The National League Central is in a state of flux, given the cross-league emigration of two of the game’s biggest sluggers, and facing the eventual exile of one of the division’s six teams to the A.L. The Astros have new names signing the paychecks and fresh faces in the front office, the Cardinals are dealing with the departure of baseball’s longest-tenured manager in addition to their franchise icon, and the Brewers are watching their league MVP plead his case against a possible PED suspension.

Astros

Bud Norris has quietly established himself as a force near the top of the Houston rotation, and his strong K rates bode well for an American League transition that rests on his horizon. Norris displayed considerable growth in 2011, and exceeded PECOTA’s expectations in every category aside from homers allowed and the context-dependent W. The right-hander’s biggest gains came on the command side of the ledger, where he shaved a full walk off of his nine-inning pace from 2010 to ‘11, while leaving plenty of room for further improvement.

Every now and then, Wandy Rodriguez must look around the clubhouse and wonder if he is living a nightmare; teammates are dropping like flies, the organization is going through a complete overhaul while bracing for a move across league lines, and rumors are swirling about new team names and uniforms. The salary purge puts his name on the top of the list for relocation, and though his future destination may not be predictable, PECOTA had no problem projecting Wandy’s 2011 pitching line. The system foresaw a decline in K rate that was matched by Rodriguez, and the computer program came within striking distance of his other rates, including a close call in the category of innings pitched. The big discrepancy showed up in his homerun rate, though the Houston southpaw defied the odds to post a lower-than-expected ERA despite a jump in homers allowed.

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Brewers

PECOTA pegged Corey Hart to ride the regression train last year, following an .865 OPS season that stood out among his career numbers, but the corner outfielder with a tight-end build defied the prognosticators and maintained his performance. Hart may have fallen short of his playing time numbers from 2010, but rate-wise he was able to replicate the previous season’s progress, clearing his ‘10 OPS by a single point. Even the seven steals were a carbon-copy of the previous season, though PECOTA projected that he would pilfer twice as many bags in less playing time. The question is whether PECOTA will come on board with the notion that Hart has turned an offensive corner, or if it will wait at the station for further regression.

The career of Yovani Gallardo has been plagued by the yips, but something finally clicked in 2011, and the 25-year old discovered a new level of domination over the strike zone. Gallardo staged a steep climb up the ranks of N.L. hurlers, as the ever-present ability to miss bats was complemented by the new-found ability to find the catcher’s leather. He teamed with Zack Greinke and Shaun Marcum to form a formidable three-headed monster atop the Brewer rotation, and the trio represents the Brew Crew’s strongest claim to the N.L. Central crown in 2012.

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Cardinals

The 2010 season was a disaster for Lance Berkman, and many thought that the 35-year old lumberjack was nearing the end of his career, citing his “old player’s skills” and advancing age. PECOTA saw otherwise, pegging Berkman to regain much of the offensive prowess that defined his Houston career, despite his coming off of an empty season that ended with his pinch-hitting in navy pinstripes. The switch-hitter staged a massive comeback in 2011, and though his splits were heavily weighted toward the first half of the year, his season totals crushed any system that takes age and previous season’s performance into account. PECOTA deserves credit for having faith in Berkman’s bottom line.

PECOTA foresaw a power spike for David Freese in 2011, and though the third baseman did not quite reach those computerized expectations, he did establish himself as a valuable cog in the St. Louis machine. The season numbers are modest in comparison to what Freese was able to accomplish in the post-season, as the 28-year old hit almost .400 with five homers while driving in 21 runs in 18 games during the playoffs. The outburst earned Freese MVP honors for both the NLCS and the World Series, and if we include the postseason stats with his regular season work, the final line comes out to .313/.397/.497 with 15 bombs and 76 RBI in 115 total games. PECOTA absolutely nailed his plate appearances, which is something akin to winning both showcases on the showdown in the Price is Right. Freese did supercede PECOTA’s wisdom in batting average and OBP, and though his ISO fell 43 points short of projection, his career minor league line of .307/.384/.531 in 1675 PA’s provides reason to believe that the postseason heroics were not a complete fluke.

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Cubs

At the age of 20, Starlin Castro hit .300 over 500 plate appearances at the major league level. It was a remarkable achievement that would be incredibly difficult to repeat in his sophomore season, and though PECOTA tempered expectations, the player comments for Castro were glowing with praise. The young shortstop proved his line was legitimate in 2011, as he cracked a .307 average over 158 ball games, and having turned 21 years old just one week before the season started, he finally earned the right to legally crack a beer in celebration after one of his 57 multi-hit contests. Castro’s offensive profile already places him firmly in the 2nd-tier of major league shortstops, behind the Troy Tulowitzki’s of the world, and the Chicago wunderkind is just scratching the surface of his considerable potential. Castro would be a perennial All Star if he resided in the American League, and he will be stealing votes away from Tulo and Jose Reyes in short order.

Entering the 2011 season, the three-year OPS numbers for Geovany Soto read as .868, .702, .890. The backstop had struggled to stay on the field, falling short of 400 plate appearances in each of the previous two seasons, with injuries likely contributing to the disaster output of 2009. PECOTA can thus be forgiven for treating the middle mark as an outlier, and for predicting numbers closer to his established rates. When all was said and done, Soto had reverted back to his shell of ‘09, producing an OPS just 19 points higher than in that anemic season, sans the excuse of playing through pain. Entering his age-29 season, Soto is forming an inverse-Saberhagen performance pattern, and if the trends hold, then fantasy players should consider Soto to be a solid sleeper pick come draft day.

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Pirates

Pedro Alvarez was supposed to be the power source that Pirate fans have lacked since Barry Bonds packed his bags for the Bay, and PECOTA’s projection was generous for a 24-year old with just 95 games appearances at the Major League level. Everything in the third baseman’s performance history suggested an immediate impact, from his college resume to his minor league domination, but Alvarez collapsed under the weight of expectations. Much can change in a year, and a player that was viewed as a franchise cornerstone heading into last season is now struggling to establish himself as a major league ball player. Bill James is anticipating a modest rebound from Alvarez in 2012, estimating a .252/.332/.429 line, and in a few weeks we will see whether BP 2k12 agrees with James’ assessment.

From some angles it would appear that PECOTA came pretty close to hitting the prediction for Andrew McCutchen, but the argument loses water as one breaks down the components of hits, walks, and isolated power. The center fielder’s rates had been remarkably consistent in his first two campaigns, but a low batting average in 2011 masked McCutchen’s growth in secondary skills, and Pirate fans continue to raise the roof on the youngster’s eventual ceiling. Alas, the perpetual rebuilding program in Pittsburgh has rumors swirling that the team’s greatest asset might be dangled in trade, though GM Neil Huntington has drawn a line in the sand, stating that a team would have to “unload the truck” in order to pry the McCutchen from his McClutches. The odds are more likely that the team will sign him to a lucrative extension, thus rewarding the best player that Pittsburgh has drafted-and-developed since Bonds.

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Reds

We the people of baseball nation have waited with great patience and profound anticipation for the ascension of Jay Bruce to the pantheon of power demigods. We have sat through trials and tribulations, from a heart murmuring 37-PA introduction to summer swoons and hot September nights. Indeed, life is never boring aboard the Bruce bandwagon, where promising streaks are off-set by frightening slumps at regular intervals. PECOTA played it safe on his age-24 season, and aside from the single-season bests in playing time, Bruce ended up right within the drop zone laid down by BP’s projection system. JB is just entering his prime, and only the unfair expectations created by his meteoric rise to the majors can take the wind out of an impressive career arc.

Though he has failed to regain the bat-missing skills of his rookie season, Johnny Cueto has established himself as a stable fixture in the Cincinnati rotation. His 2011 ERA might be nigh impossible to repeat, given the insanely low rates of hits and homers allowed, but the right-hander’s peripheral numbers are solid across the board. There could be room for even more improvement, and Cueto has watched his performance rates decrease every single season in each of the following categories: ERA, WHIP, HR/9, BB/9, H/9, and… K/9. It might be an odd pattern, but Cueto is making his case as a trustworthy asset in fantasy leagues, as five of those six rate drop-offs constitute levels of improvement. PECOTA foresaw a mad case of gopher-itis for Cueto in 2011, but the right-hander must have hired Carl Spackler to scape his land, because those gopherballs disappeared in a puff of smoke.

There were some interesting concepts put forth, though other recommendations proved to be infuriating in their lack of discourse. Perhaps a strict word limit stifled the writers’ ability to elucidate their ideas, else I must assume that a brutal deadline window acted to blunt the authors’ explanations. The following is a rundown of the radical ideas that were offered in part one of the three-part series (in reverse order for dramatic effect):

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Option #5: Reliever minimums and mound-visit limitations

Christina Kahrl’s radical suggestion is to place distinct parameters on the usage of relief pitchers, with the aim of short-circuiting the robot-like nature of some managers to abuse the bullpen in late innings, as they strive to maximize platoon splits. Repeated trips to the mound and frequent calls to the bullpen bring to a crawl the pace of the most crucial innings of close games, and this idea could help to improve the fan experience. However, doubt is cast by the fact that many of the other major sports suffer from the same foot-dragging of end-game drama. The last five minutes of a close game in the NFL or the NBA will move at a snail’s pace, with frequent time outs and clock stoppages, as well as time-slowing strategies like basketball’s frequent-foul ploy and football’s obsession with icing the kicker.

I do like some of the strategic implications of CK’s idea, though I think it would be even more interesting to add a couple of twists to her suggestion. For starters, I believe that it is unjust to penalize only the pitchers for late-game shenanigans, and it makes sense to extend similar restrictions to pinch hitters. In other words, if we are going to require a certain number of plate appearances to pass between calls to the bullpen, then we should would make the same adjustment for relief batsmen, such that a manager could not call upon consecutive pinch hitters. Likewise, I would suggest an amendment to Kahrl’s rule of a 3-batter momentum, instead lobbying for a threshold of two plate appearances. Such an adjustment, when combined with the new restrictions on pinch-hitting, would create a fascinating decision-making paradigm for managers in end-game strategy, while preventing skippers from overplaying the cat-n’-mouse game of platoon.

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Option #4: Keep rosters at 25 players, all season long

Courtesy of Tim Kirkjian, the purpose of this rule would be to kill the 40-player roster expansion of September, which TK argues provides a competitive advantage for wealthier ballclubs, due to the difference in minimum salaries from the minor leagues to the majors. The fault lies in the details of his explanation, as Kirkjian suggests that wealthy clubs can afford to call up five to ten players for a month-long major league salary, while other teams are limited to just a couple of promotions. However, a team that brings up six additional month-long salaries is effectively adding about $400k to the cost side of the balance sheet, which is a meager sum for a big league ballclub, particularly one with aspirations of contention, and such an amount would hardly prevent a cheaper team from making a competitive move.

I do think that Kirkjian is onto something, as the 40-man roster number is probably too high, given the fact that the majority of teams fall short of maximizing the roster-count in September. My suggestion would be to change the cap to about 30 players for the season’s final month, a total that would allow any team to call up the most promising prospects without breaking the bank, yet restrict the fat cats from taking “unfair” advantage of the system. It would also allow those teams that are out of contention to showcase their top young talent, thus giving their fans more reason to attend those final games that mean little in the standings, while reaping some developmental equity with their best young assets. Contending teams could add a couple of arms for the pen or bats off the bench, and do so without running up an exorbitant bill on celebratory champagne.

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Option #3: Soccer-style rules of relegation and promotion

Baseball’s perennial cellar-dwellers are viewed by some as an affront to the sport, and an increasing wariness of infidelity chases those teams who might be more mindful of the bottom line than the win-loss column. Jim Caple has a proposal that is designed to relieve such a problem (if one exists), in the form of soccer-style rules of relegation and promotion. In other words, those teams that finish at the bottom of the standings would run the risk of being demoted to minor leagues, while the best farm clubs could earn the right to play with the big boys on the main stage. Theoretically, the loyal followers of the Pirates or Royals could dream of future International League championships, while fans in Sacramento or Oklahoma City could be treated to the bright lights of the Show.

There are several issues that cast this idea into the sea of impracticality, starting with the blatant discrepancies in minor-league market sizes, but the fatal flaw is that it completely ignores the established structure of the minor leagues. The current system is one based on affiliation, with minor league teams that are controlled by parent clubs at the major league level, and any relegation or promotion would create the obvious incentive for collusion on the part of those organizations whose affiliates made the big jump. The Detroit Tigers are not about to let their playoff hopes be dashed by a late-season series with their own Toledo Mud Hens, and the front office would leap at the opportunity to rock some September roster expansion by stealing Toledo’s top players for the stretch drive. Such thoughts bring to mind another question: if a parent club calls up a player from a promoted team, is it then considered a trade?

Set aside the probability that no minor league market could compete financially with established clubs in the bigs, such that any promotion would be temporary at best, and instead consider the magnitude of change that would be necessary to create the opportunity for such a theory to gain traction. The league would have to recruit 150+ new owners to take over the minor league clubs, while overhauling the entire affiliation structure, in a process that could even necessitate that all minor league players become free agents in order to avoid blatant cases of malfeasance. This article was not the first that I had come across to suggest the soccer-relegation idea for baseball, though I was appalled by the lack of mention for any of these enormous barriers to entry. One would expect a radical idea to at least pass the sniff test of reality before earning the digital space for mainstream consumption.

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Option #2: Scheduled Double-headers

I actually like Jayson Stark’s idea on the surface, despite the impossibility of it coming to fruition. It is quite unlikely that MLB will agree to resurrect the ghost of scheduled double-dips, given the potential dollars to be lost and the identities of those who vote on such things, but if they were to ever entertain such an idea, it would likely need to be less aggressive than the plan put forth. Whereas Stark suggests a double-feature for each team every week of the season, I would limit the experiment to those months when kids are out of school, in order to encourage families to spend their summer days at the ballpark. The cost of games has changed the landscape of ballpark culture, with an emphasis on targeting corporate dollars above the family of four; this idea would provide an opportunity for American families to justify the expense, and to rekindle some of the nostalgia that has defined the history of this grand ol’ game.

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Option #1: Death to the 9^th inning

I saved the most egregious proposal for last, despite its position atop the list provided at ESPN. My jaw dropped when I read the header, and I was frozen with the shock that comes when someone you respect makes a statement that defies logical explanation, and then goes on to defend the asinine claim. David Schoenfield is the head of the Sweet Spot, succeeding the great Rob Neyer to represent the sabrmetric side of the game for the mainstream ESPy audience, yet the audacity of his proposal to short-cut the game after eight innings is supported by mortally weak evidence.

Schoenfield used a 3-pronged argument to justify the validity of his assertion, but in doing so he dug an even deeper hole of unexplained consequences. After shaking off the dumbfounding essence of an idea that proposes that we “endure” 10% less of the game that we love most, and shuddering at the thought of changing the fundamental framework of a sport that we have carefully preserved for over 150 years, I considered the loopholes in each of Schoenfield’s three arguments. It was a remarkably easy undertaking.

The essence of his first point was that Major League games are too long, and that it would be a benefit for the casual fan to cut down on game time. This idea reeks of someone who does not enjoy watching the game of baseball, who thinks of the pace of the game as a burden, and who is likely to depart in the 7^th inning in order to “beat the traffic.” It is difficult to accept that Schoenfield falls into this category, given his occupation and the passion with which he writes about baseball, but I am at a loss for why else he might make such a bold declaration. After all, MLB games are shorter in duration than their NFL counterparts, and nobody is complaining about football games that drag on too long.

The most damning aspect was David’s claim that “Die-hard fans are going to watch no matter what; shorten games and maybe you’ll get more casual fans out to the park.” As a Die-hard, I am offended by the implication that the league should downplay my preferences in favor of someone who might show up to watch the dot race on the Jumbotron. As a businessman, I am amazed that David would suggest such a blatant violation of the 80/20 rule, in which 80% of the revenue is driven by 20% of the customers, and to alienate that customer base is the equivalent of company suicide.

The second piece of evidence in Schoenfield’s case was that cutting off an inning would get rid of the necessity for an extra pitcher, thus allowing teams to carry another bat off the bench, which could open the door for more pinch-hitting opportunities and defensive adjustments late in the game. What he fails to recognize is the realistic probability that managers would fall into even more predictable patterns when faced with just eight innings and 24 outs. Reliever usage might become streamlined, with roles entrenched further given the higher percentage of innings that would be eaten by starters, and the sudden spike in pitchers-to-outs ratio would only encourage further platoon-exploitation.

The most harrowing part of Schoenfield’s defense is the last argument on the board: “It won’t ruin the stats.” David is an established authority on the subject, so I suppose that we are expected to just accept his statement as truth, this despite his one-sentence justification: “An eight-inning complete game in 2012 is just as impressive as a nine-inning complete game in 1973…” While that statement might have merit as it stands alone, it does nothing to justify his premise that stats will not be ruined, as Schoenfield focuses on just the one statistic that will catch up to the expectations created in the 1970’s. He completely avoids the obvious impact on all other counting stats, as there would be a 10% decrease in relative rates of strikeouts, walks, hits, home runs, stolen bases, RBI, Runs, VORP, and WARP, among others.

Eliminating one inning per game would amount to 162 innings per team per season, which is equivalent to 18 games worth of playing time. From a historical standpoint, it would be a statistical nightmare, and we would need to view the stats in the post-8^th inning age within context, with asterisks attached to every no-hitter or perfect game pitched in the eight-inning era. Modern hitters would have to clear the hurdle of 10% less playing time in order to break league records, and the functional impact on counting stats would be twice as severe as reverting back to the old 154-game schedule.

Indians

Friends of the feathered had to be relieved just to see Carlos Santana in a uniform on Opening Day, after coming back from last season’s horrific knee injury. PECOTA took the injury-related dent to his playing time into account when forecasting his plate appearances in 2011, and a healthy Santana was able to stomp those numbers, playing in 155 games on the year while splitting time between catcher and first base. PECOTA overestimated Santana’s batting average by 35 points, a factor that carries a ripple effect on both of the ingredients to OPS. Sure enough, the backstop fell short of his projected on-base percentage by a comparable 38 points, and his slugging component missed by 35 points on the nose. Hit rates aside, Santana was able to sustain his pre-injury production levels, and his example underscores the strengths of a PECOTA system that is remarkable in forecasting walk rates and isolated power for individual players.

Any pitcher that walks the tightrope of a sub-6.0 strikeout rate is acquainted with the frustrating inconsistency of their own run prevention, and Fausto Carmona is no stranger to the pain of hitting the ground when his defensive safety net goes missing. The BP projection system completely nailed Carmona’s K/9 as well as his WHIP, though his actual ratio of hits-to-walks was more contact-heavy than expected, contributing to an inflated ERA. Carmona’s volatility the last few seasons represents the common plight of those who pitch to contact, and there could be additional factors at play; judging by his extreme splits with runners on versus the bases empty, he might suffer from the same brand of stretch-to-windup struggles that plague Brandon Morrow.

Grady Sizemore personifies the plight of Chief Wahoo’s tribe over the last few seasons, as injuries have decimated what was once a tremendous talent. Sizemore stoked the optimistic fires with a torrid start to the season, before completely cratering when his balky knees started to bother him. Sizemore got hot again in July, but a sports hernia landed him back on the DL until the final weeks, ending with an empty 38-PA cameo at the end of the season. The hobbled Sizemore attempted only 2 SB’s all year, failing on both attempts, after once being a consistent threat for 20 or more steals per year. PECOTA thought that Sizemore would regain some of the offensive chops that defined his youth, but he was only able to provide glimpses of nostalgia, and the recently inked one-year contract with the Indians will give him a stay of execution to prove his worth once again.

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Royals

The fountain-heads in KC had grown weary of the Alex Gordon experience, and most had given up on the promise that the once “can’t miss” prospect would ever materialize into a star. The former third baseman waited until the fans had written him off before staking his claim to their loyalty, entrenching himself in the outfield and finally declaring his presence with authority. Perhaps it was a case of Gordon unleashing his selective aggression; his walk rate went down a peg while the contact and power went through the roof, with 60 more points of ISO and 90 points of average over 2010. The former #2 overall pick knocked 72 extra-base hits, including 45 doubles, while maintaining an above-average walk rate and chipping in a career-high 17 stolen bases. For future reference, the file for Gordon’s 2011 season can be found in the baseball encyclopedia under the term “breakout.”

Eric Hosmer finished the 2010 season with 211 plate appearances at AA, and an aggressive timetable would have put him in KC for a cup of coffee in September. The 21-year old went ahead and made a mockery of the Pacific Coast League for the first month of the minor league season, smoking the ball to the tune of .439/.525/.582, and convincing the Royals’ brass to extend an early invite to the Show. PECOTA’s projection includes heavy doses of adjustment for the double-jump in league context from AA to the majors, and though the playing time prediction was off, the system’s precision in nailing Hosmer’s slash line is remarkable. The Wizard of Hos rode the rollercoaster as the league learned his strengths and weaknesses, but the rookie evolved his approach to combat his opponents, displaying an exceptional ability to make adjustments at the plate. Bill James’ system projects a .311/.362/.494 line from Hosmer in his age-22 season, and though I doubt that PECOTA will be quite so sanguine about the first two ratios, we could see a spike in the power department when the BP annual comes out in February.

Mike Moustakas had a huge projection coming into the 2011 season, particularly for a 22-year old rookie, yet the tale of Moose’s season is one of a steam locomotive being passed by Hosmer’s bullet train in the night. Moustakas had more age and experience than his diamond-mate, and was ranked higher on most prospect lists coming into the year, but Hosmer just leapfrogged him with his early-season showing in Omaha, a result that was tempered by the fact that Moustakas has withered some adjustment periods upon his initial exposure to each level of the pros. The rookie third baseman’s introduction to the bigs was particularly rough, as he labored through a .182/.237/.227 line in his first 217 plate appearances, though he rebounded to hit .382/.415/.572 over the final six weeks of the season. PECOTA nailed Moustakas’ hit rate and walk rate for the year, though it missed the isolated power of 2010’s minor league homerun champ by over 100 points.

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Tigers

High BABIP’s have been a hallmark of Austin Jackson’s minor league career, but the .393 rate that he posted in 2010’s initial taste of the majors was clearly unsustainable, so regression was to be expected for the Tiger centerfielder. His BABIP drifted back toward earth in 2011, yet stayed in the upper stratosphere with a very strong .340 mark, however that was not enough to get his batting average above .250. AJ has a lot of swing-and-miss in his game, with 351 strikeouts over the past two seasons, so he requires an astronomical BABIP for his hit tool to shine. PECOTA saw this trend coming, though it did not expect the sophomore’s hit rate to fall to such depths; Jackson came within eight points of projection on each of the OPS components, but he fell 20 points short on batting average thanks to excessive whiff totals.

The Tigers have one of the best pitchers in the game atop their rotation in the form of Justin Verlander, but there is a steep drop from Verlander’s perch to the next starting arm. That void was to be filled by Max Scherzer, a 27-year old right-hander with excellent stuff to go with a somewhat funky delivery. PECOTA expected a near-repeat of Scherzer’s 2010 numbers, with a few extra hits, walks, and strikeouts thrown in for good measure. By the end of the 2011 season, Scherzer would end up posting the best walk rate of his career by a wide margin, though his K rate plummeted alongside the walks. Hitters found this new approach to their trigger-happy liking, and the numbers on contact tell the ultimate story of Scherzer’s season. Once again, balls in play were the biggest factor in a player’s variance, as the exploding rates of hits and homers wreaked havoc on Szherzer’s ERA, this despite a .311 BABIP that is right in line with his career levels. The former D’back would make for an excellent case study in the vein of Mike Fast’s research, using the Hit f/x technology to determine if there was a significant contrast in hSOB data between his 2010 and 2011 seasons.

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Twins

Entering the season, Francisco Liriano appeared to be on the cusp of regaining the momentum of his dynamite rookie campaign. He was coming off of a 2010 season that featured the highest K rate since going under the knife, and the southpaw had finally contained his walk rate to pre-surgery levels. PECOTA suspected that Liriano would give back some of those positive gains, but it did not foresee the wheels falling completely off the wagon in 2011. Everything went backwards, from his stuff to his mechanics, and his stat sheet suffered across-the-board decline, including career-worst rates of walks and strikeouts. The lone bright spot was a no-hitter that he tossed on May 3^rd, though the erratic lefty allowed six White Sox to reach base via the free pass in that particular outing, and he recorded just a pair of strikeouts. The shutout lowered his ERA from 9.13 to 6.61, but the lack of command foreshadowed the rest of Liriano’s season.

The 2009 and 2010 seasons featured a 109-point spread of OPS for the Twins’ Michael Cuddyer, and PECOTA was left with a challenge when trying to peg the offensive contributions of the leather-bound vagabond. The system chose a middle ground between the previous seasons, and the prediction proved Nostradamical; the actual counting stats are a carbon copy of PECOTA’s projection, aside from the completely random injection of double-digit steals. Cuddyer may have cracked each of the triple-slash categories by 10+ points, but the majority of those gains came from base hits, as PECOTA nailed his isolated power down to the point. Now a Rockie, Cuddyer’s defensive versatility will be put to use on a team that has need for support at all three bags as well as the outfield, and the Rox will hope that the thin air will aid his bat in such a way that they can overlook the defensive shortcomings.

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White Sox

Former top-five pick Gordon Beckham continued his mysterious decline in 2011, further derailing a career path that seemed destined for stardom 20 months ago. The former Golden Spikes winner needed just 59 games in the minor leagues before the White Sox deemed him ready for the Show, and Beckham responded with an .808 OPS in a 103-game rookie trial that featured a balance of contact, power, and patience. His offense went in the bucket in 2010, but PECOTA foresaw a modest rebound for the infielder, as ups-and-downs are par for the course when it comes to young players. The sophomore slump has afflicted many, and some players are able to shake off the experience and learn from their mistakes, while others have been known to fall down the rabbit hole in year three. Beckham followed the latter path, as his bat failed to show up for most of the 2011 season, and his future is suddenly in danger of chasing the Chesire Cat’s route to obscurity.

The isolated power of Alexei Ramirez has bounced around like a pinball for the last few seasons, and PECOTA mined beneath the career marks and struck gold. The relative hits on Ramirez’s batting average and OBP are less impressive, if only because his career numbers in those categories are more stable. Ramirez did up his walk rate beyond expectations, improving on the biggest deficiency in his offensive game, though he had showed similar patience back in 2009. PECOTA came very close on this hi-beta player, coming within 4 points of OPS and righteously projecting his 2nd-worst performance of the last four years. However, there is no way to measure the deleterious affect that Ramirez may have had on the approach of his aforementioned double-play partner, if only through association by proximity.