The alarm clock has rung, marking the dawn of the season of roster turnover, and some teams are wasting little daylight before addressing their off-season needs. The new faces extend to front offices all over the country, as no fewer than eight ballclubs are experiencing an overhaul with respect to upper-management. Those teams with key executives still intact have a head start, and last week the Royals and Giants consummated a deal involving starters from both sides, exchanging outfielder Melky Cabrera and starting pitcher Jonathan Sanchez.

The court of public opinion has deemed this trade a “win” for both clubs; the Giants dealt from their deep pitching corps to shore up an offense that ranked dead last in the NL in runs scored, and the Royals acquired a bat-missing veteran to place in their thin rotation, while at the same time opening up a spot for center field prospect Lorenzo Cain (acquired from Milwaukee in last winter’s Zack Greinke trade). Cabrera and Sanchez are both heading into their final year of arbitration, anticipating free agency after 2012, and though some have called it a financial “wash,” Sanchez is likely to earn a few million more shekels than Cabrera once the arb hearings are said and done. Perhaps this was part of the motivation for San Francisco, and might help to explain the inclusion of 24-year old pitching prospect Ryan Verdugo to cement the trade.

Some would say “case closed” at this point, but I cannot help but to dwell on the substantial loss of equity with respect to the value of Jonathan Sanchez, as Giants GM Brian Sabean engaged in a classic case of “buy high, sell low.” Sanchez’s value peaked at this time last year, after a season in which he recorded a 3.07 ERA and 1.23 WHIP en route to a World Series ring, helping to secure the first championship in San Francisco history. Sanchez was a rising star, a left-hander with K-per-inning stuff who had improved his ERA by at least three-quarters of a run every season of his career. He had a brutal walk rate of 4.5 free passes per nine innings during that 2010 season, which is pretty much par for the course for his career.

The wildness took a new extreme in 2011, maxing out at a Daniel Cabrer-ian 5.9 walks per nine. The K rate stayed above a whiff per frame, though it suffered a drop-off from the previous two seasons, and Sanchez’s stingy hit rate also remained at 2009-10 levels. Nonetheless, the southpaw’s value is at an all-time low, and Brian Sabean could not have picked a worse time to trade Sanchez. On the flip side, Melky Cabrera’s value is at an all time high, thanks to a 2011 season that saw career highs in batting average, slugging percentage, isolated power, home runs, runs, RBI, stolen bases, and every advanced metric on the market. Cabrera also posted a .332 BABiP, a mark that is 40 points higher than his career baseline entering 2011, and which stands out as a damning outlier. All considered, I have to agree with Keith Law that the Giants got the short end of the stick on this deal.

Perhaps the Gigantes had grown tired of Sanchez and his maddening inconsistency, but at least some of the lefty’s strike zone blindness could have been prevented with the right instruction. I have seen Sanchez pitch several times, and many of his command problems stem from a very basic element of the setup: his position on the stripe.

It appears that Sanchez is constantly battling the conventional wisdom that states, “left-handers pitch from the left side of the rubber.” The purpose of this instruction is to create a more difficult visual angle on opposing hitters, left-handed batters in particular, in an effort to further bolster the platoon advantage. There are a couple of issues with this strategy, starting with the fact that opposing managers will stack a lineup with right-handed bats versus a southpaw with heavy splits, thus minimizing the functional utility of the “lefty to the left side” rule. The other, more critical problem relates to mechanics, as pitchers that start on the far left side of the rubber will often finish the delivery left of the centerline (an imaginary line that extends from the middle of the rubber to the middle of home plate).

Ideally, a pitcher will drag the back foot along a path that approaches the centerline into release point, just before the foot lifts off the ground. Finishing with a centered position allows a pitcher to get his shoulders square to the plate, but a hurler that finishes to the arm-side of the centerline will need to over-rotate the shoulder axis in order to hit his targets. This creates a serious obstacle to finding a consistent release point, and in the case of Sanchez it makes it very difficult for him to effectively pitch inside to right-handed hitters.

The problem is exacerbated for closed-stride southpaws such as Sanchez, as they will naturally drift left of the centerline, even if they setup in the middle of the rubber. Pitchers can start in various positions and still finish on-center due to stride direction, but each player needs to find the unique setup position on the rubber that consistently puts him on the centerline at release point. When Sanchez pitches from the left side of the stripe, his closed stride finishes far off the centerline, and his delivery gets directed toward the left-side batter’s box.

One can watch Sanchez as he struggles to find a setup position to his liking, as he will move around the rubber throughout the game and from start to start. Sanchez has other mechanical issues aside from his setup position, particularly with repetition and timing, so he is likely never going to be a command guy. That said, he could be a minor adjustment away from shaving a walk per nine; finding a consistent starting position that lines him up at release point might just allow the lefty to come within spitting distance of league average. The Royals may not be at the forefront of biomechanics research, but they will make out like bandits in this deal if they can help Sanchez to find his release point. He is an excellent project for newly-minted pitching coach Dave Eiland, and it will be very interesting to see if any adjustments are made next season.

Trade season is starting to warm up. The Roy Oswalt soap opera has lit the fuse on the powder keg of Rumor Central, and the suspense will only increase between now and the end of July.

With 30% of the baseball season already in the books, teams are taking stock of their rosters and addressing the weak links. April aberrations have given way to the power of sample size as we head into June, and the first trimester has provided enough information for MLB and fantasy managers alike to start giving some weight to performance stats.

April is it’s own beast when it comes to fantasy trades. Flocks of bargain-hunters send out a barrage of lopsided trade offers, attempting to snare a couple of suckers who buy too heavily into the first few weeks. Waiting in the weeds are the patient managers, who heed the lessons of sample size and ignore the chaotic fluctuations that mark the early season.

By June, fantasy GM’s of all styles are looking to improve their team through trade. Injuries and poor performance create holes in a roster that must be addressed for a team to stay competitive. Many fantasy players claim to have a system or secret recipe for trade negotiation, but the majority of players cling to one of just a few strategies.

The Door-in-the-Face

Any experienced fantasy player has woken up to find a ridiculous trade proposal in his email inbox, one that offers waiver-bait in exchange for a franchise player. This tactic is known as the door-in-the-face (DITF), and is the most popular trade strategy of Yahoo public league managers.

The goal of the door-in-the-face method is to start off so expensive that the sticker shock will throw off a trade partner’s value baseline. The DITF manager then follows up with an offer that looks like small potatoes when compared to the first proposal, making it seem like a relative bargain. He who sets the starting price is usually at a disadvantage in a negotiation, but this is not the case with the DITF.

Aggressive players love the DITF strategy, as it puts them in the position of power in the negotiation despite setting the price, given that the price-point is clearly unrealistic. A fantasy manager who utilizes the DITF should expect to face a lot of flat-out rejections, and runs the risk of burning bridges with league-mates who are insulted by the initial offer. Many of the deals will never get to the stage of a second proposal, so it takes perseverance to reap the full rewards of this strategy.

It can be costly to counter a door-in-the-face with a fair-value offer, because this plays right into the hands of the DITF. There are a couple options when confronted with a DITF, in order to find out if the offering manager is serious about a potential deal. One choice is to counter with an offer of equal sticker shock, with a note suggesting to meet somewhere in the middle. This strategy preserves the negotiation power and ambiguity of one’s intentions.

Another option is to just shut the door by rejecting the offer, adding a note that says, “We seem to be too far apart in value,” and then waiting for a reaction. Sometimes this ends the negotiation immediately, as the DITF manager realizes that he won’t be able to skin this particular sheep, while other times it results in a counter-offer that is much closer to fair value.

The Foot-in-the-Door

The quiet cousin of the door-in-the-face is the strategy of foot-in-the-door (FITD). A manager using FITD will initiate the negotiation with a reasonable starting offer, but this is merely bait. If he lures an interested fish, the manager will use his foot-in-the-door to continually ask for more value, thereby exploiting the opposing manager’s willingness to complete a deal in order to force a greater concession.

The FITD manager is cunning, as opposed to the testosterone-fueled approach of DITF. The foot-in-the-door comes off as much less aggressive than its face-slamming counterpart, which makes it tougher to turn these managers down. If the trade looks like it is close to getting done, the FITD trader will keep leaning for more, knowing that most people won’t let that little extra kill the deal.

Players taking the FITD approach should have a value floor in mind when making the initial offer. If starting with something simple like steals-for-saves, then there will be plenty of potential options throughout the league, and it will be easier to walk away from the manager that refuses to concede any additional value. When the trade target is more specific, it is wise to temper one’s expectations, and to try for minor additions by targeting low-profile players.

On the receiving end of a foot-in-the-door, it is crucial to identify the strategy early and to be willing to hold firm or eventually walk away if the price continues to rise. One way to keep the cost within reason is to mirror the pace of the negotiation; when the FITD manager asks for additional value, counter with an offer that brings more to your end of deal. The goal is to remain as close to the original offer as possible, and this seesaw battle will help to stabilize the trade around the initial proposal.

The Doorstop

Behind Door #3 is the zonk prize on our show, a stubborn mule that acts as a doorstop in negotiation. The doorstop is a more conservative player, overvaluing his hand and waiting for the ideal situation to arise. He pours a lot of time into analyzing trade targets and opposing team needs, and will typically make an offer that honestly attempts to help both clubs, but with very little wiggle room built into the price. Essentially what you see is what you get.

The clear benefit to the doorstop method is the potential for immediate acceptance, rather than a drawn-out negotiation. Many managers pay scant attention to public leagues, and a deal that requires multiple points of contact has less chance to succeed. On the flip side, it is human nature to look for a bargain, and many managers are reticent to accept any initial offer. The doorstop must constantly battle with opposing managers that refuse to complete a trade without earning some type of concession.

The common goal of all negotiators is to get something more, and the doorstop method is often met with DITF’s and FITD’s, so the lack of flexibility can frustrate opposing managers. The doorstop leaves himself open to a vast array of reactions, so he must hold ground in order to adhere to the strategy. Some managers will be stoked to receive an offer that is not a door-in-the-face, and which considers their own team’s needs. But they will still be wary of a potential foot-in-the-door from a snake-in-the-grass. 

It’s relatively easy to respond to the doorstop, because the manager’s interpretation of fair-value is woven into the initial offer, setting up a perfect situation for a foot-in-the-door response. If the manager is willing to spend the time and energy to come up with a balanced proposal, then they should be down to accept a similar offer that considers their own team needs. That last point is key, because the doorstop is not going to budge very far, and one needs to show them some respect in order to get even a little something extra. It helps to identify the doorstop early in trade talks, so you can save time and just walk away if the initial offer is too weak.

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One of the most important steps in a negotiation is to identify the strategy that is used by an opposing manager. Pinpointing the negotiation tactic will dictate the best route for completing a deal without falling into any traps, which is necessary to avoid a fleecing. Countering with a mirror offer works well with the DITF and the FITD, if only because it lets the other manager know that the jig is up. It functions as a filter for the serious offers and sends the bounty hunters on their way.

It can be fun to play with these different negotiation strategies, experimenting with offers to different managers in various leagues to find out which is most profitable. It’s like playing poker; a conservative player might sit down at a table and decide that the optimal strategy is to be aggressive, based on the table dynamic.

The team making the first offer can lose some leverage in a negotiation, but methods like the DITF and the FITD help to preserve that leverage. The risk lies in the frustration of opposing managers, and greater care should be taken when swinging the door in leagues with friends or co-workers. I have seen friendships threatened by a lack of negotiation savvy, and it’s not easy to explain to your boss that the fight at the water cooler resulted from an offer of Paul Konerko for Mark Teixeira.

There comes a point in your life where it seems like everyone else has what you want. Maybe you’re out of college, working a crummy job or single. Maybe it’s worse — maybe you dropped out, got fired, or got dumped. When you walk through the city, the only people you seem to see seare college kids having fun, wealthy business men and women in power suits, and blissfully happy couples enjoying each other’s company. It’s enough to make you disillusioned. That’s been the off-season for the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim thus far.

As the confetti was swept up after New York’s celebration of yet another World Series victory, Angels fans had reason to be very optimistic. The team won 97 games during the regular season, reached the American League Championship Series against the Yankees, and the organization was setting its sights on Roy Halladay, then a member of the Toronto Blue Jays. Even as it became clear that Hallday would eventually become a Phillie, the Angels were still in on a potential Cliff Lee trade. They also showed more than a passing interest in Cuban defector Aroldis Chapman.

Yet, here we are now, just weeks away from P & C and the Angels have lost to free agency:

• The second-most valuable third baseman in the American League last year (according to FanGraphs) in Chone Figgins to the Seattle Mariners;
• Ace starter John Lackey to the Boston Red Sox;
• Gimpy DH Vladimir Guerrero to the Texas Rangers

The Angels have responded by signing:

• Gimpy DH Hideki Matsui for one year, $6 million;
• Wild Fernando Rodney for two years, $11 million;
• Joel Piniero for two years, $16 million

In essence, the Angels have swapped gimpy designated hitters, downgraded from Lackey to Piniero, lost Figgins and gained Rodney. Meanwhile, Roy Halladay went to Philadelphia, Cliff Lee went to Seattle, and Aroldis Chapman went to Cincinnati. The Angels wanted an ace pitcher and they ended up with Joel Piniero. It’s the kind of dream/reality contrast one would expect to find with the New York Mets, not the L.A. Angels.

Losing Figgins opens up third base for Brandon Wood or Maicer Izturis. That makes the soon to be 36-year-old Bobby Abreu the team’s most dangerous base-stealing threat. The lineup figures to slug more home runs and run the bases less aggressively unless Izturis defies the expectations of both stats and scouts. Furthermore, the loss of Figgins leaves the lineup thin in terms of patient hitters. Bobby Abreu drew 94 walks last year, but after him, the next-highest walks total was Torii Hunter’s 47.

Overall, the 2010 Angels look to be weaker offensively according to the projections.

Click the image below to enlarge.

Kendry Morales, Maicer Izturis, Torii Hunter, Hideki Matsui, Juan Rivera, Bobby Abreu, and Erick Aybar are all projected to perform worse in ‘10 than in ‘09. Howie Kendrick is expected to repeat what he did last year, and only catchers Mike Napoli and Jeff Mathis are expected to improve.

The addition of Fernando Rodney does little to improve a bullpen that ranked 11th out of 14 American League teams in ERA last season. Angels relievers blew 19 saves, seven of which came from closer Brian Fuentes whose ERA was much too close to 4.00. All told, the Angels are spending over $25 million, or about 25% of their payroll before arbitration cases are settled, on decidedly mediocre relief pitching.

What it boils down to then, is that the Angels are relying heavily on a starting rotation that includes four pitchers that are still under the age of 30 in Scott Kazmir, Joe Saunders, Ervin Santana, and Jered Weaver. Including newcomer Pineiro, the CHONE projections see all five starters earning ERA’s above 4.00:

• Weaver: 4.10
• Kazmir: 4.23
• Pineiro: 4.37
• Santana: 4.53
• Saunders: 4.57

The odds are that the projections won’t nail all five of them, so I wouldn’t bet on the Angels starting rotation looking as bad as CHONE says. However, the Angels could have easily improved the rotation but GM Tony Reagins seems to be content relying on young talent with thin resumes (or, in the case of Kazmir, a durability issue).

At the moment, it is the L.A. Angels who take the cake for having baseball’s least productive off-season. They played like a 92-win team last year according to their Pythagorean W-L. As they are constructed presently, the Angels are a mid-80’s team (about 87 if you’re looking for a ballpark number) in terms of wins. Considering how significantly the Seattle Mariners have improved, the Angels couldn’t afford to downgrade.

Reagins did so willingly: he tailed off his pursuit of multiple ace pitchers and waved the white flag after attempting to retain John Lackey. He settled for Pineiro, Matsui, and Rodney, much like the aforementioned disillusioned settle for DeVry University, a job waiting tables, and a significant other with a face only a mother could love.

* The article title and opening two lines reference the song “The Noose” by A Perfect Circle. It’s a good bet that most Baseball Daily Digest readers are not as obsessed with Maynard James Keenan’s work as I am, so I figured I’d do the public a service and point it out. Angels… Halos…