Value.

It is a simple word, yet such a complicated concept. The meaning of the term is the source of considerable debate, especially as it relates to the game of baseball, where the subjective perception of value is forced to reconcile with the objectivity of performance stats. The numbers serve as an account of what transpires on the diamond, and the mathematically-savvy have specific preferences when evaluating the game under a statistical microscope.

The argument reaches its pinnacle at this time each year, as the doling out of end-season awards puts the definition of “value” on the front page, and fanatics across the country dissect the most deserving candidates for Rookie of the Year, Cy Young, and the Most Valuable Player. Naturally, the MVP award spurs the greatest arguments over the “true” definition of value, and the rules on every ballot provide little clarity to the situation, encouraging voters to consider any means necessary to arrive at their conclusions.

“There is no clear-cut definition of what Most Valuable means. It is up to the individual voter to decide who was the Most Valuable Player in each league to his team. The MVP need not come from a division winner or other playoff qualifier.”

Given these vague guidelines, it figures that some voters will come to very different conclusions, and my curiosity is piqued by the various methods for evaluating player performance. A strategic approach to the question of value can involve a myriad of factors, from statistical preferences to contextual adjustments and the role of team performance. Arguing the relative merits of ballplayers is the essence of fandom, and is the catalyst for sports bar banter across the country. Some folks will get bent out of shape over the results, but in the end, the collective opinion of the “experts” often matches that of the fans.

One need look no further than the front page of Baseball Prospectus and ESPN to see that the award announcements have brought forth a clash of the old stats versus the new. The Gold Gloves were the first to be revealed, and the stat community’s recent infatuation with defensive metrics had them at odds with the decisions of the MLB managers and coaches who vote on the auretum leather. A conflict should be expected, as field generals will naturally trust eyes and reputation above the numbers, while the drawback to defensive stats is the wide variance among the top systems.

Pitchers dominated the headlines in the first week of awards, as Cy Young announcements coincided with a pair of Rookies of the Year that both hail from the mound. Craig Kimbrel’s capturing of the N.L. rookie award was somewhat controversial, despite his dominant season, as many are critical of the relative impact that 70-inning closers have on a team’s bottom line. The A.L. prize went to right-hander Jeremy Hellickson, who had the best traditional numbers of the rookie pitcher class, but who fell short of his classmates according to some of the advanced stats.

Specifically, Helix carried a hit rate of 7.0 per nine innings last season, including a .210 batting average against and a shockingly low .224 BABiP. Most projection systems attempt to normalize hit rates in order to account for the influence of defense, while others (such as FIP) go so far as to completely ignore every ball put into play, and such statistical modifications drop Hellickson below fellow rookie Michael Pineda and his superior strikeout rate.

The issue of balls in play was a common thread in the arguments over Cy Young award winners in both leagues. On the surface there appears to be no debate, as both Clayton Kershaw and Justin Verlander won the vaunted pitching triple crown in their respected circuits, leading the leagues in ERA, wins, and strikeouts. Historically, winning the triple crown is pretty much a slam dunk for taking home the CY hardware, yet some modern stats cast doubt as to which pitcher was truly the most valuable. There were exceptional candidates in both the A.L. and the N.L., and the cases for CC Sabathia, Roy Halladay, and Cliff Lee were bolstered by metrics that adjust for elements such as home ballpark, strength of schedule, and balls in play.

Like Hellickson, both Kershaw and Verlander benefited from exceptionally low hit rates. They are hence penalized by the metrics that normalize hit rate, though the individual context of each pitcher provides a lesson in how such across-the-board adjustments can fall short. Hellickson was pitching in front of the best defense in the game, according to defensive efficiency, and it follows that his line was disproportionately aided by the gloves behind him. As a rookie, Helix lacks the data to establish a personal baseline at the MLB level, making it difficult to be anything but critical about the right-hander’s performance.

Kershaw has a longer track record than Hellickson, and data from his three full major league seasons reveal some remarkable tendencies. Kersh has consistently wrecked havoc on opponents’ batting averages, and 2011’s league-leading rate of 6.7 hits per nine innings is only the second-best mark of his last three years. The past three campaigns look remarkably similar, with the exception of the last number on the right.

The Claw has shaved his walk rate by an astounding 56% in just two years, refining his arsenal and ascending to elite status at the vernal age of 23. The Dodgers ranked ninth in the majors in defensive efficiency, and I see no need to apply league-wide regression to normalize the hit rates of a player whose season matches his career baseline, yet that methodology has been employed in various corners of the room in the effort to scuff Kershaw’s case against his worthy adversaries. The implication is that Kersh was “lucky” to allow so few hits, and that he is receiving credit for the work of his defense, but the evidence does not support such a claim.

The BABIP case takes a different turn with Justin Verlander.

Verlander’s 2011 season shattered his personal benchmarks in several categories, and the .237 BABIP is a clear outlier, but the peak season is not completely out of line with a career path that is volatile yet trending in all of the right directions. The Tigers ranked 18^th in the majors in defensive efficiency at .708, a number that was certainly bolstered by the 251 shutdown innings pitched by Verlander, and which only acts to strengthen his case in the value trial.

Verlander is likely to regress next year, as would anyone coming off of a season for the ages, and all of the predictive stats will reflect that expectation. V might never have another season like 2011, but that said, I would not use league-average rates as the basis for regression. Verlander is an outlier in a sea of right-tailed data points, and the laws of regression break down when dealing with outliers, hence they are often omitted from academic statistical analysis. Outliers are the exceptions that break the rules of statistical models, which is why I prefer to use player-specific baselines for the regression of star athletes with veteran sample sizes.

What we have here is a failure to communicate the ideal applications of statistical analysis, as adjusted stats do not retain the same utility in post-hoc analysis as they do with acts of projection. It is one thing to claim that Justin Verlander’s peripheral stats are indicators for decline next year, but quite another to boast that he is less valuable than CC Sabathia if one pretends that they both pitched in the same imaginary park against cloned opponents in front of a ghost defense. The more adjustments that are made to a player’s stat line, the further we travel from reality, and the more we distort the events that actually happened on the field. Moreover, the anger sharks start swimming in my head when some statisticians are willing to intentionally ignore 70% of the data via DIPS, and then claim to have a system that produces superior results.

Suffice to say that the voters were convinced of Verlander’s superiority, and on Monday the Detroit ace capped his epic season with a shiny new MVP award. He became the first pitcher to capture an MVP in 19 years, a feat made even more remarkable considering that the 1992 award went to Dennis Eckersley, and today’s writers would probably vote for a kicker before tabbing a relief pitcher as league MVP.

Aside from the Verlander angle, the MVP debates came down to the old argument of whether the award goes to the player with the best stats, or the one with the best numbers for a playoff team. Jose Bautista was the top offensive player in the American League, but playing for the 4th-place Blue Jays knocked him down on many ballots. Bautista finished third in the MVP voting, and was the only player in the top 12 that played for a non-contending club. The N.L. award came down to a very tight race between Ryan Braun and Matt Kemp, with both players posting MVP-worthy stats, and in the end Braun’s performance for a playoff-bound Milwaukee team trounced Kemp’s superior numbers to capture the hardware.

The MVP results were a blow to a portion of the baseball community that believes that a candidate should not receive credit for the work of his teammates. The thought process is in the same vein as DIPS theory, as an attempt to isolate a player’s individual contributions in order to assess his “true” value, and the implication is to remove the emphasis on team record and context-dependent batting stats such as runs and RBI. The strategy makes sense from the perspective of a GM who is trying to evaluate player performance in a vacuum, but I have to question the practice as it pertains to award voting.

The RBI may not have the most predictive value, but it is an essential component of baseball’s accounting system. The RBI leaderboards are typically populated by the game’s greatest sluggers, yet it is a statistic that is more appreciated in small sample sizes, as the hero of a single ball game is quite often the player who drives home the key run in a critical situation. The RBI weighs heavily when determining the MVP of a short series, and the award always goes to a player on the winning team. It would be almost unthinkable to grant the MVP of the LCS, World Series, or even the Super Bowl to someone from the losing side; therefore it is logically consistent to consider team performance when evaluating the merits of the league’s MVP.

Some of the greatest baseball minds have come to very different conclusions as to the “correct” way to assess value, leaving the numerically-inclined to choose a favorite flavor (or recipe) of stats. Most of the advanced metrics are very useful for evaluation, and while the quality of those stats varies from the ingenious to the inconsequential, the presence of so many options allows a baseball enthusiast to make comparisons at the click of a mouse. We have access to more data than ever before, and better ways to crunch the numbers, yet the various methods of massaging the box score have left the baseball community speaking different dialects of the same language.

Sabrmetrics is as much art as it is science. Studying the game optimally requires a blend of the objective and the subjective, and the field will continue to evolve as the world of available data expands beyond the box score. Until recently, statistical studies were limited by the handful of inputs that have been manually logged into baseball scorebooks for over a hundred years. That world is changing, beginning with the injection of Pitch f/x into the mainstream, and with new tools such as Hit f/x and hi-speed motion analysis knocking on the door to public discovery. The dynamic technology of Hit f/x has already leaked its fruits onto the statistical community, as Mike Fast of Baseball Prospectus was afforded a sneak preview that revealed some groundbreaking results.

We will delve deeper into Mike’s findings next time, as the True Value series continues with an inspection into the element of “luck” with respect to balls in play. In the meantime, we can reflect on the soothsaying skills of ESPN’s Jayson Stark, whose crystal ball predicted the winners of every major award about two months ago.

The alarm clock has rung, marking the dawn of the season of roster turnover, and some teams are wasting little daylight before addressing their off-season needs. The new faces extend to front offices all over the country, as no fewer than eight ballclubs are experiencing an overhaul with respect to upper-management. Those teams with key executives still intact have a head start, and last week the Royals and Giants consummated a deal involving starters from both sides, exchanging outfielder Melky Cabrera and starting pitcher Jonathan Sanchez.

The court of public opinion has deemed this trade a “win” for both clubs; the Giants dealt from their deep pitching corps to shore up an offense that ranked dead last in the NL in runs scored, and the Royals acquired a bat-missing veteran to place in their thin rotation, while at the same time opening up a spot for center field prospect Lorenzo Cain (acquired from Milwaukee in last winter’s Zack Greinke trade). Cabrera and Sanchez are both heading into their final year of arbitration, anticipating free agency after 2012, and though some have called it a financial “wash,” Sanchez is likely to earn a few million more shekels than Cabrera once the arb hearings are said and done. Perhaps this was part of the motivation for San Francisco, and might help to explain the inclusion of 24-year old pitching prospect Ryan Verdugo to cement the trade.

Some would say “case closed” at this point, but I cannot help but to dwell on the substantial loss of equity with respect to the value of Jonathan Sanchez, as Giants GM Brian Sabean engaged in a classic case of “buy high, sell low.” Sanchez’s value peaked at this time last year, after a season in which he recorded a 3.07 ERA and 1.23 WHIP en route to a World Series ring, helping to secure the first championship in San Francisco history. Sanchez was a rising star, a left-hander with K-per-inning stuff who had improved his ERA by at least three-quarters of a run every season of his career. He had a brutal walk rate of 4.5 free passes per nine innings during that 2010 season, which is pretty much par for the course for his career.

The wildness took a new extreme in 2011, maxing out at a Daniel Cabrer-ian 5.9 walks per nine. The K rate stayed above a whiff per frame, though it suffered a drop-off from the previous two seasons, and Sanchez’s stingy hit rate also remained at 2009-10 levels. Nonetheless, the southpaw’s value is at an all-time low, and Brian Sabean could not have picked a worse time to trade Sanchez. On the flip side, Melky Cabrera’s value is at an all time high, thanks to a 2011 season that saw career highs in batting average, slugging percentage, isolated power, home runs, runs, RBI, stolen bases, and every advanced metric on the market. Cabrera also posted a .332 BABiP, a mark that is 40 points higher than his career baseline entering 2011, and which stands out as a damning outlier. All considered, I have to agree with Keith Law that the Giants got the short end of the stick on this deal.

Perhaps the Gigantes had grown tired of Sanchez and his maddening inconsistency, but at least some of the lefty’s strike zone blindness could have been prevented with the right instruction. I have seen Sanchez pitch several times, and many of his command problems stem from a very basic element of the setup: his position on the stripe.

It appears that Sanchez is constantly battling the conventional wisdom that states, “left-handers pitch from the left side of the rubber.” The purpose of this instruction is to create a more difficult visual angle on opposing hitters, left-handed batters in particular, in an effort to further bolster the platoon advantage. There are a couple of issues with this strategy, starting with the fact that opposing managers will stack a lineup with right-handed bats versus a southpaw with heavy splits, thus minimizing the functional utility of the “lefty to the left side” rule. The other, more critical problem relates to mechanics, as pitchers that start on the far left side of the rubber will often finish the delivery left of the centerline (an imaginary line that extends from the middle of the rubber to the middle of home plate).

Ideally, a pitcher will drag the back foot along a path that approaches the centerline into release point, just before the foot lifts off the ground. Finishing with a centered position allows a pitcher to get his shoulders square to the plate, but a hurler that finishes to the arm-side of the centerline will need to over-rotate the shoulder axis in order to hit his targets. This creates a serious obstacle to finding a consistent release point, and in the case of Sanchez it makes it very difficult for him to effectively pitch inside to right-handed hitters.

The problem is exacerbated for closed-stride southpaws such as Sanchez, as they will naturally drift left of the centerline, even if they setup in the middle of the rubber. Pitchers can start in various positions and still finish on-center due to stride direction, but each player needs to find the unique setup position on the rubber that consistently puts him on the centerline at release point. When Sanchez pitches from the left side of the stripe, his closed stride finishes far off the centerline, and his delivery gets directed toward the left-side batter’s box.

One can watch Sanchez as he struggles to find a setup position to his liking, as he will move around the rubber throughout the game and from start to start. Sanchez has other mechanical issues aside from his setup position, particularly with repetition and timing, so he is likely never going to be a command guy. That said, he could be a minor adjustment away from shaving a walk per nine; finding a consistent starting position that lines him up at release point might just allow the lefty to come within spitting distance of league average. The Royals may not be at the forefront of biomechanics research, but they will make out like bandits in this deal if they can help Sanchez to find his release point. He is an excellent project for newly-minted pitching coach Dave Eiland, and it will be very interesting to see if any adjustments are made next season.

Game Seven of the World Series is an experience like no other. Every other elimination game involves one team having the chance to take a champagne shower, with the other just hoping to play another day, but Game Seven means do-or-die for every player on the field. It is guaranteed to be the penultimate day of the baseball season, regardless of outcome, and America had not been treated to a World Series Game Seven since the Angels and Giants went the distance nine years ago. Managers will take a different approach to Game Seven, with quick hooks and unrestrained use of the bullpen; there is nothing to save for tomorrow, and this challenge represents the ultimate test to a manager’s mettle.

This has been an epic series, with just about every element that a fan could want, starting with a couple of one-run games that were driven by strong pitching performances, followed by an offensive onslaught featuring a record performance by the game’s best player. Derek Holland and his mustache stole the headlines in Game Four, and the following night found the teams tied in the bottom of the eighth inning when Mike Napoli knocked a two-run double that would prove to be the difference. The chaotic battle of Game Six was equal parts terrific and horrific, perpetuated by horrid defense and sketchy managerial decisions. The win-or-die team face the final strike multiple times, coming back twice from two-run deficits (including a ninth-inning rally), before David Freese granted the baseball world one more day with an 11^th inning blast of walk-off proportions.

Game #7 wasted no time in stirring up the action. The Rangers got to Chris Carpenter for two quick runs in the top of the first inning, and the Cards responded in turn when St. Louis homeboy David Freese stroked a two-run double with two strikes and two out in the bottom half. The two-bagger gave Freese a run of three straight at bats with ultimate impact, given the previous night’s game-tying triple in the ninth and game-winning bomb in the eleventh. Carpenter continued to struggle with his location in the second inning, displaying issues with mechanical timing, but he would escape unscathed. Texas starter Matt Harrison was also off his game, causing Ron Washington to call the ‘pen and have C.J. Wilson warm up in the first inning, though Wilson’s services would not be called upon until later in the game.

Allen Craig continued his postseason clutchitude with a bomb in the third inning that put the Cardinals ahead 3-2, and three innings later he would turn the opposite trick by robbing Nelson Cruz of a homerun with a leaping snag at the left-field wall. Craig had already proved his ability to rise to the occasion early in the series, but his Game Seven feats with both bat and glove would help the crowd to forget that Matt Holliday was M.I.A. Meanwhile, Carpenter continued his playoff trend of bumpy entrances that smooth out as the game progresses, and proceeded to shut down the Rangers after the first inning.

The wheels came off the Ranger bandwagon in the bottom of the fifth. Scott Feldman came in to face the top of the Cardinal lineup, and went on to harness his inner Wild Thing by awarding four free passes to the six hitters that he faced, with one being intentional and another via the plunking of Pujols. Feldman did retire two hitters, but the final walk forced a run home, and C.J. Wilson entered the game with the bases loaded. Wilson came in with a playoff-record 19 walks this postseason, and he promptly hit Rafael Furcal with the first pitch of the at bat, forcing in another run to make the score 5-2.

Tony LaRussa operated his carousel of relievers in the top half of the seventh, kicking things off with his geriatric arms. Arthur Rhodes is a great story, as the 41-year old veteran pitching in his first career World Series, and to top off, he is pitching against the club that dropped him just two months ago. Rhodes combined with Octavio Dotel, the weary traveler with notches from twelve organizations on his belt, to get the Cards through the inning without damage.

The Cards tacked on another run in the bottom of the seventh, watched Lance Lynn retire the heart of the Texas lineup in order in the eighth, and then called on Jason Motte to close out the series. The Rangers looked defeated in the dugout as Motte pumped 98 mph fastballs, echoing the mood of owner/legend Nolan Ryan. Motte had the moxie (and the beard) to finish the job without incident, ending the season on a flyball to left field that Craig wrapped in leather, simultaneously setting the city of St. Louis into a state of fanaticism.

The World Series trophy marked the 11^th title in Cardinal history, good enough for the silver medal all-time, though they still trail the Yankees by a ridiculous 16 rings. St. Louis was also the fifth wild card team to win the World Series in the 17 years of the wild card era, and the first since the Red Sox historic trophy run of 2004. Freese was named Series MVP, which will sit right alongside the NLCS MVP award in his trophy cabinet (a feat last accomplished by Cole Hamels in 2008). Both teams fought admirably, and though the Texas Rangers were denied the organization’s first world championship for the second year in a row, they are well-poised to compete for the ultimate crown over the next several seasons.

Fire up the hot stove, and let the off-season begin.