His first winter on the job, he was essentially handed something of a crisis in the making. Torii Hunter was asking for an unholy sum of money and Johan Santana was already out the door. The Garza-for-Young swap was an unnecessary move, and one that hasn’t turned out well, but if we judged all GMs by their worst moments, the pantheon of good GMs would be very small indeed.

Since the beginning of the 2009 season, you’d be hard-pressed to find a GM that has done a better job of preparing his team to win now without completely mortgaging that team’s future. Since July, the Twins have added Orlando Cabrera and Carl Pavano, both of whom played a key role in the team’s playoff run; Miguel Angel Sano (Jean) and Max Kepler, the top Dominican and European prospects, respectively; and J.J. Hardy, Jim Thome, Clay Condrey, and most recently, Orlando Hudson.

For years, Twins fans could hibernate through the hot-stove season and miss very little—it’s hard to get excited about Ramon Ortiz and Rondell White when that’s all the team does in four months.

This week was simply the culmination of what was already one of the most productive offseasons in team history. Joe Mauer’s extension may not be a done deal, but it is clearly in the works, then came word Thursday that Hudson, thought to be nearing a deal with the Washington Nationals, was in fact close to signing with the Twins.

Rumors flew all day that a deal was done, that it was pending, that he was looking at Cleveland, but finally, at around 10 pm CST, the word went out that the deal was officially completed.

Celebrate, Twins fans, not only did you get the player you wanted, you got the player your team needed most.

Hudson, who was a favorite of many fans last offseason as well, fits the Twins remaining needs to a T. His career OBP of .348 bests Orlando Cabrera’s .313 mark with the Twins last season and throttles Brendan Harris’ .242 OBP he put up when batting in the second spot in the order.

That was one of the major criteria used to judge any signing by the Twins after they acquired Thome: Would this hitter be able to provide a high OBP in the second slot? This is critical, because with Joe Mauer showing more power than he did in previous years, as well as top years from Michael Cuddyer and Jason Kubel at the heart of the order, the Twins needed a second hitter beside Denard Span to create RBI opportunities for those producers later in the lineup.

Thankfully, Hudson does exactly that, and as a switch-hitter, he doesn’t contribute to the Twins’ overwhelming tilt to the left. Hudson posted the ninth highest VORP among second baseman, despite being benched at the end of the season in favor of what Joe Torre perceived to be the hot hand. When his defense is included, Hudson was a 5.4 win player, which would have tied him for second on the Twins in 2009.

As with investments, past success is no guarantee of future results, but the Twins have acquired a player who could potentially be a key part of a team that goes deep into the playoffs without giving up anything other than money, and given that they are paying him about half of his original asking price, they’re hardly doing that.

I must confess a certain level of surprise that this deal actually happened. The Twins’ payroll, even before adding Hudson was over $90 million, almost 1/3rd higher than it had been in 2009. Hudson’s asking price was $9 million, and while he wasn’t going to get that in this market, he wasn’t advertizing a price cut either. I foresaw both parties looking interested, but getting hamstrung by the monetary concerns in negotiations. It’s a credit to Smith and his staff that they didn’t try to wait Hudson out and see how low they could drive the price, as they did with Joe Crede last year. Such a strategy works if you’re the only one bidding, but Hudson made it clear that he had no aversion to signing with the hapless Nats, as long as he was making what he deemed to be a fair sum.

Signing one player seldom makes a huge difference for a team, but the Twins are at the point where a 1-2 win increase is worth a lot to them, as it can be the difference between winning the AL Central and a whole lot of golf in the offseason. If paying for Hudson took them a bit over their expected budget, then it was money well spent.

Smith has a long career ahead of him, which means not only more time to make smart moves, but also more time to make mistakes. One thing ought to be clear from the last eight months: Smith is savvier than a lot of people, both within Minnesota and outside of it, gave him credit for.

After Game 163, I went on Marty Andrade’s podcast and said what I’d been thinking for a long time: We’ve judged Bill Smith too quickly.

His first winter on the job, he was essentially handed something of a crisis in the making. Torii Hunter was asking for an unholy sum of money and Johan Santana was already out the door. The Garza-for-Young swap was an unnecessary move, and one that hasn’t turned out well, but if we judged all GMs by their worst moments, the pantheon of good GMs would be very small indeed.

Since the beginning of the 2009 season, you’d be hard-pressed to find a GM that has done a better job of preparing his team to win now without completely mortgaging that team’s future. Since July, the Twins have added Orlando Cabrera and Carl Pavano, both of whom played a key role in the team’s playoff run; Miguel Angel Sano (Jean) and Max Kepler, the top Dominican and European prospects, respectively; and J.J. Hardy, Jim Thome, Clay Condrey, and most recently, Orlando Hudson.

For years, Twins fans could hibernate through the hot-stove season and miss very little—it’s hard to get excited about Ramon Ortiz and Rondell White when that’s all the team does in four months.

This week was simply the culmination of what was already one of the most productive offseasons in team history. Joe Mauer’s extension may not be a done deal, but it is clearly in the works, then came word Thursday that Hudson, thought to be nearing a deal with the Washington Nationals, was in fact close to signing with the Twins.

Rumors flew all day that a deal was done, that it was pending, that he was looking at Cleveland, but finally, at around 10 pm CST, the word went out that the deal was officially completed.

Celebrate, Twins fans, not only did you get the player you wanted, you got the player your team needed most.

Hudson, who was a favorite of many fans last offseason as well, fits the Twins remaining needs to a T. His career OBP of .348 bests Orlando Cabrera’s .313 mark with the Twins last season and throttles Brendan Harris’ .242 OBP he put up when batting in the second spot in the order.

That was one of the major criteria used to judge any signing by the Twins after they acquired Thome: Would this hitter be able to provide a high OBP in the second slot? This is critical, because with Joe Mauer showing more power than he did in previous years, as well as top years from Michael Cuddyer and Jason Kubel at the heart of the order, the Twins needed a second hitter beside Denard Span to create RBI opportunities for those producers later in the lineup.

Thankfully, Hudson does exactly that, and as a switch-hitter, he doesn’t contribute to the Twins’ overwhelming tilt to the left. Hudson posted the ninth highest VORP among second baseman, despite being benched at the end of the season in favor of what Joe Torre perceived to be the hot hand. When his defense is included, Hudson was a 5.4 win player, which would have tied him for second on the Twins in 2009.

As with investments, past success is no guarantee of future results, but the Twins have acquired a player who could potentially be a key part of a team that goes deep into the playoffs without giving up anything other than money, and given that they are paying him about half of his original asking price, they’re hardly doing that.

I must confess a certain level of surprise that this deal actually happened. The Twins’ payroll, even before adding Hudson was over $90 million, almost 1/3rd higher than it had been in 2009. Hudson’s asking price was $9 million, and while he wasn’t going to get that in this market, he wasn’t advertizing a price cut either. I foresaw both parties looking interested, but getting hamstrung by the monetary concerns in negotiations. It’s a credit to Smith and his staff that they didn’t try to wait Hudson out and see how low they could drive the price, as they did with Joe Crede last year. Such a strategy works if you’re the only one bidding, but Hudson made it clear that he had no aversion to signing with the hapless Nats, as long as he was making what he deemed to be a fair sum.

Signing one player seldom makes a huge difference for a team, but the Twins are at the point where a 1-2 win increase is worth a lot to them, as it can be the difference between winning the AL Central and a whole lot of golf in the offseason. If paying for Hudson took them a bit over their expected budget, then it was money well spent.

Smith has a long career ahead of him, which means not only more time to make smart moves, but also more time to make mistakes. One thing ought to be clear from the last eight months: Smith is savvier than a lot of people, both within Minnesota and outside of it, gave him credit for.

Orlando Hudson photo courtesy of www.picapp.com

In late January, I took a look at what major league clubs are dishing out for a Win Above Replacement on the free agent market. While relievers seem to be getting an inordinate amount of cash for their contributions, position players and starters inking one-year deals are signing for $3.2-3.3 million per WAR.

Since that article ran, a few notable free agents have found new clubs or re-upped with their current team. Here are the $/WAR figures for those players, based on 2010 CHONE projections:

(Couple notes: I adjusted the playing time for Giambi and Winn-CHONE had them with near full-time duty. I also added the incentives money Garko would make, based on plate appearances.)

And here’s the updated chart showing what teams are paying for a win this off-season, based on player and contract type:

The numbers haven’t changed drastically. There’s a higher degree of uncertainty with the one-year players (or else they would be holding out for bigger, long-terms pacts), but GMs seem to be getting some nifty deals.

Today, let’s do a little reverse-engineering with this chart. The guys who are unsigned at this point figure to sign one-year deals. Using the $/WAR figures above, we can estimate what these free agents might get when they eventually sign on the dotted line.

Based on 2010 CHONE forecasts and the $/WAR figures for free agents inking one-year deals ($3.1 M/WAR for position players, $3.4M/WAR for starters), here are some rough guesses of what the remaining free agent hitters and starters might earn:

Free Agent Position Players

Free Agent Starting Pitchers

Again, these are just really rough guesses, based on how the market has played out thus far. I wouldn’t be surprised if several of these guys get less guaranteed cash than suggested here. Crede (back), Bedard and Wang (shoulder surgery) are serious health risks. Hudson and Lopez might get squeezed, given the paucity of GMs looking for a second baseman. The particulars of both player and team have to be taken into account.

Is it Opening Day yet?

He had a string of 3 straight seasons with more than 215 innings pitched, earning the label of team workhorse, and was in the middle of another great campaign when I made the deal. The numbers made it easy to completely ignore the shaky W-L record, and I looked forward to a couple seasons of Schilling-like dominance.

That was almost five years ago, and the meantime has not been too kind to the former gold medal winner. As BDD teammate Matt Sisson points out, Sheets hasn’t pitched more than 200 innings in a season since ’04 due to a malady of injuries. His ratios stayed strong from 2005 – 2008, but various ailments kept him off the mound for a chunk of each season. The toll from heavy workloads and injury cascades culminated in elbow surgery in February of 2009, spoiling his first visit to free agency and resulting in a lost season.

(stats via www.baseball-reference.com)

Matt and BP’s Christina Kahrl have credited Billy Beane for seizing an opportunity when he signed Ben Sheets, grabbing a potentially undervalued asset than can be flipped at the trade deadline for young talent. This is a savvy observation, given that new faces in Oakland last about as long as a fresh beer in the hands of Norm Peterson, and that a mid-season deal would shave the overall cost.

Getting maximum value out of Sheets will be tougher than it was with Matt Holliday, and the road to the trade deadline could have its share of speed bumps. Command is Sheets’ calling card, but that is typically the last thing to return following elbow surgery. It could take awhile for the right-hander to find his release point, and the A’s brass will hold their collective breath every time that he takes the mound, waiting to exhale until he leaves the game with his right arm intact.

If Sheets comes up with even a minor injury, or if he experiences an extended period of growing pains in his return to the Majors, it could easily cripple his trade value. The gamble on Big Ben’s right arm only pays off if he is healthy and effective for the first 3-4 months of the season.

If Sheets can pull that off and the A’s find themselves out of contention by mid-summer, then he should make for an attractive target to a contending team. His trade value could take a hit, however, depending on the status of the performance bonuses in his contract.

Sheets is owed an additional $500k when he crosses each threshold of 165, 175, 185, and 195 innings pitched. A team that trades for the righty will find themselves in the unenviable position of acquiring a pitcher that costs $3.5 million if he flames out, but $5.5 million if he finishes out the season. That might not bring the best exchange of young talent, especially considering that Sheets’ lost year will likely disqualify him from draft pick compensation at the end of the season.

It’s impressive that Sheets was able to convert a single throwing session into an eight-figure contract, as the A’s were so impressed that the deal was reportedly on the table within an hour of the showcase. The Athletics are already giving Big Ben the royal treatment, with manager Bob Geren proclaiming him the team’s ace and Opening Day starter with the ink still drying on the contract.

Sheets will be 2nd-highest paid player on the team in 2010, with a $10 million base salary plus the other $2 million in performance bonuses. The player at the top of the team’s salary chart is Eric Chavez, one of the few players in baseball that has been more brittle than Sheets over the last five years. The A’s might be lucky if their two most-compensated employees are active for a full season between them.

The A’s have heard this song before, serving as roadies to the Rich Harden Experience for years. They passed on a reunion this off-season, opting to pay an extra 33-60% for another free agent pitcher with even more recent struggles staying on the field. It’s as if they missed having the Harden headaches around, but didn’t want to come crawling back to the pitcher they dumped a year and a half ago.

The only pitchers from this free agent class that will make more money than Sheets in 2010 are John Lackey and Andy Pettitte. For their money, the A’s are counting on the longtime Brewer to provide a veteran presence and to stabilize a young rotation. As is, the team is already counting on another 2009 absentee to be their #3 starter, and a handful of kids are battling for the fifth spot in the rotation.

The A’s missed out on Aroldis Chapman when the bidding war escalated to $30 million, and they also fell short on Adrian Beltre, Marco Scutaro, and even Jamey Carroll. The team had money to spend, but every player they pursued was snared by another hunter. It seemed that nobody wanted to play in the Oakland Mausoleum, and perhaps the team felt the need to over-bet the pot in order to secure their purchase.

The contract guarantees Sheets enough money to match his 2007 salary, and the performance incentives could soar high enough to make 2010 the most lucrative season of his career. He was able to secure this contract on the heels of a season lost to another arm injury, in a down economy and a buyer’s market, and by a frugal team on a tight budget.

Some might call it a good gamble, but I wouldn’t risk a quarter of my chips on a gutshot draw, especially when I’m short-stacked with a limited bankroll. I like finding bargains based on health risk, but $10-$12 million is no bargain, and Sheets represents the epitome of health-related risk.

Hey, I’m rooting for the guy, and hoping that he pulls an ‘04 Chris Carpenter season out of his hat. The A’s are certainly banking on it, and dreaming about the prospect that might fall to them on the river. Just call me skeptical.

But the guys in the middle appear to be getting squeezed. GMs are sitting back, judging a free agent’s talents against in-house options, and declaring, “you’re only a slight upgrade-lower your asking price or we’re moving on.”

So, what are teams paying for a Win Above Replacement (WAR) on the free agent market this offseason? To try and answer that question, I used Sean Smith’s handy Free Agent Tracker, which records a player’s signing terms as well as his projected WAR during the length of the contract. Using that data, we can get a feel for what clubs are dishing out for a win this winter.

Here are the position players who have signed one-year deals, sorted by projected dollars per win:

Teams are paying about $3.2 million per WAR for one-year position players. Of course, there’s a high degree of uncertainty with many of these players (that’s why they’re signing one-year deals in the first place). Glaus could be a decent first base option for the Braves, or shoulder and back ailments could end his career. Nick Johnson’s a great get, if he stays healthy. Vlad Guerrero and Hideki Matsui have achy knees, Crisp’s coming off of season-ending shoulder surgery, Beltre also had shoulder surgery and Ankiel lost a fight with a center field wall. You get the picture: these guys could provide a great return on investment, or they could bust. GMs pay accordingly.

(Note: Beltre has a $5M player option for 2011, which becomes a $10M option if he logs 640 plate appearances. LaRoche has a $7.5M mutual option for the 2011 season. Ankiel has a $6M mutual option for 2011. Contract info from Cots Baseball Contracts).

Here are the position players signing multi-year contracts this winter:

Overall, teams are paying about $4.8 million per WAR on multi-year deals with free agent position players. CHONE is not sanguine about Bay’s chances of providing bang for all those bucks. Even with significant regression factored in, Figgins looks like a smart signing.

(Note: Bay has a $14M vesting option for 2014, based on PA in 2012 and 2013. Holliday has a $16M club option for the 2017 season.)

Now, the starting pitchers. Here are the starters inking one-year pacts:

Like their position player counterparts, the one-year starting pitchers are mostly guys looking to re-establish value. Clubs are paying $3.3 million per WAR for one-year starters. Again, there’s a lot of volatility here: Harden could be a monster, or he could make ten starts. Duchscherer is returning from elbow surgery and clinical depression.

And multi-year contracts for starting pitchers:

Teams are dishing out $5.2 million per projected WAR to starters on multi-year deals. Lackey’s deal strikes me as neither egregious nor shrewd. He was the best starter available, and the Red Sox paid more than sticker-value. Given the club’s position on the win and revenue curve, it’s defensible.

Relievers aren’t included on Sean Smith’s Free Agent Tracker. So, what I did was use ESPN’s free agent tracker to find the contract terms for relievers. For one-year deals, I used CHONE’s projected WAR to find the projected dollars paid per WAR. For multi-year deals, I took 2010’s projected WAR and applied a generic -0.2 WAR aging curve for each additional year.

Here are the free agent relievers signing one-year deals:

And the multi-year ‘pen arms:

(Note: Valverde has a $9M club option for the 2012 season.)

Yeah, that’s ugly. There has been much discussion lately about the value of relievers. Personally, I think it’s near impossible to justify the payouts given to relief pitchers in free agency in recent years. Even accounting for the high-leverage situations in which they pitch, relievers just don’t provide enough quantity to earn these kinds of salaries. Also, when a closer is sidelined, his innings aren’t given to a replacement-level pitcher. The set-up guy moves into the 9th inning, the middle reliever becomes the set up guy, and so on right to the bottom of the ‘pen. Those high-leverage frames aren’t passed on to the mop-up guy.

So, to recap, here’s what teams are paying for a win this off-season:

The multi-year relievers really drag the average down. Without them, clubs are paying between $4.5 and $4.6 million per WAR, which is around the commonly accepted number. There have been some bargain contracts this winter. But when it comes to relievers, GMs are paying for fillet mignon and getting cheesburgers.

There comes a point in your life where it seems like everyone else has what you want. Maybe you’re out of college, working a crummy job or single. Maybe it’s worse — maybe you dropped out, got fired, or got dumped. When you walk through the city, the only people you seem to see seare college kids having fun, wealthy business men and women in power suits, and blissfully happy couples enjoying each other’s company. It’s enough to make you disillusioned. That’s been the off-season for the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim thus far.

As the confetti was swept up after New York’s celebration of yet another World Series victory, Angels fans had reason to be very optimistic. The team won 97 games during the regular season, reached the American League Championship Series against the Yankees, and the organization was setting its sights on Roy Halladay, then a member of the Toronto Blue Jays. Even as it became clear that Hallday would eventually become a Phillie, the Angels were still in on a potential Cliff Lee trade. They also showed more than a passing interest in Cuban defector Aroldis Chapman.

Yet, here we are now, just weeks away from P & C and the Angels have lost to free agency:

• The second-most valuable third baseman in the American League last year (according to FanGraphs) in Chone Figgins to the Seattle Mariners;
• Ace starter John Lackey to the Boston Red Sox;
• Gimpy DH Vladimir Guerrero to the Texas Rangers

The Angels have responded by signing:

• Gimpy DH Hideki Matsui for one year, $6 million;
• Wild Fernando Rodney for two years, $11 million;
• Joel Piniero for two years, $16 million

In essence, the Angels have swapped gimpy designated hitters, downgraded from Lackey to Piniero, lost Figgins and gained Rodney. Meanwhile, Roy Halladay went to Philadelphia, Cliff Lee went to Seattle, and Aroldis Chapman went to Cincinnati. The Angels wanted an ace pitcher and they ended up with Joel Piniero. It’s the kind of dream/reality contrast one would expect to find with the New York Mets, not the L.A. Angels.

Losing Figgins opens up third base for Brandon Wood or Maicer Izturis. That makes the soon to be 36-year-old Bobby Abreu the team’s most dangerous base-stealing threat. The lineup figures to slug more home runs and run the bases less aggressively unless Izturis defies the expectations of both stats and scouts. Furthermore, the loss of Figgins leaves the lineup thin in terms of patient hitters. Bobby Abreu drew 94 walks last year, but after him, the next-highest walks total was Torii Hunter’s 47.

Overall, the 2010 Angels look to be weaker offensively according to the projections.

Click the image below to enlarge.

Kendry Morales, Maicer Izturis, Torii Hunter, Hideki Matsui, Juan Rivera, Bobby Abreu, and Erick Aybar are all projected to perform worse in ‘10 than in ‘09. Howie Kendrick is expected to repeat what he did last year, and only catchers Mike Napoli and Jeff Mathis are expected to improve.

The addition of Fernando Rodney does little to improve a bullpen that ranked 11th out of 14 American League teams in ERA last season. Angels relievers blew 19 saves, seven of which came from closer Brian Fuentes whose ERA was much too close to 4.00. All told, the Angels are spending over $25 million, or about 25% of their payroll before arbitration cases are settled, on decidedly mediocre relief pitching.

What it boils down to then, is that the Angels are relying heavily on a starting rotation that includes four pitchers that are still under the age of 30 in Scott Kazmir, Joe Saunders, Ervin Santana, and Jered Weaver. Including newcomer Pineiro, the CHONE projections see all five starters earning ERA’s above 4.00:

• Weaver: 4.10
• Kazmir: 4.23
• Pineiro: 4.37
• Santana: 4.53
• Saunders: 4.57

The odds are that the projections won’t nail all five of them, so I wouldn’t bet on the Angels starting rotation looking as bad as CHONE says. However, the Angels could have easily improved the rotation but GM Tony Reagins seems to be content relying on young talent with thin resumes (or, in the case of Kazmir, a durability issue).

At the moment, it is the L.A. Angels who take the cake for having baseball’s least productive off-season. They played like a 92-win team last year according to their Pythagorean W-L. As they are constructed presently, the Angels are a mid-80’s team (about 87 if you’re looking for a ballpark number) in terms of wins. Considering how significantly the Seattle Mariners have improved, the Angels couldn’t afford to downgrade.

Reagins did so willingly: he tailed off his pursuit of multiple ace pitchers and waved the white flag after attempting to retain John Lackey. He settled for Pineiro, Matsui, and Rodney, much like the aforementioned disillusioned settle for DeVry University, a job waiting tables, and a significant other with a face only a mother could love.

* The article title and opening two lines reference the song “The Noose” by A Perfect Circle. It’s a good bet that most Baseball Daily Digest readers are not as obsessed with Maynard James Keenan’s work as I am, so I figured I’d do the public a service and point it out. Angels… Halos…

The deal is expected to pay Hairston more than $2 million, the source said.

Hairston, 33, will be united with his brother Scott, 29, who was re-acquired by the Padres in a trade with the A’s this week.

It’s not exactly rare that two brothers will play for the same team, as we have had several notable examples this decade such as Jason and Jeremy Giambi, Pedro and Ramon Martinez, and Bengie and Jose Molina. While the phenomenon is not all that interesting, it did make me wonder about the pairing of brothers across baseball’s many eras.

I divided the years between 1900 and present into six eras which you will see in the following table:

A few caveats about the above table. The era names and the years included are not official. Some of them are obvious, such as the Dead Ball Era, but you may disagree with others. It’s not all that important. Secondly, pairs of brothers were double-counted, such as Roberto and Sandy Alomar in 2003 and ‘04 with the White Sox. However, instances of three brothers playing together (such as Felipe, Jesus, and Matty Alou in 1963 with the Giants) were only counted once. Lastly, it’s blatantly obvious that you cannot have 2.43 pairs of brothers, but I went to two decimal points simply to help illustrate some small differences in the eras. Again, not terribly important.

An aside (after caveating, no less): It is interesting to note the amount of brother-teammates more than doubled after the Dead Ball Era in the Live Ball Era. That is because, of the 50 total pairings in the Live Ball Era, only 14 of them were distinct. Namely, Lloyd and Paul Waner played on the same team from 1927-41 (15 seasons) and Joe and Luke Sewell played together from 1921-30 (10 seasons).

Anyway, to the point: Using Rally’s WAR Database, it is easy to analyze the brother-pairings in each era. Stay a while, won’t you?

The best brother compiled about 95% of all the positive value of the pairings. The “other” brothers appear to have hurt their teams, generally speaking.

Dead Ball Era

• Best Combined Season: Christy and Henry Mathewson of the 1907 New York Giants compiled 6.7 WAR together, with 6.6 of that coming from Christy, a Hall of Famer.
• Worst Combined Season: Jack and Mike O’Neil of the 1903 St. Louis Cardinals hurt their team to the tune of -3.4 WAR, -3.3 from Mike.
• Best Brother: Christy Mathewson with his 6.6 WAR with the 1907 New York Giants.
• Worst Brother: Grover Lowdermilk of the 1911 St. Louis Cardinals put up -1.3 WAR.

Live Ball Era

• Best Combined Season: Dizzy and Paul Dean combined for 12.9 WAR with the 1934 St. Louis Cardinals.
• Worst Combined Season: Gee and Hub Walker cost the 1931 Detroit Tigers -0.5 WAR.
• Best Brother: Dizzy Dean of those ‘34 Cardinals was worth 8.1 WAR.
• Worst Brother: Luke Sewell cost the 1929 Cleveland Indians 1.8 WAR.

Integration Era

• Best Combined Season: Mort and Walker Cooper combined for 9.4 WAR with the 1942 St. Louis Cardinals.
• Worst Combined Season: Cloyd and Clete Boyer compiled -2.2 WAR for the 1955 Kansas City Athletics.
• Best Brother: Mort Cooper earned 6.4 WAR with the ‘42 Cardinals.
• Worst Brother: Cloyd Boyer took away -1.6 WAR from the ‘55 Athletics.

Expansion Era

• Best Combined Season: Gaylord and Jim Perry compiled 12.5 WAR for the 1974 Cleveland Indians.
• Worst Combined Season: Felipe and Matty Alou, at the end of their careers, hurt the 1973 New York Yankees by combining for -1.7 WAR.
• Best Brother: Hank Aaron went into double-digits with 10.0 WAR in 1963 with the Milwaukee Braves.
• Worst Brother: Tony Conigliaro didn’t help the 1969 Boston Red Sox with his -1.6 WAR.

Free Agency Era

• Best Combined Season: Cal and Billy Ripken teamed up for 10.5 WAR with the 1990 Baltimore Orioles.
• Worst Combined Season: Rick and Mickey Mahler hurt the 1979 Atlanta Braves with their -0.8 WAR.
• Best Brother: Cal Ripken earned 11.0 WAR with the 1991 Baltimore Orioles.
• Worst Brother: Billy Ripken was worth a whopping -2.5 WAR with the 1988 Baltimore Orioles.

Expansion II Era

• Best Combined Season: Jason and Jeremy Giambi — well, mostly Jason — helped the 2001 Oakland Athletics by adding 11.4 WAR.
• Worst Combined Season: Andy and Alan Benes took away -3.2 WAR from the 2001 St. Louis Cardinals.
• Best Brother: Jason Giambi added 10.3 WAR to those ‘01 Athletics.
• Worst Brother: Andy Benes, at the end of his career, was worth -2.9 WAR.

Of the 184 brother pairings, the “best” brother contributed negatively (-0.1 or lower) in 17 of them (92.4%). The “worst” brother contributed negatively in 91 of them (49.5%). Overall, there were 23 pairings (12.5%) that ended up hurting their teams.

The Live Ball Era saw the most contribution from brothers, with 224.3 of the 647.5 total (34.6%). It had the most individual contribution from the “best” and the “worst” brother at 184.0 and 40.3 aggregate WAR. The Dead Ball Era was the worst era for brothers in terms of combined and individual aggregate WAR from the “best” and “worst” brothers.

As for organizations hiring brothers, the Pittsburgh Pirates have had 26 indistinct brother pairings while the Arizona Diamondbacks have had only one. Of current teams, the Colorado Rockies, Florida Marlins, Houston Astros, Milwaukee Brewers, Minnesota Twins, Seattle Mariners, Texas Rangers, and Toronto Blue Jays have not had two brothers play simultaneously for them.

Going into 2010, the Hairstons Scott and Jerry and Gonzalezes Adrian and Edgar will be the only pairs of brothers playing for the same team. The CHONE projections are expecting Scott to contribute 0.6 WAR and Jerry 0.2 for a total of 0.8. They will not be setting any records together, for sure.

Photographs courtesy of http://www.picapp.com/

Aroldis Chapman

The Reds, finishing with a sub-.500 record nine seasons running, add Chapman to a young core of players that includes slugging first baseman Joey Votto, outfielder Jay Bruce, and pitchers Edison Volquez, Johnny Cueto, and Homer Bailey. The organization also touts prospects Todd Frazier and Yonder Alonso.

Of the aforementioned, Votto, Volquez, and Cueto become arbitration-eligible after the 2010 season and free agents after 2014; the Reds control the rest for a long time. In other words, the Reds have the potential to build a powerhouse team that will be cheap and under control for at least several years.

Eye 2012 as a potential break-out year for the organization. It is likely when the bulk of the core of the organization will be at the Major League level, when Votto will be in his prime, and most importantly, when the Reds will have money and interest as a means to attract premier free agents.

A potential 2012 lineup for the Reds could look like:

C: Ryan Hanigan

1B: Yonder Alonso

2B: Brandon Phillips (could be traded)

3B: Scott Rolen (could be traded)/Todd Frazier

SS: Zack Cozart/free agent/trade acquisition

LF: Joey Votto

CF: Chris Dickerson/Drew Stubbs

RF: Jay Bruce

SP: Edison Volquez, Johnny Cueto, Homer Bailey, Aroldis Chapman, [Insert Back-of-the-rotation Starter]

According to Cot’s Contracts, Rolen would be the highest paid player at over $8 million. After that, it would be Yonder Alonso at $1.4M or Joey Votto depending on what he is awarded in arbitration.

There’s a ton of if-propositions, of course. And you have the “wish in one hand, spit in the other” line of thinking. However, if the Reds can roll some hot dice, they can be tough to contend with in just a couple years, especially given the state of the NL Central. Consider:

St. Louis Cardinals: Committed $120M over seven years to Matt Holliday and will have commit more to retain Albert Pujols.

Milwaukee Brewers: Prince Fielder is a free agent after 2011; will be just as dependent on prospects panning out as Cincinnati, though there is much more reason for pessimism given the lukewarm performances from Manny Parra and the inconsistency of Yovani Gallardo.

Chicago Cubs: That they signed Milton Bradley as a free agent and — and — turned him into Carlos Silva is all you need to know about the direction in which this team is going. This is a franchise in disarray.

The Pittsburgh Pirates

Houston Astros: In the same off-season in which a phenomenal talent in Aroldis Chapman was signed for five years for $30 million with an option for a sixth year, Astros GM Ed Wade signed reliever Brandon Lyon to a three-year, $15 million deal. When the Reds will be paying their core players well under market value, the Astros will be paying the corpses of relievers Lyon and Matt Lindstrom.

Pittsburgh Pirates: They are to baseball teams what Charlie Brown is to placekickers.

Consider the Philadelphia Phillies when thinking of what the Reds’ future may hold. The Phillies, while a bit more successful than the Reds prior to their 2007-09 properity, built up a lot of hope in their Minor League system. They drafted Chase Utley, Ryan Howard, Michael Bourn, Gavin Floyd, and Cole Hamels, most of whom eventually accentuated the likes of Jimmy Rollins and Pat Burrell for years.

The talent lived up to the hype: Utley turned into the best second baseman in baseball, Howard became one of the game’s premier sluggers, Hamels dazzled in the 2008 post-season; and the Phillies otherwise turned their prospects into talent elsewhere (such as trading Bourn to acquire closer Brad Lidge, who had a perfect season in ‘08).

It could all go wrong for the Reds just as easily as it all went right for the Phillies — after all, they do employ Dusty Baker who requires the organization have Dr. James Andrews on speed-dial. However, given the mediocrity abound in the NL Central and the wealth of talent ready to blossom in the Reds organization, there is a lot of reason to have optimism in Cincinnati in the coming years.

Just not in 2010, of course.

Home page photo courtesy of the Associated Press

Beltre has dealt with some minor health issues, but has logged 449 or more plate appearances in every season since he started playing regularly. Outside of his fluke 2004 season, Beltre has been a slightly above average player offensively, with a wRC+ between 87 and 113 in his five years with the Mariners and a career average 107. 2009 was his worst season as a starter, the second straight season in which his OPS declined (100 points from ‘08 to ‘09) and saw his walk rate cut in half from 8% to 4%.

Adrian Beltre

Everyone is well aware that Beltre isn’t known primarily for his bat, however. This is a fact that both fans of traditional fielding metrics and Sabermetrics agree upon. The two-time Gold Glove winner (in ‘07 and ‘08) has a career average UZR/150 of 14 and has been 15.6 or higher in three out of the past four seasons.

According to FanGraphs, Beltre’s glove accounted for more than half of his value last year. Since 2002, Beltre has averaged 4.2 WAR and been worth $14.5 million in free agent dollars on average. Despite his horrid 2009, he was still worth 2.4 WAR, which translates to nearly $11 million in FA bucks.

Clearly, the Red Sox are going to get exactly what they paid for assuming relative good health for Beltre. The move from the vast Safeco Field to the short left field at Fenway Park will help boost his offense a bit, and Kevin Youkilis can take his glove over to first base where he has a career 6.5 UZR/150.

As the title states, the Red Sox can thank the Philadelphia Phillies for their nifty signing. Early on in the off-season, the Phillies snapped up free agent Placido Polanco, signing him to a three-year, $18 million deal to play third base. Beltre didn’t draw much interest after that, as the Oakland Athletics were the only other team to even feign interest.

Due to the Phillies quickly signing Polanco to a below-market deal (and Seattle’s signing of Chone Figgins coming shortly thereafter), the price tag on Beltre was effectively lowered and his leverage in negotiations was significantly weakened. Beltre and his agent couldn’t threaten to sign elsewhere for more money, which allowed the Sox to wait the market out in this game of chicken.

Ultimately, both the Red Sox and Beltre win with this short-term deal, believe it or not. The Red Sox, of course, sign a productive player on the right side of 30 with low financial risk. The short-term deal works for Beltre because he will play in a more hitter-friendly environment with a very competitive, highly marketable team for a season or two, which will help in negotiations in a potentially more lucrative market after the 2010 or ‘11 season. Sure, Beltre would have preferred a three- or four-year deal but that simply was not going to happen with the economics in its current state.

The Red Sox make an upgrade in the infield at both infield corners with one signing and Beltre makes an investment in himself for 2010 and potentially ‘11. For that, they can both thank the Phillies.

Is that really accurate, though? As a result of making his big league debut as a teenager, Beltre hit free agency in his mid-twenties. The M’s handed him a five-year, $64 million deal prior to the 2005 season. Courtesy of Fan Graphs, here’s how Beltre’s production (in terms of Wins Above Replacement) matched up with his salary from 2005 to 2009:

Adrian Beltre as a Mariner

It’s not very often that you’ll hear “good fiscal decision” and “Bill Bavasi” in the same sentence, but the Mariners got exactly what they paid for.

Beltre again hit the free agent market this offseason, with super agent Scott Boras reportedly looking to land his client a four-year deal with an annual salary “north of $10 million.” Granted, Beltre is coming off of perhaps the worst season of his career. He landed on the DL in late June following surgery to remove bone spurs from his left shoulder. Beltre was also sidelined in August with…well, let’s not talk about it, okay?

Assuming his shoulder is sturdy and his…other issue doesn’t linger (he’s protected now), Beltre looks to be the best non-Holliday free agent left on the market. If your team has a hole at the hot corner, you should be rooting for your GM to ink Beltre. Here’s why.

His Bat is Better Than You Think

Yes, Beltre never came close to replicating his jaw-dropping 2004 season at the plate. But that obviously shouldn’t have been the expectation.

Fan Graphs has a handy stat called wRC+, which takes a player’s Weighted On-Base Average (wOBA) and adjusts it, based on park and league factors. 100 is average, while anything over 100 is above-average. From 1999 (his first full year as a starter) to 2003, Beltre posted a collective 102 wRC+ (two percent better than average). In 2004, his wRC+ skyrocketed to 165. Sure, it seemed reasonable that Beltre would retain some of those gains, given his youth. But to put that ‘06 number into context, Alex Rodriguez has a career 153 wRC+.

As a Mariner, Beltre batted a collective .266/.317/.442. That looks disappointing when you consider that he hit .274/.332/.463 with the Dodgers. But here’s the thing: Safeco Field is death to right-handed power hitters.

According to the 2010 Bill James Handbook, Safeco decreased home run production for righty batters by nine percent compared to a neutral ball park from 2007-2009. Overall, Safeco has squelched run-scoring by six percent over the past three years.

With Seattle, Beltre had one full, disappointing season with the bat in 2005 (91 wRC+) and then slogged through 2009 at well below optimum health (87 wRC+). But from 2006-2008, he posted wRC+ figures of 108, 113, and 108, respectively. His overall wRC+ as a Mariner was 102.

In all, Beltre has a 107 wRC+ as a big leaguer. He might not be a great hitter, but he’s been better than average once you account for Safeco’s power-sapping tendencies.

He’s Got Slick Leather

Beltre is a supremely gifted third baseman. Per Fan Graphs, he has posted a +13.9 UZR/150 mark at the hot corner since 2002. Over the past three seasons, Beltre checks in at +10.2 per 150 defensive games.

John Dewan’s Plus/Minus system is also a big fan of Beltre’s leather. From 2007-2009, Adrian has saved an average of 17 runs more per season than an average third baseman.

The most recent Fans Scouting Report rated Beltre as the best overall third baseman in the majors. Even if we assume his reflexes slow down somewhat in the coming years, Beltre still figures to be a defensive asset.

He’s Not Over the Hill

Beltre won’t turn 31 until April 7th, making him a relatively young free agent. He’s a decent athlete with double-digit steal totals in three of the past four seasons, and he possesses cat-like quickness at third base. Anecdotally, he seems like a good bet to age well.

So, what’s he worth?

Let’s say that Beltre will be a league-average hitter next year. Jeff Zimmerman of Beyond the Box Score released a projected 2010 UZR/150 total for players (further details here). Beltre has a projected +9 UZR/150 next season. That would make the Boras client worth about 3.1 Wins Above Replacement in 2010.

One win is thought to cost about $4.5 million on the free agent market (though recent research by Sky Andrecheck suggests that figure might be too low). If we use the $4.5M per win number, then Beltre figures to provide nearly $14M in production in 2010. Even if we assume that Beltre declines a half-win per season from 2011-2013 (2.6 WAR in 2011, 2.1 WAR in 2012, 1.6 WAR in 2013), he would offer a little north of $42M worth of value to prospective employers over four years. And that’s a fairly conservative estimate.

Don’t be shocked if Boras lands another eight-figure annual salary for Beltre this offseason. He’s worth it.

* Please recognize and applaud the restraint I showed by not making the obvious Halladay-holiday pun.

First you have the Phillies, winners of the NL East three years running, representatives of the National League in the World Series two years in a row, and 2008 World Series champions. They live comfortably and don’t consider living up to the standards of others. In other words, they won’t fight to get the last toy in stock for their kids; they just want to get in, get out, and be done with the holiday rush.

So it is no surprise that in each of the past two off-seasons, new GM Ruben Amaro Jr. has rushed out into free agency, signing aging veterans Raul Ibanez and Placido Polanco very early on. Despite initial reluctance, Amaro’s kids (the fans) eventaully warmed up to Ibanez during an MVP-caliber first half of the 2009 season. As for Polanco, it is likely that the economics of his contract allowed Amaro to pursue a trade for Roy Halladay.

Mets GM Omar Minaya

Then you have the Mets, who have been wearing concrete shoes in the NL East these last few years. GM Omar Minaya epitomizes the type of shopper who has to buy his kids just as much as you bought yours, and more. You got your kids Rock Band? Well, the store just ran out of those, but Minaya bought Rock Revolution, a cheap knock-off. You got your kids an Arnold figurine from Terminator? Omar got his kids an Arnold figurine from Jingle All the Way. That not being enough, he’ll also do some more shopping after Christmas, with discounts abound.

The Phillies got Halladay; the Mets got Escobar, Bay, and Molina. That’s called “keeping up with the Joneses“.

The Mets certainly could have been serious contenders in the bidding for free agent Matt Holliday, who is an overall better, albeit more expensive, baseball player than Jason Bay. Holliday is younger, plays much better defense, and is adept at running the bases in addition to his superior skill at the plate. Simply put, Holliday is a better overall baseball player, averaging 5.0 WAR per season to Bay’s 3.5 (without factoring in base running). Additionally, given Holliday’s skill set, it is more likely that he will decline less rapidly than a bat-only player like Bay.

However, as R.J. Anderson points out, Bay’s contract is backloaded. The Mets will enjoy Bay now and pay for him later; they’re putting him on their credit card. It is unlikely that that would have been the case with Holliday. The money the Mets save in the short-term will help them bolster their roster in other areas as the regular season draws near. Should the Mets not find any players that pique their interest, they can use the money they’ll be saving to pick up an impact player at the July 31 trading deadline.

The Mets may have purchased the inferior product, but they have put themselves in a favorable position to compete with the Phillies for the NL East crown in 2010. That’s right: they may have bought their kids Rock Revolution instead of Rock Band, but the kids will have enough fun with it to validate the purchase. And in a few months, the Mets will be able to pick up Rock Band in the bargain bin. (Is this metaphor becoming jumbled yet?)

So the Mets now have a lineup that includes Jose Reyes, Carlos Beltran, David Wright, and Jason Bay. Barring the injury bug that paralyzed them last season, the Mets should once again find themselves in the top-half of the league in offense. Johan Santana, still among the best starting pitchers in baseball, will lead the starting rotation and is supported by a cast of mostly league-average or slightly better starters. Francisco Rodriguez is only 28 and still among the elite closers.

Still, the Mets may not be as talented a team as the rival Phillies. However, there is more than enough talent on their roster to win games at a 53% or better clip, putting them at least in the Wild Card race. In the event that they find themselves out of playoff contention before mid-September, Omar Minaya may find himself unemployed. For the health of the family, the Mets have to win in 2010. Otherwise, they will never live down the choke in Game 7 of the 2006 NLCS, the late-September slides in ‘07 and ‘08, and outright failure in ‘09 and ‘10.

All of the suave Christmas shopping will mean nothing in the wake of divorce.