous.  Instead of looking at average age for the entire season one could look at the average age of starting positional players in day games versus night games for all teams.  Of course many more teams could be examined than the 70 that were looked at above (14 American League teams from 2005-2009).  And average pitcher age should not be completely ignored either, though a relationship would be more difficult to identify.

But while there could be many ways to examine this theory with more scrutiny, one would still expect a relationship to show up at least a little bit in the graph above, which essentially looks like a random set of numbers thrown on a graph.

The more likely scenario is that Bob Geren was trying to find an explanation for something that needs no explanation.  In all likelihood the A’s do not have an inherent ability to play better during the day, and the age of players probably doesn’t change that (in)ability either.  Sometimes over the course of the season funny numbers will show up in a team’s stat line that demands an explanation.  But these odd numbers are in all likelihood simply a fluke.  Next year’s A’s team, which will probably be on the young side again, are just as likely to reverse this year’s daytime success as they are to replicate it.

Cameron’s entry instantly brought back memories of the BDD Dream Draft conducted before the 2009 season and the team I selected, mainly because I was pretty sure I had selected the man Cammy identified as his build around player — Ryan Zimmerman — although I knew he wasn’t my first pick (that was Joe Mauer… how’d I do?).

At the time, Zimmerman wasn’t even my secondary or tertiary (those selections were CC Sabathia and Brandon Phillips) but he was coming off of injury and whenever participating in any kind of draft, I always wait a round or two longer to select a guy with any sort of question mark surrounding him because I assume how I value him will not be how others do. In the case of Zimmerman, it worked out.

Here’s what I said about the selection at the time:

The 24-year-old 3B had a decent year despite injury and should only get better if most of the major projections are to be believed. In addition to his solid bat, Zimmerman is definitely no slouch in the field and should be moving into his prime over the next few years. As young as Zimmerman is, I’m not going to sweat last year’s injury and solidify one of my two corner infield needs.

Having later filled my other corner infield slot with Adrian Gonzalez (in the 10th round!!!), things have been looking up for Brian Joseph’s Dream Team. Considering the caliber of baseball minds brought in to participate in the draft (the faux GMs can be reviewed here) and how my team has fared through 1-3/4 seasons of play (here’s a recap of the first year where this writer’s team had accumulated 43.6 WAR — nearly 8 wins more than the next closest GM), the satisfaction level with the BJDT (everything has to have an acronym, right?) has been pretty high.

With the exception of one player.

When I took Travis Snider in the 5th round, I was a little unsure of the pick at the time. So, his struggles over the past 2 seasons have not been surprising. Taking his current age of 22 into consideration and he’s still part of the BJDT for 4 more seasons (the idea was to construct the team focusing on the next 6 years), he’s not the one player that has left me totally dissatisfied.

That player is Nate McLouth. Taken one round after Snider, I remember wanting to add a center fielder. With Grady Sizemore (1st round to Eric Seidman), Josh Hamilton (2nd round to Joe Hamrahi), B.J Upton (2nd round to Cory Schwartz), Cameron Maybin (4th round to Melissa Lockard), Matt Kemp (4th round to Bill Baer), Curtis Granderson (4th round to Michael Street), and Carlos Beltran (5th round to Eric San Inocencio) all gone, center field was no longer just a John Fogerty song playing in my head because baseball season was growing near. It came down to two players and with the 53rd selection in the BDD Dream Draft, Brian Joseph selects:

Nate McLouth, CF, Pittsburgh Pirates

Let me continue to fill up my outfield and lock up CF with this selection. This came down to two players and I may end up selecting the other at some point so I won’t mention him but I settled on Nate McLouth of the Pittsburgh Pirates. McLouth’s speed, power ability to lead off and play center and his age — 27 this year — all made him an attractive choice. McLouth did struggle at times last year but was also fantastic more than he struggled. I know many were critical of the Gold Glove he received and I agree that McLouth didn’t really deserve the award but his defense was at least average and at times better than average.

At the time, McLouth was the “safe” pick in my mind compared to the other player I alluded to in my write-up of my 6th round selection. With McLouth, I thought I was getting a bat with an undervalued glove statistically (his -12.3 fielding runs during his Gold Glove year looked like a fluke). And during the 2009 season, it looked like I was right. While his hitting fell off, McLouth’s glove became respectable in the eyes of UZR although his average performance wasn’t enough to stop the Gold Glove jokes.

This year, on the other hand, has been a disaster. Through yesterday, McLouth is hitting .168/.279/.265 and there isn’t a defensive metric (or pair of eye balls) that considers him even adequate in the field in 2010. His performance earned him a demotion to Gwinnett where he continues to struggle and he left last night’s minor league clash with a shin injury.

Needless to say, from McLouth, to quote the Rolling Stones, I can’t get no satisfaction!

What’s especially troubling is the “other player” I alluded to who was never revealed and never selected in the draft — Michael Bourn.

Looking back over the past 1-3/4 year, Bourn easily ranks among the best center fielders in the game but at the time of this draft, he was coming off of a .229/.288/.300 season and a visually dazzling but statistically average defensive first full season with the Astros. He was the butt of Ed Wade jokes who gave away baseball’s perfect closer for a really fast outfielder who hit like a pitcher.

At the time, there was a part of me looking to save face and making a guy like Bourn one of the top 60 players selected in a Dream Draft would have been enough to make at least a few people snicker. Heck, I was questioning my sanity when I looked down at my short list of center fielders.

Compounding the issue for the BJDT was a rumor of the Dream Draft being extended to 15, 25 or 40 rounds, even. Knowing how highly I valued Bourn at the time and no one in their right mind valued him as much as I did — except for Wade, maybe, and he wasn’t one of the GMs involved in our little thought exercise — I fully expected the draft to continue beyond 10 rounds, for Bourn to be sitting there as a backup plan to McLouth and Snider (with McLouth moving to right or left field, of course) and for me to scoop him up.

The draft never continued. I never selected Bourn. The BJDT while still very good (the club has accumulated another 25.5 WAR in 2010 so far) could have been so much better if I had some guts.

Alas, no guts, no glory. Or worse yet — Nate McLouth!

While a few thousand words could be spent picking apart Cistulli’s dumbassery disguised as intelligent commentary, let’s avoid the bait and cut to the baseball information. Although let’s at least mention that ripping what the New York Times dot com readers enjoy reading for being garbage and reason to lose all faith in humanity then following it with a 7-paragraph love fest toward a man being held up as a hero for berating a human being, cursing in public, and stealing beer (The beer is noteworthy because of he grabbed a couple of Diet Pepsis no one would find it cool) is selective in what is approved and not approved behavior.

Back to the baseball portion of the post:

According to Cistulli, job security is awful for a Major League Baseball manager. His proof? Six managers have lost their job this year! SIX!!! (Actually, it’s been 5 and 1 interim manager but who’s counting?) What jumps out to Cistulli is the 20% turnover rate for the Major League manager!

What jumps out first from this list is that a full six of those men weren’t managers at the beginning of the season. That means, right off the bat, that 20% of the employees from this particular group were fired just this year. Consider, by way of comparison, if Morrison & Foerster (the New York-based law firm known affectionately as MoFo) were to fire 20% of its associates. People would, in the parlance of today’s youth, freak the eff out.

I’m going to assume that said “freak(ing) the eff out” only applies to 2010 since, in 2009, “MOFO” laid off 201 employees. With a staff of roughly 1,000-1,500 employees, the turnover rate is similar to that of the highest ranking managerial position in professional baseball. Such a decision by MOFO likely met with “What do you call 53 attorneys at the bottom of a lake?” jokes amongst the “people” unless one of those lawyers acted like a fool toward their ex-employers and stole some complimentary chocolates.

Then, Cistulli breaks down the tenure of a Major League manager to 4.5 years then by using the median, claims the length of employment is closer to 3 years. This, of course, ignores years spent as a manager with other teams, although Cistulli alludes to (and dismisses) such a phenomenon in the next paragraph.

After providing the evidence of how volatile and insecure the job of a Major League manager is, Cistulli poses this thought experiment (A “thought experiment” is what people who are highly educated and obsessed with shoving down your throat the fact that they are able to use words with more than 2 syllables call a question):

Let’s try a thought experiment. Say I’m a dude who can offer you a job. And say this job is pretty hot. But here’s the thing about it: you’re probably gonna be fired in 2013.

Would you take it?

If for some reason, you’re on the fence here, let’s dig a little deeper into the shelf life of a Major League manager. From 2005-2009, 31 Major League managers lost their jobs. At an average of 6.2 managers per season, 2010, so far, is looking fairly typical and supports Cistulli’s claim that being a manager isn’t as secure as the jobs of his circle of friends. (Note: Cistulli’s circle of friends includes 3 lawyers, 3 writers, a librarian, a writing instructor, and a computer programmer. It does not include anyone from the hospitality or retail industries which historically have turnover rates in the 30-40% range.) While life is good for Carson’s dinner party guests, the turnover rate for a Major League manager is perfectly in line with studies done on the turnover rate for the general workforce. A study done by Culpepper and Associates showed that turnover for 191 participating organizations in various industry sectors was 17% in 2009 (down from 22% in 2007). Other information about turnover (easily found through a Google search or a conversation with your local big box retail manager) reveals that 20% is fairly consistent (if not slightly conservative) with what happens in the “real world.”

The one thing drastically different about the shelf life of a Major League manager and the shelf life of Joe Employee is the actual job security that comes with being a Major League manager. Even if it isn’t as a Major League manager, a long career in baseball can be expected. Here’s a breakdown of the 31 managers who lost their jobs from 2005 to 2009:

• Current Major League Managers: 10
  Lou Piniella (Cubs), Ken Macha (Brewers), Bruce Bochy (Giants), Joe Girardi (Yankees), Dusty Baker (Reds), Buck Showalter (Orioles), Joe Torre (Dodgers), Jim Tracy (Rockies), Ned Yost (Royals), Manny Acta (Indians)
  
• Current Major League Bench Coaches: 5
  Alan Trammell (Cubs), Tony Pena (Yankees), Willie Randolph (Brewers), John Gibbons (Royals), John McLaren (Nationals)
  
• Current Major League Hitting Coaches: 2
  Lloyd McClendon (Tigers), Clint Hurdle (Rangers)
  
• Other Baseball Jobs: 7
  Art Howe (Top Coach at MLB European Academy)
  Felipe Alou (Semi-retired/Manager of Dominican Republic team at WBC)
  Frank Robinson (Works in Commissioner’s Office)
  Buddy Bell (Director of Minor League Operations for Chicago White Sox)
  Sam Perlozzo (3rd Base Coach for Philadelphia Phillies)
  Bob Melvin (Scout for New York Mets)
  Dave Miley (Manager of Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, Yankees AAA Team)
  
• Retired: 1
  Jack McKeon

That leaves 6 who are without jobs in baseball, although Eric Wedge took the year off to give himself a mental/physical break and Mike Hargrove, who walked away in 2007, cited “burn out” as the reason he wasn’t currently working in a recent newspaper interview. Of the other 4, Cecil Cooper and Phil Garner are actively seeking employment, Jerry Narron is on the public speaking circuit, and Grady Little is alive.

Wedge, Hargrove, and Garner continue to be on the short list of clubs seeking managers and Wedge stated he was offered jobs from 6 or 7 organizations following his dismissal in Cleveland. Cooper wants to work again in baseball but he’s also one of the most recent of the “unemployed” on the above list.

That leaves 2: Jerry Narron, a 5-year managerial veteran with a lifetime 291-341 (.460) record with 2 clubs, and Grady Little, a relatively successful manager in his 4 years in the Majors (358-290, .552) but more known for his decision to leave Pedro Martinez in too long during a playoff meltdown against the Yankees that continued the “Curse of the Bambino.”

Cistulli concludes:

Whatever the case may be, the principal draw of baseball’s managerial positions certainly isn’t job security.

It isn’t?

Pitchers are a much shallower pool. Danny Graves, a Vietnamese-American, is one of the standout Asian-American pitchers in recent years, but another two seem to be putting it together this season, while a third soldiers on, having a bounceback year with his 10th organization.

1. Brandon League, a fourth-generation Japanese-American, flashed a fastball that pushed triple digits for Toronto, but—as is often the tale with hard-throwers—he didn’t really come into his own until he refined his change of pace. He’d used a changeup before last season, when he finally got the feel for the splitter, and everything seemed to fall into place. His 3.16 xFIP in 2009 was a career high, while his 3.58 FIP was a close second to his 3.55 FIP in 2006.

Those improvements came courtesy of the drop in walks and rise in strikeouts you see above. Seattle traded for him in the offseason, and he’s continued that success, albeit at a slightly decreased level. In 2010, his walk rate has risen a notch, while his Ks have dropped, but the superior Seattle defense—as well as the grass infield at Safeco—lopped a hit per 9 IP off his average and plunged his BABIP from .322 in 2009 to .260 in 2010.

Though the team around him has floundered, League has become a fixture in the Mariners’ pen and the likely successor to Aardsma, should anything happen to Seattle’s closer. He should be proud to continue the Asian-American relief tradition established by Graves.

2. Like League, Jeremy Guthrie is also of Japanese descent and showed promise for years, thanks to a fastball in the mid-90s and a good slider with late movement. In 2007-8, he had two good years, with a cumulative 6.0 K/9 and 2.6 BB/9, leading to an overall 3.66 ERA and 1.22 WHIP. Though Baltimore thought they had their ace, Guthrie’s peripherals didn’t support this, as FIPS of 4.41 and 4.35 in 2007 and 2008, respectively, indicate.

2009 saw him give back all these gains, as he led the league with 17 losses, his FIP ballooned to 5.31 and his strikeout rate slipped back again. A more normal .294 BABIP (after two seasons of .277 and .267) led to the bloated ERA and WHIP in his Rotolympus card. But 2010 has seen him return to adequacy, with a recent stretch of games that could indicate he’s putting it together.

His overall peripherals are improved since 2009, with his reduced 4.58 FIP coming from a lower walk rate, even as his K rate has continued to fall, too. A friendly .264 BABIP and 5.00 xFIP show that he’s been aided by some luck, but a better indicator could come from his groundball rates, which returned to 41.9% in 2010 after a plunge to 34.7% in 2009.

All six of his most recent starts have been quality starts, and he’s bumped his strikeout rate to 5.2 K/9, and his walks have dropped to a teeny 1.5 BB/9. That’s all led to a 1.51 ERA and a 0.94 WHIP and a 4-2 record. Whether this will continue or not remains to be seen, but Guthrie has at least returned to serviceable levels.

3. “Serviceable” pretty much defines Bruce Chen’s career, though there were times when the Panamanian-born Chinese-American would have loved to have reached even those underwhelming levels. Veteran of 12 seasons and a Mike-Morgan-like 10 teams, Chen had a few good seasons in Atlanta before bouncing around; between 2000 and 2003, he played for at least two teams each season.

Suddenly, he seemed to settle down in Baltimore, where he stuck for three straight seasons, with a strong 15-11 record his first two years there, with a 3.67 ERA and 1.25 WHIP, before collapsing to a 0-7 record in 2006, his ERA ballooning to 6.93 and his WHIP shooting to an unsightly 1.74. The TJS that ended his 2007 and 2008 seasons explained this, and 2009 saw him climb his way back to the majors after rehab.

In 2010, Chen has had some glimpses of excellence, like when he carried a perfect game into the 7th inning against the Angels on July 4. But he’s also had reminders of the old, awful Chen, like the four starts where he’s given up 4 or more runs, including three of them after that near-perfecto.

But overall, he’s been solid: his 4.51 FIP is his best since 2000, while his 4.97 xFIP is his best since 2005; the latter points to the favorable 8.1% FB/HR rate he’s enjoyed this season. His K/9 is his best since 2003, though his BB/9 leaves something to be desired. If nothing else, Chen proves that a crafty lefty (his fastball tops out in the mid-80s) can come from any country.

Next week: the Asian-American hitters, including the recently promoted Darwin Barney!