It’s hard to defend Howard’s emotional outbursts in a critical game that cost the Phillies their top RBI man and first baseman and thrust pitcher Roy Oswalt into left field, the clean-up spot in the lineup, and Phillies’ history but then again, it’s hard to see how anything Howard did warranted an ejection in the 2nd inning, let alone the 14th inning of a tie game where both teams’ benches were depleted.

But Scott Barry thought otherwise. Like a skilled hunter, Barry baited his prey early in the at-bat. After Howard put his hands on his hips — frustrated by an accurate Barry call on a check swing — the umpire mocked Howard by placing his hands on his hips and staring down the Phillies’ first baseman. The stare down continued as the at-bat continued. Four pitches later, Howard checked his swing again (this time not going around) and Barry rung him up. In disgust, Howard threw his bat down the line and began walking to first. From roughly 120 feet away, Barry sent the Phillies’ slugger to the showers with an uncalled-for ejection.

The facts of the events — preserved at MLB.com — will surely get blown out of proportion. Some will have Howard throwing his bat and helmet (the helmet launched after the ejection). Others will have the first baseman furiously charging Barry who fled toward the left field foul pole (again, it happened… but after the ejection). During the incident, the Houston Astros radio announcers described how Howard pushed umpire Sam Holbrook as he tried to make his way to Barry (actually, it was Holbrook who pushed Howard as the first baseman was restrained by Placido Polanco and Sam Perlozzo as Holbrook jumped in front of Ryan and decided it was his place to put his hands on a player even though such an action by a player would be a slam dunk suspension and fine).

The ejection launched Tuesday’s Astros-Phillies game into surreal status as Roy Oswalt was sent in to play left field and Barry, an umpire, was sent to the top of Philadelphia’s Twitter Trending list. The Phillies went on to lose. Coincidentally, Oswalt — in Howard’s spot in the lineup — made the final out representing the winning run.

Sadly, the story is an umpire. And not even a Major League one (Barry is a AAA call-up).

Even more unnerving is the fact that Barry has thrust himself into the spotlight before. Last week, Barry ejected Nationals’ third baseman Ryan Zimmerman for throwing his bat after striking out during the 8th inning of yet another 2-2 game with playoff implications (the Braves were the opponents and eventual winners of the game).

Barry’s Zimmerman ejection — the first of Ryan’s life — was even less defensible. Sent to the showers without a word or negative action toward the umpire, Barry decided to put the spotlight on himself rather than the game with a substantially unnecessary ejection of the team’s best player in a game that could have an impact on who plays in the postseason and who doesn’t.

In both cases, the games were likely to end the same way — with the Braves winning in the 9th over the lowly Nationals and the Astros finally scoring a run to break the extra-inning stalemate with the offensively dormant Phillies — but now there’s the “what if” that looms. In either case, the odds that anyone of the 45,000-plus that showed up in Philadelphia or 18,000-plus on hand in Atlanta paid to watch Scott Barry throw out a guy named Ryan are slim to none.

Unfortunately, for those who paid to watch a baseball game with the best Major League talent both sides had to offer, a minor league umpire stole the spotlight for a minute with his unnecessary impact on the game.

Cameron’s entry instantly brought back memories of the BDD Dream Draft conducted before the 2009 season and the team I selected, mainly because I was pretty sure I had selected the man Cammy identified as his build around player — Ryan Zimmerman — although I knew he wasn’t my first pick (that was Joe Mauer… how’d I do?).

At the time, Zimmerman wasn’t even my secondary or tertiary (those selections were CC Sabathia and Brandon Phillips) but he was coming off of injury and whenever participating in any kind of draft, I always wait a round or two longer to select a guy with any sort of question mark surrounding him because I assume how I value him will not be how others do. In the case of Zimmerman, it worked out.

Here’s what I said about the selection at the time:

The 24-year-old 3B had a decent year despite injury and should only get better if most of the major projections are to be believed. In addition to his solid bat, Zimmerman is definitely no slouch in the field and should be moving into his prime over the next few years. As young as Zimmerman is, I’m not going to sweat last year’s injury and solidify one of my two corner infield needs.

Having later filled my other corner infield slot with Adrian Gonzalez (in the 10th round!!!), things have been looking up for Brian Joseph’s Dream Team. Considering the caliber of baseball minds brought in to participate in the draft (the faux GMs can be reviewed here) and how my team has fared through 1-3/4 seasons of play (here’s a recap of the first year where this writer’s team had accumulated 43.6 WAR — nearly 8 wins more than the next closest GM), the satisfaction level with the BJDT (everything has to have an acronym, right?) has been pretty high.

With the exception of one player.

When I took Travis Snider in the 5th round, I was a little unsure of the pick at the time. So, his struggles over the past 2 seasons have not been surprising. Taking his current age of 22 into consideration and he’s still part of the BJDT for 4 more seasons (the idea was to construct the team focusing on the next 6 years), he’s not the one player that has left me totally dissatisfied.

That player is Nate McLouth. Taken one round after Snider, I remember wanting to add a center fielder. With Grady Sizemore (1st round to Eric Seidman), Josh Hamilton (2nd round to Joe Hamrahi), B.J Upton (2nd round to Cory Schwartz), Cameron Maybin (4th round to Melissa Lockard), Matt Kemp (4th round to Bill Baer), Curtis Granderson (4th round to Michael Street), and Carlos Beltran (5th round to Eric San Inocencio) all gone, center field was no longer just a John Fogerty song playing in my head because baseball season was growing near. It came down to two players and with the 53rd selection in the BDD Dream Draft, Brian Joseph selects:

Nate McLouth, CF, Pittsburgh Pirates

Let me continue to fill up my outfield and lock up CF with this selection. This came down to two players and I may end up selecting the other at some point so I won’t mention him but I settled on Nate McLouth of the Pittsburgh Pirates. McLouth’s speed, power ability to lead off and play center and his age — 27 this year — all made him an attractive choice. McLouth did struggle at times last year but was also fantastic more than he struggled. I know many were critical of the Gold Glove he received and I agree that McLouth didn’t really deserve the award but his defense was at least average and at times better than average.

At the time, McLouth was the “safe” pick in my mind compared to the other player I alluded to in my write-up of my 6th round selection. With McLouth, I thought I was getting a bat with an undervalued glove statistically (his -12.3 fielding runs during his Gold Glove year looked like a fluke). And during the 2009 season, it looked like I was right. While his hitting fell off, McLouth’s glove became respectable in the eyes of UZR although his average performance wasn’t enough to stop the Gold Glove jokes.

This year, on the other hand, has been a disaster. Through yesterday, McLouth is hitting .168/.279/.265 and there isn’t a defensive metric (or pair of eye balls) that considers him even adequate in the field in 2010. His performance earned him a demotion to Gwinnett where he continues to struggle and he left last night’s minor league clash with a shin injury.

Needless to say, from McLouth, to quote the Rolling Stones, I can’t get no satisfaction!

What’s especially troubling is the “other player” I alluded to who was never revealed and never selected in the draft — Michael Bourn.

Looking back over the past 1-3/4 year, Bourn easily ranks among the best center fielders in the game but at the time of this draft, he was coming off of a .229/.288/.300 season and a visually dazzling but statistically average defensive first full season with the Astros. He was the butt of Ed Wade jokes who gave away baseball’s perfect closer for a really fast outfielder who hit like a pitcher.

At the time, there was a part of me looking to save face and making a guy like Bourn one of the top 60 players selected in a Dream Draft would have been enough to make at least a few people snicker. Heck, I was questioning my sanity when I looked down at my short list of center fielders.

Compounding the issue for the BJDT was a rumor of the Dream Draft being extended to 15, 25 or 40 rounds, even. Knowing how highly I valued Bourn at the time and no one in their right mind valued him as much as I did — except for Wade, maybe, and he wasn’t one of the GMs involved in our little thought exercise — I fully expected the draft to continue beyond 10 rounds, for Bourn to be sitting there as a backup plan to McLouth and Snider (with McLouth moving to right or left field, of course) and for me to scoop him up.

The draft never continued. I never selected Bourn. The BJDT while still very good (the club has accumulated another 25.5 WAR in 2010 so far) could have been so much better if I had some guts.

Alas, no guts, no glory. Or worse yet — Nate McLouth!

While a few thousand words could be spent picking apart Cistulli’s dumbassery disguised as intelligent commentary, let’s avoid the bait and cut to the baseball information. Although let’s at least mention that ripping what the New York Times dot com readers enjoy reading for being garbage and reason to lose all faith in humanity then following it with a 7-paragraph love fest toward a man being held up as a hero for berating a human being, cursing in public, and stealing beer (The beer is noteworthy because of he grabbed a couple of Diet Pepsis no one would find it cool) is selective in what is approved and not approved behavior.

Back to the baseball portion of the post:

According to Cistulli, job security is awful for a Major League Baseball manager. His proof? Six managers have lost their job this year! SIX!!! (Actually, it’s been 5 and 1 interim manager but who’s counting?) What jumps out to Cistulli is the 20% turnover rate for the Major League manager!

What jumps out first from this list is that a full six of those men weren’t managers at the beginning of the season. That means, right off the bat, that 20% of the employees from this particular group were fired just this year. Consider, by way of comparison, if Morrison & Foerster (the New York-based law firm known affectionately as MoFo) were to fire 20% of its associates. People would, in the parlance of today’s youth, freak the eff out.

I’m going to assume that said “freak(ing) the eff out” only applies to 2010 since, in 2009, “MOFO” laid off 201 employees. With a staff of roughly 1,000-1,500 employees, the turnover rate is similar to that of the highest ranking managerial position in professional baseball. Such a decision by MOFO likely met with “What do you call 53 attorneys at the bottom of a lake?” jokes amongst the “people” unless one of those lawyers acted like a fool toward their ex-employers and stole some complimentary chocolates.

Then, Cistulli breaks down the tenure of a Major League manager to 4.5 years then by using the median, claims the length of employment is closer to 3 years. This, of course, ignores years spent as a manager with other teams, although Cistulli alludes to (and dismisses) such a phenomenon in the next paragraph.

After providing the evidence of how volatile and insecure the job of a Major League manager is, Cistulli poses this thought experiment (A “thought experiment” is what people who are highly educated and obsessed with shoving down your throat the fact that they are able to use words with more than 2 syllables call a question):

Let’s try a thought experiment. Say I’m a dude who can offer you a job. And say this job is pretty hot. But here’s the thing about it: you’re probably gonna be fired in 2013.

Would you take it?

If for some reason, you’re on the fence here, let’s dig a little deeper into the shelf life of a Major League manager. From 2005-2009, 31 Major League managers lost their jobs. At an average of 6.2 managers per season, 2010, so far, is looking fairly typical and supports Cistulli’s claim that being a manager isn’t as secure as the jobs of his circle of friends. (Note: Cistulli’s circle of friends includes 3 lawyers, 3 writers, a librarian, a writing instructor, and a computer programmer. It does not include anyone from the hospitality or retail industries which historically have turnover rates in the 30-40% range.) While life is good for Carson’s dinner party guests, the turnover rate for a Major League manager is perfectly in line with studies done on the turnover rate for the general workforce. A study done by Culpepper and Associates showed that turnover for 191 participating organizations in various industry sectors was 17% in 2009 (down from 22% in 2007). Other information about turnover (easily found through a Google search or a conversation with your local big box retail manager) reveals that 20% is fairly consistent (if not slightly conservative) with what happens in the “real world.”

The one thing drastically different about the shelf life of a Major League manager and the shelf life of Joe Employee is the actual job security that comes with being a Major League manager. Even if it isn’t as a Major League manager, a long career in baseball can be expected. Here’s a breakdown of the 31 managers who lost their jobs from 2005 to 2009:

• Current Major League Managers: 10
  Lou Piniella (Cubs), Ken Macha (Brewers), Bruce Bochy (Giants), Joe Girardi (Yankees), Dusty Baker (Reds), Buck Showalter (Orioles), Joe Torre (Dodgers), Jim Tracy (Rockies), Ned Yost (Royals), Manny Acta (Indians)
  
• Current Major League Bench Coaches: 5
  Alan Trammell (Cubs), Tony Pena (Yankees), Willie Randolph (Brewers), John Gibbons (Royals), John McLaren (Nationals)
  
• Current Major League Hitting Coaches: 2
  Lloyd McClendon (Tigers), Clint Hurdle (Rangers)
  
• Other Baseball Jobs: 7
  Art Howe (Top Coach at MLB European Academy)
  Felipe Alou (Semi-retired/Manager of Dominican Republic team at WBC)
  Frank Robinson (Works in Commissioner’s Office)
  Buddy Bell (Director of Minor League Operations for Chicago White Sox)
  Sam Perlozzo (3rd Base Coach for Philadelphia Phillies)
  Bob Melvin (Scout for New York Mets)
  Dave Miley (Manager of Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, Yankees AAA Team)
  
• Retired: 1
  Jack McKeon

That leaves 6 who are without jobs in baseball, although Eric Wedge took the year off to give himself a mental/physical break and Mike Hargrove, who walked away in 2007, cited “burn out” as the reason he wasn’t currently working in a recent newspaper interview. Of the other 4, Cecil Cooper and Phil Garner are actively seeking employment, Jerry Narron is on the public speaking circuit, and Grady Little is alive.

Wedge, Hargrove, and Garner continue to be on the short list of clubs seeking managers and Wedge stated he was offered jobs from 6 or 7 organizations following his dismissal in Cleveland. Cooper wants to work again in baseball but he’s also one of the most recent of the “unemployed” on the above list.

That leaves 2: Jerry Narron, a 5-year managerial veteran with a lifetime 291-341 (.460) record with 2 clubs, and Grady Little, a relatively successful manager in his 4 years in the Majors (358-290, .552) but more known for his decision to leave Pedro Martinez in too long during a playoff meltdown against the Yankees that continued the “Curse of the Bambino.”

Cistulli concludes:

Whatever the case may be, the principal draw of baseball’s managerial positions certainly isn’t job security.

It isn’t?

Unfortunately for Poz, writing about the Mariners in a negative light has consequences and someone is always going to stick their head up the bull’s ass to find out if that really was a T-bone no matter how respected the butcher is. Enter Dave Cameron who is always at the ready when it comes to bull.

After reading Posnanski’s take on this year’s Mariners, Cameron was more surprised than disappointed. The guy who almost always gets it right, got it wrong. Dave’s words, not mine. To be fair, here’s the exact reaction from Cammy (leaving out Dave’s flair for overreaction would be incendiary:

I was surprised more than I was disappointed. The guy who almost always gets it right missed, and missed big time.

Then, Dave (over)reacts to one of his favorite writers raining some reality on his favorite parade. Let’s start with the heart of the Cameron rebuttal to Posnanski’s article:

No, it was not obvious in February. There’s a reason you didn’t see this coming, Joe – it was impossible to see coming. The things that have sunk the team – getting career worst years from Bradley, Kotchman, Figgins, Jose Lopez, Snell, and Rowland-Smith – were not things that you could predict. There was no reason to believe that those six guys would all play at replacement level or below. None.

It’s interesting to what Cameron points to as the “things that have sunk the team.” It’s hard to argue that any of the players mentioned aren’t having career worst years but, again, this is an oversimplification of the Mariners’ problems in 2010. In all cases, there were at least yellow flags and in others, the team was able to negate the negative impacts quickly.

For example, Ian Snell and Ryan Rowland-Smith are perfect to look at. Back in October, Cameron penciled in Snell and RRS for 2.5 WAR this season. At the time, there wasn’t an inkling of Cliff Lee, Seattle Mariner and Brandon Morrow was still in the rotation. So, to be more accurate on Cameron’s projection, Snell, RRS, Jason Vargas, and Doug Fister would supply the team with 550 innings and 3.5 WAR.

Even if we accept that Snell — a 28-year-old pitcher with two consecutive declining seasons — would stabilize and RRS — whose similarity scores at age 26 list Jim Shellenback, Ken Patterson, Garland Braxton, Don Gross, and Ken Frailing as his top comparisons — would be a 1-2 WAR contributor in his first full year as a starter, there’s still a major problem with including both of these pitchers amongst the list of “things that sunk the team.” With Lee in and Morrow out, the last 3 rotation spots went to the foursome of Snell, RRS, Vargas, and Fister projection-wise. In Cammy’s estimation, this quartet should have produced 3.5 WAR in 550 innings, a pretty fair amount of innings to attribute to the final 3 spots in the rotation.

How are they doing so far? Through 387 innings, the 4 pitchers have added 2.0 WAR to the Mariners. While the 2.0 WAR for the quartet is below the 2.5 WAR the group should have added, according to Cameron’s preseason projections, it’s hard to believe 0.5 wins is enough to “sink” the Mariners’ ship.

What about Chone Figgins? Even though Figgins hasn’t been very good in Seattle, there’s still a chance he rebounds enough to better his worst offensive performance, 2006, which was coincidentally the last season he also wasn’t an asset in the field (like 2010) and didn’t play third base (he was an outfielder in ‘06). Right now, his 0.7 WAR is still not officially Figgins’ worst season (yet) and is only roughly 1 win below what Cameron thought the team would get if Jose Lopez was the everyday second baseman.

Speaking of Lopez, it’s hard to fathom why his ‘10 drop-off should be considered such an unexpected decline. Using batting runs as a measurement, until ‘08, Lopez consistently “added” -16.4 batting runs/150 games. Lopez’s “breakout” year in 2008 equated to 2.1 batting runs, aided by a .306 BABIP. While his BABIP was more in line in ‘09, Lopez’s 11.1% HR/FB was much higher than his career 7.2% HR/FB and probably didn’t hurt his “impressive” 0.1 batting run contribution. Even with his rough offensive season and switch to a position where more is expected offensively, Lopez has added 0.2 WAR — about 0.5 WAR less than Cammy projected for their third base hole.

At the time Cameron wrote about “The Foundation” (a group capable of winning 75 [or 79 if you preferred Cammy's analysis of "The Roster Quantified" two months prior] without any additional off-season help), Milton Bradley wasn’t part of the equation. Then again, neither was much contribution from a DH. But a Bradley collapse wasn’t completely out of the equation, in retrospect. Last year’s struggles for Bradley on the field were masked by the difficulty he had in the dugout and the clubhouse. In addition, a look through Bradley’s similar batters didn’t bode well for his Age 32 season. Ivan Calderon retired after his Age 31 decline and only Paul O’Neill produced more than 2 WAR at Age 32. The others that made worthwhile offensive contributions at Age 32 — Carl Everett and Trot Nixon — were obligations at the plate by Age 33.

Finally, there’s Casey Kotchman. For some reason, Cameron can’t seem to let go of the fact that Kotchman was once considered a hitting prospect. The fact of the matter is that Kotchman hasn’t produced offensively since 2007 when he hit .296/.372/.467. In ‘08 and ‘09, Kotchman lived off of his plus glove as his poor offense was compounded by playing a position where big offense is expected. Below league average does come as a surprise but it’s not something that should be looked at as unfathomable. The one thing that could be counted on was Kotchman not living up to the 3.8 WAR produced at first base by the Mariners’ 2009 first basemen.

In every single case, the player is performing so far below any reasonable expectation that you cannot make a case that this was something that anyone should have seen coming.

Again, pinning the Mariners’ disaster on the collapse of all 6 of these players is short-sighted and claiming these 6 were “so far below any reasonable expectation” is asinine. Snell not only showed signs of slipping over the past 2 years but battled a mental breakdown before joining Seattle. Bradley was always an off-the-field wild card, took a step backward on the field in ‘09, and historically resembled others who saw their offense disappear at age 32 and beyond. RRS was being asked to do something he never did before for an entire season. Figgins was asked to play a position other than third base and had a history of inconsistent offensive output. Lopez never really was a plus on offense and within positional context, neither was Kotchman… no matter how “in their prime” the pair was entering 2010.

Joe’s assertion is that looking at multiple years of data would have allowed us to see that the Mariners had a terrible offense and would crash and burn. The problem, though, is that this isn’t reality. ZiPS projected the Mariners for 86 wins, and it’s based on data, not off-season hype. CHONE was a bit more conservative, coming in at 78 wins, but not projecting any AL West team for more than 86 wins. Overall, the best projection systems thought the M’s were about a .500 team, maybe a little bit better.

Whether or not Joe’s assertion was right or wrong, Cameron’s breakdown of the projection systems is not accurate (including his claim that CHONE came in at 78 wins when the link he supplied says CHONE came in at 77 and ZiPS at 86.6 or 87). Considering CHONE’s projection of 77 wins is one win more than their call on the Nationals and ZiPS predicted a similar win total for the Cardinals, the projections feel somewhat wide in their views.

More importantly, comparing Poz’s claim that “we should have known” and how teams are portrayed by projection systems is like comparing apples to oranges. Take ZiPS for example. The projection system had the Mariners on top of the AL West and only 5 teams in baseball better than the #6Org.

To repeat:

Overall, the best projection systems thought the M’s were about a .500 team, maybe a little bit better.

Cammy would want to stress how there wasn’t a lot of wild optimism like Posnanski seems to claim in his article… Or would he? Here’s Cameron’s response to a comment at “Inside The Book” regarding the two posts:

ZiPS had them winning the division.  In the RLYW simulations based on CHONE, MARCEL, PECOTA, OLIVER, and CAIRO, the team won the division 25.6% of the time and won the wild card another 3.8% of the time.  At 29.4%, the only teams that had better playoff odds before the season (per the projection systems, minus the one most optimistic about the roster) were the big three in the AL East, Minnesota, and Texas.

Is it just me or is that pretty freakin’ optimistic? Here’s Cameron’s comment at U.S.S. Mariner to contradict his comment at “Inside The Book”:

The idea that there was this runaway, uncontrollable optimism about the Mariners season that was unfounded based on facts is just revisionist history. By any reasonable standard, this team should have been viewed as a .500ish club – one with some problems, but also one with strengths. If things went their way, they could have been a contender. Instead, absolutely nothing has gone their way, and the result has been a disaster.

There’s that “nothing has gone their way” comment again. Hard to believe someone could write that with a straight face knowing Vargas and Fister have contributed as many WAR as Tim Hudson, Barry Zito, Cole Hamels, Andy Pettitte, and Mike Pelfrey.

More importantly, it might not be “runaway” optimism but 1 projection system had the club in the playoffs and the rest had the team in the playoffs 29.4% of the time. Only 5 teams in the AL had better playoff odds. Cameron himself wrote the club had a “great shot” at the playoffs. But he also admitted:

… the season hinges on several unpredictable players.

Of the 6 players that “sunk the season”, 4 were on Cameron’s list of the unpredictable. Although his preseason preview didn’t put a win number on it, Cameron says he called for 83 wins. He also claimed the Mariners had a “great shot at the playoffs” if the pieces fell into place despite 1 projection system (CHONE) having the team in the bottom third of the league and only 1 of the 4 feeling this club was the best team on paper and that was more due to the expected drop-off of the other teams.

But none of that stopped the optimism Posnanaski talked about, the same optimism Cameron now denies. While only 1 of the projection systems made the Mariners their division pick in the AL West, ESPN: The Magazine slapped the Mariners on their front cover. There were plenty of experts — including Posnanski — who wrote in Mariners next to AL West division winner. If Cameron was so sure there was reason to be cautious maybe he should have offered a rebuttal to Poz’s preseason decree:

… the Mariners are everyone’s favorite, including my own, going into the season…

In the same breath, Cameron still claims the 2010 Mariners were a good team on paper and this collapse was beyond any reasonable expectations:

But no one saw this coming, and no one should have seen this coming, because this was essentially the perfect storm of problems in one season. There’s a reason Murphy has a law – sometimes, everything that could go wrong does. This is one of those times. It is not, however, a chance to look back and say “well, we should have known better.” No, you shouldn’t have. The team was evaluated fairly based on the best information available. It didn’t work out. That’s life.

If Cameron means this year’s incarnation is headed for 100 losses and no one should have expected it, well, duh! Of course not. No one should ever expect any team to lose 100 games. Even for awful teams, a lot has to go wrong to accomplish that. But Poz’s point was that this team should have been seen as an also ran instead of a contender. He even illustrated it vividly with his re-telling of the 1987 Cleveland Indians’ story.

One thing neither Cameron nor Posnanski talked much about was last year’s Mariners team. There were obvious concerns on the surface because of their Pythagorean W-L record but any type of analysis based solely on that is lazy. Actually, the ‘09 Mariners were roughly 39 wins above replacement. And, even though they added a decent amount of talent, could it be expected to win any more games than 2009?

Sure, Cliff Lee was a great acquisition but the next 35 starts after King Felix in 2009 came from Jarrod Washburn and Erik Bedard. While Lee is a huge upgrade on paper over both (Washburn because he’s just not that good and Bedard because he can’t stay healthy), the pair combined for 4.6 WAR in 2009. How much more could be expected from Lee?

While Figgins seemed like an okay signing at the time, his true talent wasn’t the 6.1 WAR he posted in 2009. It wasn’t the replacement level he played at in 2006, either. It probably was somewhere in the middle in the 2-3 WAR range, very similar to the 2.4 WAR the Mariners got from Adrian Beltre in 2009.

Writing in Kotchman on the lineup card at first base should have meant better defense but defense is the one area of the game we’re least skilled at quantifying and predicting. And, even at his best Casey at the glove wasn’t worth more than 1 win in the field. On the other hand, his job was to replace Russell Branyan’s very good season from 2009 where not only was he good at the plate, he wasn’t even a liability in the field. The Mariners got 3.8 WAR out of the first base position. It would have taken a career year from Kotchman to fill the void left at first.

The team also got 2 wins from the catcher position in 2009 and even though Adam Moore looks talented, is it reasonable to expect a rookie to step in and be great right away?

To get back to 85 wins, the Mariners needed to replace roughly 11 wins that left via free agency. Plus, they had to make up for whatever drop-off Franklin Gutierrez would have since his 6.1 WAR ‘09 season was built around a defensive season no one should ever expect to repeat. The ‘10 Mariners were counting on David Aardsma to repeat a surprising ‘09 year where he added 2.0 WAR.

The only positions where Seattle didn’t get at least 2 WAR contributions in ‘09 were short stop, left field, and DH. At short, they were relying on Jack Wilson to make up for his offensive shortcomings in the field. Even though Wilson has proven to be a defensive wizard at times, his defensive contributions haven’t been consistent and neither has his health. In left field and DH, the club was relying on an unpredictable rookie, a future Hall of Famer who most thought had already played one year too much, and Milton Bradley who came with baggage, health concerns, and a deteriorating bat. Even at positions where it should have been a slam dunk to see improvement, the caution flag was out.

Reading through Posnanski’s article, the ‘87 Indians example was as fitting to this year’s Mariners as the glass slipper was to Cinderella:

I so clearly remember the 1987 Cleveland Indians … the team that ended up on the cover of Sports Illustrated. The cover read: “Believe it! Cleveland is the best team in the American League.” There was absolutely no reason to believe it. The 1986 Indians had won 84 games (after losing 100 in 1985) with a terrible and old pitching staff (Their second-best pitcher was 47 year old Phil Niekro — their TWO best pitchers were knuckleballers). But they had won more than they lost by leading the league in batting average, slugging percentage and by scoring a bunch of runs (they were last, though, in walks — a pretty decent sign that things could turn bad when their luck changed). The narrative that things had changed in Cleveland was strong, and the Sports Illustrated cover strengthened it, and the excitement of young power hitters like Joe Carter, Brook Jacoby and Cory Snyder (all would hit 30-plus homers) made it even more appealing. So many of us WANTED it to be true. I did believe it.

But wanting it to be true doesn’t make it true. The Indians lost 100 games again. I thought then it was bad luck, but it was a bad narrative. This year’s Mariners are on pace to lose 100 too. Yes, all those promising narratives written in February end up in the trash can. And we are left wondering what ever made us believe in the first place.

Sound familiar? The 2009 Mariners won 85 games (after losing 101 in 2008) with a terrible offense. But they had won more than they lost by leading the league in ERA and UZR (they were 11th in strikeouts and opponents owned a BABIP 26 points better than league average — a pretty decent sign that things could turn bad when their luck changed). The narrative that things had changed in Seattle was strong, and the ESPN: The Magazine cover strengthened it, and the excitement of Z’s offseason hauls like Cliff Lee, Chone Figgins, Casey Kotchman, Milton Bradley, and Brandon League made it even more appealing. So many WANTED it to be true. Many like Poz believed it. Cammy believed it, too, even if he won’t admit it.

At least Posnanski was willing to admit he was wrong. Don’t expect that from Cameron any time soon.

Fellow first-year pitcher Mike Leake is on a similar timeline. Leake has a higher cap than Stras, due to the additional 33 innings that he threw during his final year of college, but he has also seen a larger workload thus far in the majors. Applying the Verducci Effect by adding 30 IP to his 2009 total, Leake would be capped at 172 IP this season, leaving 42 more innings before operation shutdown.

It remains to be seen whether the Verducci Effect can be applied to minor league stats, let alone those from college ball. Many pitchers are more efficient at the lower levels, thanks to opposing hitters that lack major league discipline, and innings can be less taxing. Another variable for Strasburg and Leake is the fact that they pitched just once a week in the NCAA, and were afforded two additional days of rest between starts as compared to playing pro.

There are several young hurlers that could face a limited workload over the final two months of the season. At least a dozen pitchers will be on a Stras-sized leash down the stretch, and their absence from the mound will have an impact on pennant races and fantasy championships.

(stats through 8/10/10)

Mat Latos was a fantasy sleeper pick heading into the season, and the 22-year old has blossomed into a frontline starter for the division-leading Pads. His numbers are not a mirage, having made 13 of his 21 starts away from Petco Park, with a 2.46 ERA, 0.98 WHIP, and 82:25 K:BB ratio in 80.1 innings on the road. The Friars will be tempted to run Latos out there through September and possibly into the playoffs, but such a toll could weigh heavily on the prodigy’s future. The team is saying all the right things, with a plan to monitor Latos as he gets beyond 150 innings, but they have yet to divulge a specific cap. Avoiding the Verducci Effect would put him on the shelf by Labor Day, but playoff pressure will surely test the team’s resolve.

Justin Masterson has not had the success of the other pitchers on this list, but Cleveland keeps running him out there, leading to an innings count in the 130’s. He works hard for his outs, running up high pitch counts per inning. A converted reliever, Masterson might be able to go beyond his theoretical Verducci cap, but the bottom-feeding Indians have little incentive to find out the cost of stretching the slinger.

Phil Hughes has re-established himself as the Yankees’ premier wunderkind, passing Joba Chamberlain to settle the question of who belongs in the rotation. It’s also been reported that the Yankees will not be handling Hughes with Joba gloves when it comes to his workload. His ’09 innings are skewed, as he made just 7 starts and spent most of the season in the ‘pen, while his career high is the 146 innings that were tossed in 2006. Rumors have the Bankees halting Hughes somewhere around 160-175 innings, so he will receive breaks down the stretch and could be headed to the bullpen for October.

Madison Bumgarner started slow in spring, effectively delaying his 2010 MLB arrival until the end of June. The Giants completely rely on their pitching staff, and though the rotation is plenty strong without Bumgarner, he represents a massive upgrade on the other options available for the back end of the rotation. The charging Giants are just 2.5 games back of San Diego, and will face a tough decision as they weigh the costs and benefits of extending Bumgarner beyond 170 innings.

Ian Kennedy has turned in the best season of all the players involved in the 3-way off-season swap between the Tigers, Yankees, and D’Backs. He is outpacing the headliners, including outfielders Curtis Granderson and Austin Jackson, as well as fellow arms Max Scherzer and Edwin Jackson. Kennedy pitched just 23.2 innings last year, and had a career high of 146.1 in 2007. MLB.com reports that he will be limited to 180-185 innings this season, though the D’Backs’ new regime would be wise to play it safe and cut him off a bit sooner. 

Brett Cecil is the latest in a series of productive arms to surface in Toronto, where control artists apparently grow from the maple trees. The Jays have a whole staff of pitchers that could see their innings cut during the final months, and I wouldn’t be surprised to see a number of SP’s among the September call-ups. Cecil has another 6 or 7 starts in him before the Jays likely pull the plug on his 2010.

Perhaps the biggest breakout of 2010 has been that of flame-throwing southpaw David Price. The former #1 overall pick disappointed fantasy owners last season, thanks to a 2008 cameo that over-pumped the hype machine, but he has exceeded expectations this year. The result is a league leading win total and an escalating innings count. Contending in the AL East prevents the Rays from playing it safe with their prized left-hander, and Tampa will need to temper his remaining innings in order to keep him available for October. His theoretical cap is about 190 innings, and the team will face some difficult decisions in September. Personal goals like a 20-win season will be shoved aside in order to strike a balance between playoff baseball and workload management. 

Gio Gonzalez battled inconsistency throughout 2009, but he has been a stable source of innings for an A’s rotation that has lost Brett Anderson, Ben Sheets, and Justin Duchscherer for large chunks of the season. The left-handed curveball specialist is approaching his inning total from last year, though he has enough room under the Verducci limit to make the majority of his starts between now and the end of the season.

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Honorable Mention

It’s tough to peg a precise innings cap for a handful of players, due to role changes or recent seasons marred by injury. The situations are similar to those of Phil Hughes or Ian Kennedy, but the teams involved have been less candid with their intentions.

Jaime Garcia has exceeded anyone’s expectations in his first full season following Tommy John surgery. The Cardinals hoped that the 24-year old Garcia could help fill out the back end of the rotation, and he has rewarded them with a 2.71 ERA in 126.1 innings. He passed his 2009 total of 37.2 innings back in May, and is on track to crack his career high by September. Garcia threw 155 innings in 2006, his only other season that exceeded 125 IP. With such a spotty track record, the Cards would be unwise to roll the dice too many times on the young lefty. The key is to know when to count their winnings and walk away from the table, which will be soon if they want to use those chips again in October.

Jonathon Niese has already exceeded last season’s injury-shortened count of 120 innings. The injury was not to his arm, and he threw more than 170 innings in 2008, so there could be more in the tank. The Mets are thin on the hill, and Manager Jerry Manuel claims that the southpaw does not have an innings cap this season, so the 23-year old Niese could see a considerable workload over the final two months of the season. Reality check: The Mets are in 4^th place in the NL East, 9.5 games back, and would be well served to preserve Niese’s arm for future seasons.

Everyone knows the story behind Francisco Liriano, but it’s not so easy to tell what the Twins will do with his innings down the stretch. The AL Central always comes down to the wire, and Minnesota will be tempted to test him. At 26, Liriano has cleared the injury nexus, but his history of arm troubles combined with tremendous upside creates a considerable gamble. His career high in innings is 167.2, a figure he reached in the minors back in 2005, and he has been anything but a workhorse in the majors. The 140.2 innings in 2010 are already more than last year’s total, and playing October baseball could bring an unprecedented workload for Liriano. This is a case that bears watching.

Brandon Morrow’s 1-hit, 17-strikeout gem against the Rays was a vivid reminder of the cost of success. The former 1^st rounder has been on a roll since late May, but the 137-pitch effort versus Tampa will cost him a skipped start. His inefficient approach offers a sharp contrast to the other pitchers on the Toronto staff, and could be a deciding factor as the Jays look at their rotation options in September. Like Liriano, Morrow is 26 and beyond the injury nexus, but the converted reliever has already passed his career high for innings. The 4^th place Blue Jays should have an easy decision to shut him down after a handful of starts. 

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Many of these pitchers will be restricted over the next two months. Starts will be skipped, some guys will be moved to the bullpen, and others will be shut down entirely. There will be some that continue to pitch at nearly the same pace, as teams throw caution to the wind in order to fight for a playoff spot. The postseason can create a snowball effect for young starters, as more innings are stockpiled at the end of a long season for tired, developing arms.

Not all innings are created equal, and individual pitchers have vastly different risks when it comes to their workload. Pitch efficiency, mechanical efficiency, and conditioning go a long way toward determining a pitcher’s ultimate health. In this sense, the Verducci Effect is merely a guide, and there are other risk factors that major league teams must weigh before shutting down a young gun.

It’s likely the Mariners managerial change will be the last in-season move unless the Indians give up on Manny Acta 1 year into a 3 year deal, the Mets finally part ways with Jerry Manuel who is in the last year of his deal (although he does have an option for ‘11) or the Pirates decide extending John Russell through the ‘11 season was a mistake.

Now that these men have joined the ranks of the unemployed (with the exception of Samuel who has stayed on as an evaluator for the Orioles at their Dominican Republic academy), let’s speculate on their MLB futures:

Trey Hillman

Formerly a successful manager in Japan, Hillman’s professionalism should keep him on the medium list for managerial positions but might not make the cut to the “short list.”

Dave Trembley

Trembley, the man Samuel replaced, posted a .398 winning % in his 2-plus years in Baltimore and is probably headed back to a coaching job before he gets another shot at a managerial position, if he ever does.

A.J. Hinch

Hinch’s contract pays him through 2012 and his reputation for player development and poor track record as Arizona’s manager should send him back to a role on the talent evaluation side of the game rather than as a manager… at least right away. Just 36, Hinch has plenty of time to work his way back into a managerial position, if he wants to do it again.

Fredi Gonzalez

Of the 6 men out, Gonzalez makes the most sense to be in line for a managerial job right away. Despite his team’s consistently frugal ways, Gonzalez owned a 276-279 record in Florida including a 2nd place finish in the NL East in 2009. Gonzalez is currently the most popular name linked to the Atlanta Braves who will replace Bobby Cox following the ‘10 season. The smart money would be on Gonzalez managing somewhere in ‘11, even if it isn’t Atlanta.

Juan Samuel

Samuel is probably the long shot on the board to manage in the Majors again. He turned down an opportunity to stay on with the Orioles as the team’s third base coach to instead work in player development but Sammy’s Major League career took him to 7 different cities. A number of managers who had the pleasure of working with Samuel the player are still around in some capacity and could lure him away from Baltimore and back as a coach but don’t expect him to return to managing any time soon.

Don Wakamatsu

All reports say Wakamatsu “lost the clubhouse” in Seattle and now that the luster of the ‘10 off-season has worn away, their ‘09 success has reached “fluke” status. How that impacts Wakamatsu’s future managerial prospects is a tough call but his ties to the Arizona Diamondback organization — from ‘97 to ‘99, Don managed at the A and AA levels — and with Texas and Oakland. The Mariners ‘09 performance should keep him on the “long list” at least when managerial positions are discussed.

To be fair to Andriola, he’s a Mets fan. After a 6-run 8th inning from a Phillies’ offense standing on half a stump of a leg, the New York Metropolitans fell to 54-55 on Friday and, for the third straight season, look headed for another postseason-free October. With a payroll of over $120 million and top shelf talent like John Santana, David Wright, Jose Reyes, Mike Pelfrey, Carlos Beltran, and Francisco Rodriguez, it has to be maddening to watch the team’s hopes and dreams dashed year in and year out.

Then again, just because Andriola’s prose was likely pulled from the inner diary of a madman, it doesn’t excuse it from being held to some sort of standard since it was presented on one of the Internet’s more respected sites for baseball information.

To Pat’s credit, the analogy works… to a point. If you build a dam out of wood, the weak logs are just as important as the strong logs. In Andriola’s world, most dam builders are busted by their focus on trying to fix their dams by making the strong logs stronger while ignoring the weak logs. (Personally, he lost me at friendly beavers and making a dam out of wood in the 21st century but that’s beside the point.)

In the world of baseball, Andriola thinks this is analogous to teams expecting more from their superstars while ignoring rounding out their rosters with the right 1-2 WAR players necessary to properly fill out a roster. Andriola then flies off the track by choosing the Mets as his example club.

Here’s a few of his missteps with a more accurate representation of what’s wrong with this year’s Mets:

The best example I can give here is the Mets, although I’m sure you can think of examples with your own favorite team. The Mets started this season with the following lineup:

C Rod Barajas
1B Mike Jacobs
2B Luis Castillo
3B David Wright
SS Jose Reyes
LF Jason Bay
CF Gary Matthews Jr.
RF Jeff Francoeur

Good try but the Mets expected Daniel Murphy to return as the team’s first baseman until an injury in the last week of Spring Training sent the club scrambling. Enter Mike Jacobs… but let’s get back to that because we don’t want to steal Andriola’s thunder:

Do you see the weak logs? It shouldn’t be that hard. Mike Jacobs is now a Triple-A player for the Jays after proving he can’t hit major league pitching during his brief stay with the Mets.

Can Mike Jacobs really be counted as a mistake for the Mets? The Mets “Opening Day” first baseman played a total of 7 games. The Mets felt rookie Ike Davis needed to be flipped for a few minutes after being removed from the Spring Training oven. Since then, Davis has played 96 games and posted a WAR of 1.5. In essence, the “weak log” at first this year was Ike… who has contributed about what Andriola and others would want from a “weak log”.

Gary Matthews Jr. had a .234 wOBA for the Mets, striking out in 41% of this plate appearances.

Again, here’s another overstatement from Andriola. Matthews started a total of 9 games in April, 3 games in May, and was gone from the team by the first week of June. His replacement? Angel Pagan who started Games 3, 4, 7, and 9 before taking over the center field position regularly on April 17th. Both Pagan and Matthews were expected to be 4th and 5th outfielders upon the quick return from Carlos Beltran who was slated for a May comeback from offseason surgery. Matthews, a former 2-4 WAR contributor who crashed and burned the last 2 seasons was delivered to the Mets at a 95% discount and was quickly dispatched from the roster before he could do any damage. Pagan has delivered a 4.2 WAR which is a superstar-level season while Beltran’s rehab stretched into late July.

Rod Barajas is currently on the DL, but has been below average with a .292 wOBA and 0.5 WAR on the season.

Nice cherry picking, Pat. Barajas was signed in the off season for $900,000 along with Henry Blanco (for $750,000) to compete with league minimum slaves Omir Santos and Josh Thole. While Santos hasn’t seen the light of day (he’s hitting .160/.208/.266 in the minors), the injured Barajas, Blanco, and Thole have combined to contribute a performance valued at a combined 1.7 WAR.

Jeff Francoeur honestly doesn’t deserve to play baseball at any level professionally, despite how affable he may be. His .284 wOBA is made even worse by his tendency (or just self-afflicted rule) to swing at everything often and early.

Actually, Francoeur is a perfectly useful platoon outfielder who either has enough juice to refuse such an assignment or manager Jerry Manuel is so inept he can’t figure out that Frenchy is much more effective vs. LHP (.317/.380/.439 this year) than vs. RHP (.218/.267/.359). And the second half of that sentence is even more brutal. It’s hard to figure out how wOBA is made worse by Francoeur’s free swinging ways. Would it be better if he took strike 3 more often or grounded into a few more double plays instead of striking out? It’s hard to believe a “sabersavvy” guy like Andriola wouldn’t cut Francoeur some slack for his .261 BABIP compared to a career .299 mark.

I won’t even mention Alex Cora.

Seriously? Andriola dodges mentioning more frequent ‘10 Met regulars Davis and Pagan but sneaks in Cora who was expected to play very little but thrust into action thanks to Luis Castillo missing time.

Many of those players have been replaced. Josh Thole has been very good during his limited time at catcher, Angel Pagan has been one of the best players in baseball this season, and Ike Davis is having a nice rookie year at first base. Still, this unsurprisingly hasn’t been enough for the medicore Mets.

So, let me get this straight? While the club has replaced three of their weak links (sorry, the log thing isn’t really even that good of an analogy to be frank) with a “very good” Thole, the National League’s most surprising contributor (Pagan), and a productive rookie thrust quickly into the starting role, it unsurprisingly not enough? Hmmmmmmmm…

When you see that it took months for R.A. Dickey and Hisanori Takahashi to replace Oliver Perez and John Maine in the rotation, nobody should be surprised at the record of the Mets.

Back to reality: By May 21st (46 days into the season), both Dickey — a pitcher who hasn’t posted a plus WAR performance since 2004 — and Takahashi — added as a bullpen arm with the ability to start — were in the rotation. They replaced a 28-year-old making $12 million a year and a 29-year-old consistent back-end rotation arm returning from arm problems in 2009. The Mets were 20-22 when both were installed in the rotation. Since then, they have gone 35-33. The implication that starting the season with Dickey and Takahashi in the rotation instead of Perez and Maine would have produced some sort of miracle flip in the W-L column seems a little misguided, doesn’t it?

When James Kannengeiser of Amazin Avenue gave some wise ways the Mets could improve their ball club, it was met with this reply from Matt Cerrone at the ever popular MetsBlog:

Sure, releasing Oliver Perez, Jeff Francoeur and Alex Cora might help, and it would sure get the attention of fans, but, at the end of the day, Mike Pelfrey, Carlos Beltran, Francisco Rodriguez, Jose Reyes, Jason Bay and others are still on the roster and still need to get their collective act together.

Matt saw that the weak logs were hurting the dam, and simply decided that the bigger logs had to get their “act together.”

And here comes Andriola’s defense of the Mets’ superstars in 3… 2… 1…

I guess it didn’t matter that Mike Pelfrey has a better ERA/FIP/xFIP/tERA than last year

More cherry picking… Pelfrey ‘09 delivered an uninspiring 5.03 ERA/4.39 FIP/4.52 xFIP/4.56 tERA compared to his slightly better than mediocre 4.16 ERA/4.03 FIP/4.49 xFIP/4.57 tERA of ‘10. Both seasons can’t touch his ‘08 where he posted a 3.72 ERA/396 FIP/4.49 xFIP/4.35 tERA. It’s hard to find fault in someone asking a little more from the ‘10 version of Pelfrey.

or that K-Rod has been flat-out great

K-Rod has been great? 5 blown saves in 29 tries and another loss in the 3 games Francisco was asked to keep the game tied sounds less than great. Amongst closers, the “flat-out great” K-Rod is 22nd of the 26 relievers with 15 saves or more in save conversion %. While K-Rod’s statistics are good, THE one that has the biggest impact on the W-L column doesn’t think highly of Mr. Rodriguez’s performance.

or that Jose Reyes has been incredible after a slow start thanks to coming back from an injury (and is still on pace for a 3-WAR year per 150 games)

Incredible? Through 94 games played, Jose Reyes has a 1.7 WAR (which works out to a 2.7 WAR/150) which is fairly close to the contributions of Jerry Hairston (1.5 WAR in 100 games) and Erick Aybar (also 1.5 WAR in 100 games). He also owns a .278/.317/.412 slash line which is below his career slash line of .285/.335/.432. These types of claims should be reserved for sports talk radio not something presented as sound analysis.

or that Carlos Beltran got back from serious knee surgery after the All-Star break.

As pointed out earlier, Pagan has filled in admirably for Beltran and created a situation where Francoeur can be properly used now that Beltran is back. Plus, one has to ask how much ownership is on the player who delayed surgery to repair a ‘09 injury until January 2010 and ignored the team’s request to delay the surgery to allow their medical team to look at the injury.

The strong logs were not strong enough.

While this was a shot at Cerrone’s take on the Mets’ situation of needing better performance from the top, it’s interesting how Andriola notably ignored the performances of Jason Bay who has hit just .259/.347/.402 in the first year of his 4-year/$66 million contract and is currently on the disabled list.

I wish I could say that this is a problem that is just relayed via talk radio and blogs, but it’s not.

Unsurprisingly, Andriola shows his true colors here. It’s no shock he’s familiar with talk radio… he just dished out a diatribe fit for a call into Mad Dog Radio.

General Managers consistently choose to ignore minor holes on their roster, and this comes from a lack of understanding the true value of stats like Wins Above Replacement (WAR).

It’s hard to see how Andriola presents a solid example of Omar Minaya ignoring minor holes on their roster. One thing the Mets did this offseason was add plenty of potential minor contributors in addition to the handful of Major League ready players ready to step in. It’s hard to figure out how Minaya could have used WAR to discover the rotation replacements since WAR tells us little about the potential performance of current rotation staples Jonathon Niese (a prospect) and Hisanori Takahashi (a Japanese import) or R.A. Dickey whose recent WAR values were replacement level or worse and projected as a 5-plus ERA pitcher according to Bill James, Marcel, and ZiPS. Only CHONE was optimistic about Dickey with a projected ERA of 4.36 — 2 runs higher than his projection-busting 2.36 ERA.

Solid roster management is one of the most valuable traits that any sports executive can have. Unfortunately, those strong logs can only take so much pressure until they break.

Andriola is right about roster management being important. But it’s hard to see where the Mets’ struggles can be traced to the supporting cast rather than those in starring roles. Or maybe it’s the poor field management and payroll crippling deals handed out to the likes of Jason Bay and Oliver Perez that forced the Mets to look for lightning in a rubber bottle in the likes of Matthews and Jacobs.

At the end of the day, though, the Mets have struggled due to more injuries, a few key contributors failing to deliver at previous levels, payroll constraints due to poor signings, and the rest of the National League East improving. If anything, it’s the contributions of the Angel Pagans and R.A. Dickeys of the roster that has kept this year’s Mets from being totally irrelevant this year.

Typically, I will discuss how 20 runs scored and 4 runs against over 5 games is treated the same way whether the results are 20-0, 0-1, 0-1, 0-1, 0-1 or 4-2, 4-0, 4-0, 4-0, 4-2. In Pythagorean terms, 20 runs scored and 4 runs against works out to a .950 winning percentage. Example 1 would be considered “unlucky” in some people’s eyes and “underperforming” in others whereas example 2 would be considered slightly “lucky” in some breakdowns and slightly “overperforming” in others. It’s hard to see how a team failing to produce offensively for 4 games can be considered “unlucky” OR expected to win 95% of the time over that stretch or how going 5-0 over a 5 game stretch where the team allows only 4 runs would be “lucky” OR “overperforming” but that’s what Pythagorean W-L suggests.

The counter to this would instantly be small sample size issues. But it’s interesting to see how a stretch of games can have on Pythagorean W-L when the sample is much larger. Take the Houston Astros’ recent 7-game winning streak, for example. Before dropping a game to the Cardinals on Wednesday, the Astros went 7-0 in the previous 7 games. In those games, they outscored their opponents 57-12. Before looking at how this impacted their Pythagorean W-L record, here’s a breakdown of the game-by-game results:

July 27: Houston 6, Chicago 1
July 28: Houston 8, Chicago 1
July 30: Houston 5, Milwaukee 0
July 31: Houston 6, Milwaukee 0
Aug. 1: Houston 5, Milwaukee 2
Aug. 2: Houston 9, St. Louis 4
Aug. 3: Houston 18, St. Louis 4

Now, oddly enough, as bad as the Astros have been in ‘10, before their recent hot stretch, they were outperforming their Pythagorean W-L record by 6 games. Through 99 games, the Astros were 40-59 but Pythagorean W-L saw a 34-65 team — a difference of 6 wins.

After their offensive awakening, Houston improved to 47-59 and also saw their Pythagorean W-L improve to 43-63. So, over a 7-game stretch, the Astros performed so well that their Pythagorean W-L improved by 9 wins and eliminated 2 losses.

To be more specific, the Astros added 8.2 wins over their improbable stretch of 7 consecutive wins. Sample size not big enough? If the Astros return to their performance prior to the 7-game winning streak, removing the 57-12 stretch will cost the club 8.18 wins.

So, even though the Astros went 7-0 over a 7 game stretch, theoretically, Pythagorean W-L expected the club to win 8.2 times during their winning streak. Talk about high expectations for a team that just traded away their best 2 players!

And how about that 18-4 win on August 3rd? According to Baseball-Reference’s Play Index, teams who score 18 runs in a game are 208-0! Throw in all games where teams score 18 runs or more and the record dips slightly to 536-2 since 1920 for a staggering .996 winning percentage. However, converted to Pythagorean W-L, the Astros should have a .940 winning percentage. Actually, if Pythagorean W-L were applied to all games where teams scored 20 or more runs (where teams are 193-2) since 1920, those teams would have outperformed their Pythagorean W-L by an impressive 16 games. If this were a real team, despite scoring 21.6 runs/game, this mythical offensive juggernaut would be somewhat “lucky” to be 193-2. Seems illogical, doesn’t it?

At the end of the day, the Astros are what they are, a subpar ball club who will finish far out of the playoff hunt. Whether or not they got to this point of the season by being “lucky” or “overperforming” is somewhat inconsequential in the grand scheme of things when a team is as bad as they have been this year. Unfortunately, their “Pythagorean expectations” will be used by many to show how much worse this team is than their disappointing record. At least they can thank their 7-0 stretch for helping them win 8.2 games in Pythagorean terms.

Who says you win games one at a time?

On Monday, the Cardinals dropped a half game behind the Cincinnati Reds in the National League Central race after a 9-4 loss to one of the many below average teams in the division, the Astros. The game was tied in the 8th with the bases loaded and one out when Chris Johnson hit a nubber toward Schumaker who gloved it but made a terrible throw to the plate that allowed Houston to take a 5-4 lead. Humberto Quintero grounded into a double play to end the inning. The Houston offense added 4 in the 9th but, at that point, the game was completely changed by a poor defensive play by Schumaker. Well, that’s not completely accurate. The top of the 9th featured 2 infield singles by the Astros hit to, yup, you guessed it, Skip Schumaker!

Since “we” hate to actually watch baseball when evaluating players (our eyes lie, a lot!), let’s take a look at what Cammy was thinking when he declared the Schumaker experiment a rousing success after 6 months and what the reality is. According to Cameron, Schumaker struggled defensively last year for the first 6 weeks as he battled through his “learning curve” and then settled in nicely. Here’s his explanation:

… Schumaker had the worst UZR of any second baseman in baseball, standing at -7 runs in just six weeks of baseball. He just wasn’t making the plays necessary at the position. The learning curve had proven steep.Schumaker’s UZR since May 17th? -0.7. (Note: Cameron wrote this on September 14, 2009) After a rough start, the best defensive metric we have thinks he’s been basically average for the last four months. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Cardinals themselves have improved a great deal since then as well, running away with the NL Central in the process. And they’ve done it by preventing runs with a heavy ground ball pitching staff.

Fast forward to 2010: Not including Monday’s below average fielding performance, Schumaker has a -7.5 UZR through 721-1/3 innings at 2nd. After finishing ‘09 with a -7.4 UZR, that gives Schumaker a -10.4 UZR/150 through 571 Balls In Zone, a fairly decent sample size. It doesn’t take 20/20 vision to realize Schumaker has a poor glove and not even a very good arm. Now, with a sample size large enough to pay attention to, it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to see the numbers support the same conclusion — Schumaker is not a very good second baseman.

Actually, he’s pretty terrible. This year, only Howie Kendrick (-9.8 UZR) has cost his team more than Schumaker, according to the defensive stat du jour.

At some point, it might be discovered that being partnered with a subpar fielder on the same side of the diamond has some impact on the other player’s defense. It might help explain Albert Pujols’ massive decline in UZR over the past two seasons since, for most of his career, he’s been partnered with plus defenders at second base.

More importantly, though, the point missed by Cameron was that the 2009 Cardinals won IN SPITE of the Schumaker experiment, not because of it. In a 162-game season, one thing often lost is how the impact of an extra loss here and there can bring down a season. Last season, it didn’t matter for the Cardinals because 84 wins would have taken down the NL Central and their 91 wins while plenty was the 5th highest number of wins of a division winner. With a subpar fielder on the field the bulk of the time and a team that emphasizes the ground ball out, as Cameron points out, it’s even more vital to have decent fielders behind the ground ball-inducing hurlers, right?

Disagree? Cameron doesn’t.

Knowing Dave Duncan‘s desire to spread the gospel of the two-seam fastball, the Cardinals know the importance of infield defense to their success. Despite the risks, they were still willing to take a gamble on Schumaker’s ability to turn himself into a decent defender at the position, and they held to their convictions even after a really bad start to the season. Their reward? A league average hitter who can hold his own as a middle infielder.

Nearly a year later, it looks like not only was Cameron’s rush to judgment on Schumaker’s defense incorrect (-7.5 UZR through 2/3 of a season if far from “holding your own”) but he’s not even a league average hitter this year. This writer won’t make the same mistake the captain of the U.S.S. Mariner did with his leap to grade Schumaker’s defense by claiming Skip isn’t a league average hitter but, in 2010, his .256/.323/.331 slash line surely isn’t inspiring greatness.

The danger of winning is typically it becomes a great deodorant. But even those who go overboard with the Axe Body Spray from time to time know showering regularly is important. Where 2009’s success for the Cardinals may have done the most damage was because of just that. As Cameron concluded:

The Cardinals deserve a lot of credit for not just making the move, but sticking with it. I have a feeling they won’t be the last team to get away from strict mindsets about what types of players can play certain positions. As teams experience success moving guys like Schumaker to second base, I have a feeling we’ll see this trend take off.

What the Cardinals failed to realize in the wake of their 2009 success was that Schumaker was (and is) a weak link in the club’s chain of success. To use a poker analogy, the Cardinals pushed hard with a less than premium starting hand and because they sucked out once and got everyone to fold another time, they decided to gamble with that same marginal hand again. And, while other teams were able to satisfy their needs via free agency at second base — Kelly Johnson, Orlando Hudson, David Eckstein, Jerry Hairston, and Omar Infante were readily available — the Cardinals pushed again with the marginal Schumaker.

As for the trend taking off, it happened to strike the fancy of Cameron’s favorite baseball franchise. The Mariners, currently synonymous with “baseball genius” thanks to the presence of “Z” in the front office, made the off-season decision to move Chone Figgins to second. While the move wasn’t quite the Schumaker experiment (Figgins logged 794-1/3 innings at second from ‘02 to ‘09 with a cumulative UZR of -2.7), he has been as poor as Schumaker (-6.9 UZR through 929-1/3 innings in ‘10) in the field at his new position and fairly brutal (.238/.334/.288) at the plate. After a longer look at Schumaker and a second “experiment” gone wrong, teams may think twice about such an experiment.

Hey, Cammy! Do you think that feeling you had was just gas? Too many trips to the Tapas bar might be one explanation.

]]> http://www.baseballdailydigest.com/2010/08/04/column-to-be-named-later-re-revisiting-schumaker/feed/ 0 http://www.baseballdailydigest.com/2010/07/31/column-to-be-named-later-wheres-the-damn-blueprint/ http://www.baseballdailydigest.com/2010/07/31/column-to-be-named-later-wheres-the-damn-blueprint/#comments Sat, 31 Jul 2010 10:05:47 +0000 Brian Joseph http://www.baseballdailydigest.com/?p=16804

…and the Astros are paying most of the money in the deal. Drayton McLane/Ed Wade, you’re doing it wrong!

That’s Jason Collette’s recent comment to a Jack Moore piece at Fangraphs about the pending Berkman plus cash to the Yankees deal. And Collette’s an expert on teams that now how to “do it”… he’s a notable member of the Rays’ fan community. If there’s any team familiar with the proper way to rebuild a franchise, the Tampa Bay Rays surely know how.

It’s a shame Ed Wade and Drayton McLane are too stupid to breathe, let alone figure out how to rebuild a franchise. Or maybe they did?

You see, often left out of the story of the wonderfully charming Tampa Bay Rays, armed with their phenomenal front office led by the suave AND debonair Andrew Friedman, is how most of their team is made up of 1st round draft picks. But not just any 1st round draft picks. Their current roster boasts a 1st overall selection, 2nd overall selection, 3rd overall selection, and 4th overall selection. Plus, two other major contributors were picked up in a deal for yet another 1st overall selection. That doesn’t even include two other 1st overall selections — 2008 1st pick Tim Beckham who has yet to find his groove at high-A ball and 1999 1st pick Josh Hamilton who, well, you know that story by now — or their 2001 selection which was the 3rd pick overall, Dewon Brazelton who last pitched for the Camden Riversharks in the independent Atlantic League.

Unlike other sports, Major League Baseball doesn’t allow the trading of draft picks (although Pat Andriola of FanGraphs surely thinks they should) so a large part of the current Rays’ success — one of those teams that “did it right” — was by acquiring 8 picks in the top 4 of the draft from 1999 to 2008. That’s a feat that required a lot of sucking.

Imagine for a minute where the Rays would be right now with something less than Evan Longoria, David Price, Jeff Niemann, B.J. Upton, Matt Garza, and Jason Bartlett. Consider the fact that the Rays had more top 4 selections from 1999 to 2008 than the Astros have had in their entire franchise history (6), to follow the Rays’ blueprint for success, the Astros have to be terrible for a very long time. For the Rays, it was 10 straight years of 70 wins or less.

Those 8 high 1st round selections by the Rays are more than all but 7 franchises have had amongst the first 4 picks in the draft in their entire team’s history but let’s not hold that against them. The Rays paved the way for future generations of teams on how to build a perennial contender. Lose… A LOT!

That’s not fair, actually. The Rays made plenty of deadline deals under the watchful eye of Friedman for the Astros to mimic. In 2006, the Rays acquired Dioner Navarro, Jae Weong Seo, Justin Ruggiano, Ben Zobrist, Mitch Talbot, Joel Guzman, and Sergio Pedroza. In 2007, they picked up Grant Balfour, Calvin Medlock, Brian Shackleford, and Dan Wheeler. Of the 11 players the club dealt for 3 and 4 years ago, 4 are on the current roster and only 1 of the 11 made Baseball America’s Top 100 Prospects list at the time of the deal (Joel Guzman, #26 on ’06’s list).

Impressed? Of the bunch, Zobrist is the one name that sticks out. Let’s see what was said about the deal when it went down in ‘06. ESPN’s Keith Law would have tweeted (instead he wrote):

Tampa Bay adds two depth prospects to its farm system, which is critical, since that’s the type of prospect they failed to add through years of high-risk/high-ceiling drafting that left them with a few star-caliber prospects but an extremely thin system beyond that.

Okay, maybe that’s a little longer than a tweet. But still, Zobrist wasn’t touted anywhere near his 2009 breakout season and has continued to be a decent contributor. In the end, though, the trade deadline deals weren’t what catapulted the Rays to the elite group of teams of the last few years. It was the sucking.

Ironically, around the same time the Rays were sucking, so were the Philadelphia Phillies. While they didn’t suck for as long as the Rays did, the Phillies also acquired a lot of their talent in the draft and made some weak deadline deals to free up salary and move disgruntled veterans. For most of the rebuilding, the GM of that club was the same currently “doing it wrong” in Houston.

It’s not a dangerous bet to say that Wade will likely follow his previous blueprint a little closer than the one the Rays used to become successful. The rebuilding process in Philadelphia required an entire revamping of the minor league system (very similar to the situation he faced when taking over the Astros) and little salary flexibility thanks to a decent amount of cash tied up in fading veterans.

The Rays blueprint, on the other hand, cost a GM his job… and while many think he doesn’t deserve it, Wade’s likely to do everything he can to hold on to his current title… and sucking for 10 years probably won’t cut it.