The Matt Lindstrom Conundrum
Posted by Bill Baer on Sunday, December 6, 2009 at 11:50 pm
Jon Heyman, Ken Rosenthal and several others are reporting that the Florida Marlins are looking to trade reliever Matt Lindstrom. The right-hander is due for salary arbitration for the first time in his career. After great performances in 2007-08, he had a letdown of a season last year — when he was initially given the Marlins’ closer role vacated by Kevin Gregg — with an ERA just south of 6 and an average of 4.6 walks per nine innings.
Matt Lindstrom
Lindstrom has two main pitches in his arsenal: a four-seam fastball that averages 96 MPH and an 82 MPH slider. He seems like a natural fit at the back end of any bullpen, but his poor showing in ‘09 should cause hesitation in awarding him high-leverage innings.
In ‘07, Lindstrom averaged 8.3 strikeouts per nine innings and just 2.8 walks per nine innings. The next year, he saw a significant regression in his strikeout rate (6.8 per 9) and an increase in his walk rate (4.1 per 9). Last season, his strikeout rate rebounded a bit (7.4 per 9), but continued to see his walk rate climb (4.6 per 9).
Obviously, the walk rate is concerning, but maybe we can find optimism by looking at his peripherals from last season.
Lindstrom’s BABIP last season sat at .342, which seems high but it was at .335 in ‘07. This seems to be his natural BABIP and should not be cause for concern.
His runners left on base percentage (LOB%) was 61.6% after previously resting at 72.3% and 76.3% the previous two seasons. Aha. Lindstrom was allowing hits at about a 34% clip and averaging about a walk every two innings — a bad combination. The league average LOB% is 72%.
While some of his LOB% woes may be due simply to randomness (or bad luck if you prefer), it’s so far under what we’d expect that there has to be an underlying factor. My theory is that as a result of his walk rate, and coupled with his thin pitch repertoire, he was very transparent on the mound. Thus, hitters were more successful against Lindstrom when there was at least one runner on base as opposed to the bases empty. The statistics bear this out:
- Bases empty: .744 OPS
- Runners on: .873 OPS
- Runners in scoring position: .868 OPS
Pitchers are constantly trying to mix up their pitches so as to throw off hitters (see: Nash equilibrium). Obviously, with only two pitches, it is a difficult endeavor to create new pitch sequences. In ‘07 and ‘08, Lindstrom’s fastball was more than seven runs above average. Rate-wise, they were 0.91 and 1.08 runs above average per 100 fastballs. Last season, the fastball was five runs below average total and 0.80 runs below average per 100 fastballs. His slider, which he used 2.2% more in ‘09 than in ‘08, improved by 1.5 total runs above average, or about 0.9 per 100 of them.
Furthermore, the Marlins had a subpar defense according to Ultimate Zone Rating (UZR) at FanGraphs. Per 150 defensive plays, the Marlins were 3.4 plays below average. They were especially weak at second base, third base, left field, and right field. One of the culprits, Jeremy Hermida, is no longer with the team, and another culprit in Dan Uggla may be traded before the regular season begins. However, the Marlins don’t figure to have any significant improvements in 2010 based on their personnel, and thus we should expect the Marlin defenders to continue to let down their pitching staff.
In his perfect season in 2008, Philadelphia Phillies closer Brad Lidge allowed fly balls to clear the outfield fence at a meager 4% clip. In his disastrous ‘09 season, that percentage jumped to nearly 15%. Similarly, Lindstrom’s percentages hovered around 2-3% in ‘07 and ‘08, and jumped to 9% last year. In more concrete terms, going into ‘09, Lindstrom had allowed three total home runs in 124 and two-thirds career innings. He allowed five in ‘09 in 47 and one-third innings.Like his LOB%, some of it is likely due to randomness, but it’s too significant an increase to give all of the credit to luck.
Hitters caught on to Lindstrom’s lack of command, swinging at fewer than half of his pitches last year. He started off an at-bat with a first-pitch strike only 54% of the time as opposed to 61% the previous two seasons. He put himself at an instant disadvantage.
What could cause his control issues? There aren’t enough available videos on MLB.com to verify this, but something in Lindstrom’s mechanics seems to change with runners on base. I hypothesized above that his pitch selection is transparent, but look also at his walk rates:
- Bases empty: 14.25 PA per BB
- Runners on: 6.6 PA per BB
- Runners in scoring position: 5.5 PA per BB
From what I can tell from the scant Lindstrom-related videos on MLB.com — and I do not get the chance to watch Marlins games when they’re not playing the Phillies — he seems to use a longer delivery (but, being a reliever, not a full wind-up, of course) when the bases are empty.
If any Marlins fans can verify or refute this hypothesis, I’d be very grateful.
All told, we can identify some, or even most, of Lindstrom’s struggles:
- He’s had a below-average defense behind him
- Transparent pitch selection, thus allowing hitters to sit on fastball, which accounts for about 75% of his pitches
- Mechanics with runners on base as opposed to bases empty causes inability to consistently pitch in the strike zone
- Hitters are much more selective at the plate due to his lack of command
Once the struggles and the factors behind them are identified, Lindstrom and whatever team he will be playing for in 2010 can take the appropriate steps necessary to fix them. Lindstrom is certainly not a lost cause. He’s only 30 years old and will be relatively cheap for several years, which makes him a great low-risk, high-reward candidate for the Tampa Bay Rays, Texas Rangers, and the several other teams interested in acquiring his services.
